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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this project is to provide a theological basis for the practice of discipleship in the 
world as a form of aesthetic existence. The study is framed by Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s cryptic 
call for a recovery of Søren Kierkegaard’s notion of aesthetic existence in being Christian, set 
against the backdrop of their mutual concern for the captivity of the church to Christendom. 
In addition to the contribution by Kierkegaard (discipleship as poetic living) and Bonhoeffer 
(Christian living as polyphonous this-worldly celebration of Christological reality), three 
further key intellectuals have been selected, each of whom contributes an important 
dimension to understanding everyday aesthetic existence as discipleship. Drawing from 
contemporary neuropsychological findings, Iain McGilchrist’s research points to the 
fundamental role that aesthetic existence plays in being human and relating to the world. 
Graham Ward’s work builds on this by highlighting that embodied and affective engagement 
with the world both plays a significant role in faith formation and concomitantly frames 
ethical life by conjoining praxis and poiesis through incarnational living. Aesthetics is not to 
be disconnected from action, as Nicholas Wolterstorff elucidates, but is best understood in 
light of social practice, playing a narratival role toward specific teloi, however implicit this 
may be. Ultimately, this study concludes that a liturgical orientation to all of life rightly 
orders the formative power of aesthetic existence in service to the Word and world, thereby 
contributing to discipleship, as opposed to the aestheticized creation and sustenance of 
virtuality.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
EVERYDAY AESTHETIC EXISTENCE AND DISCIPLESHIP 
The aim of this project is to provide a theological basis for the practice of discipleship in light 
of embodied existence in the world. The understanding of both discipleship and the “world” 
that we will be working with will be correlated with Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s articulation, 
particularly in relation to his cryptic remarks on aesthetic existence.1 The primary research 
question driving this project thus asks whether aesthetic existence is fundamental to being 
human, and therefore to being a Christian, bodily engaged in the life of the world? If the 
answer to this question is yes, then two further sub-questions emerge. Firstly, what are the 
implications for the formation of being Christian (discipleship)? Secondly, what are the 
implications for being Christian, embodied in the world? The former question probes 
implications for what is often perceived to be the life of faith, while the latter explores 
implications for that which is typically considered the life of the world, or ethics, even though 
the ultimate aim of this project is to challenge this very dichotomy.  
In order to investigate the role of aesthetic existence in discipleship, five key intellectuals 
have been selected, each of whom adds an important dimension to understanding 
Bonhoeffer’s description of aesthetic existence as discipleship. We begin with Søren 
Kierkegaard, not only because Kierkegaard’s initial framing of the term is pivotal to our 
understanding, but because in many respects, Bonhoeffer’s perspective on discipleship echoes 
Kierkegaard’s in their mutual response to the problem of Christendom. Both challenge the 
church of their day with the question of what it means to be a disciple of Jesus, amidst the 
church’s captivity to Christendom, a challenge that continues to have relevance today. As we 
shall see, there are points of correspondence in Kierkegaard’s own journey from aestheticism, 
through the primacy of ethics, to discipleship, as costly discipleship. Kierkegaard thus 
provides the foundation from which to examine Bonhoeffer’s use of the phrase “aesthetic 
existence,” which comes late in Bonhoeffer’s theological development, but which is rooted in 
his theology from early on. As we turn to Bonhoeffer’s understanding of discipleship, read 
                                                
1 The term “aesthetic existence,” as used in this project, will be initially defined in the 
methodology section and further developed in chapters two and three. At this point however, 
it may be helpful to note that the framing of the phrase is drawn from Bonhoeffer’s reflection 
on Søren Kierkegaard’s stages of human existence. Consequently, aesthetics is considered 
here in the broadest, classical sense of the term, encompassing aesthetic experience as sensory 
immediacy in everyday life, rather than being limited to beauty and the arts.  
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through the lens of his comments on aesthetic existence in his prison letters, we will see that 
aesthetic existence is not only a fitting celebration of Christological this-worldliness, but that 
it plays a formative role in human development and the perception of reality which undergirds 
such formation. 
It is evident that this formative role corresponds to current neuropsychological understandings 
regarding what it means to be human, specifically as elucidated by findings from affective 
neuroscience and brain modality. It therefore becomes important to incorporate these findings 
through the terms we are discussing in relation to aesthetic existence and the current debate 
about being human. Here we draw from the work of Iain McGilchrist, who shows that brain 
lateralisation teaches us a fundamental truth about what it means to be human. The 
predominantly affective and embodied nature of right-hemisphere attention needs to be 
integrated with abstract and detailed left-hemisphere attention to accurately apprehend the 
relational nature of reality.  
In order to integrate McGilchrist’s argument with theology we draw from the work of Graham 
Ward, who engages with McGilchrist and builds on the findings of neuroscience in light of 
contemporary theological reflection. Ward shows aesthetic existence plays a formative role in 
belief formation and the consequent development of faith. His understanding of discipleship, 
as integrated with aesthetic existence, in many ways leads us back to Kierkegaard; 
discipleship is about commitment and lived experience in light of embodied existence in the 
world.  
Finally, to develop this in terms of practical theology today, we need to relate it to the life of 
the church as liturgy, as service of the Word and world. Nicholas Wolterstorff’s rigorous 
analysis helps us to not only understand liturgy as action, but liturgy’s integral relationship to 
all aesthetic engagement, as action. Such an understanding of liturgy integrates discipleship 
and aesthetic existence through engagement with the life of the world.  
1.1 Rationale: The persistence of discipleship as cheap grace 
Kierkegaard’s Christendom model has perennial significance and continues to resonate with 
where Christianity finds itself today. The conflation of Christianity with empire remains 
problematic, as recent political events in the United States have once again highlighted. 
Amidst the aestheticization of everyday life, the concomitant rise of consumerism and the 
political manifestation of these realities and economies of desire in the life of the church, 
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discipleship is all too often void of costly grace. The proposal here is that exploring the 
relationship between aesthetic existence and discipleship opens up perspectives on this 
dynamic that would otherwise not be understood.  
In Kierkegaard’s historical context, Christian discipleship had been sacrificed on the altar of 
comfortable Christendom. For Kierkegaard and for many others, this has always been the 
dangerous tendency for the life of the church. It is this tendency that ultimately led 
Bonhoeffer to write about cheap grace and costly discipleship. However, for Kierkegaard, to 
highlight costly discipleship meant a critical stance against aesthetic existence (not a rejection 
of it), but a movement beyond aesthetic existence. Whereas Bonhoeffer suggests that aesthetic 
existence takes his writings about discipleship in a fresh direction, in which aesthetic 
existence becomes integrated into discipleship rather than being swept aside. The goal of this 
project is to recover Kierkegaard’s critique of cheap discipleship and aestheticism, not by 
rejecting aesthetic existence, but by building upon Bonhoeffer’s attempt to integrate costly 
discipleship and aesthetic existence. The key to the success of such an enterprise is a careful 
understanding of the nature of the aesthetic, particularly in relationship to the rational, and 
their mutual role in the nature of being human and becoming Christian. 
The recent rise in interest of theological aesthetics, as a field of study in its own right, has 
raised important epistemological and anthropological questions. Gesa Elsbeth Thiessen, by 
way of introducing her theological aesthetics reader, points out that it is only in the last three 
decades or so that the field of theological aesthetics has become a major focus in theology.2 
She describes the “aestheticization of everyday life in postmodern society” as playing a 
catalytic role in this interest. From an academic perspective, the postmodern context has 
cultivated a renewed interest in aesthetics by questioning the ratiocentrism that marked 
modernity. Michael Lacewing argues that, “The central claim of ratiocentrism is that the good 
life can be understood in terms of and attained by reason and strength of will.”3 The subject-
oriented paradigm of postmodernity challenges this claim, opening new lines of thought 
around what it means to be human, and consequently, the basis of meaning, belief and 
ultimately, action.  
                                                
2 Gesa Elsbeth Thiessen, Theological Aesthetics: A Reader (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 
1. 
3 Michael Lacewing, ‘What Reason Can’t Do’, in The Moral Life: Essays in Honour of John 
Cottingham, ed. Nafsika Athanassoulis and Samantha Vice (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 140. 
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This postmodern critique of ratiocentrism opens a door for richer epistemological dialogue in 
the area of theological aesthetics. In the field, traditionally, human experience of the 
transcendent nature of beauty and the sublime has been seen to have something to offer the 
quest for knowledge of the divine, of the mysterious Other, and therefore, the life of faith. In 
the latter half of the 20th century, Hans Urs von Balthasar exemplified this through his 
seminal work which sought to ground theology in aesthetics. Along with the other voices of 
the Nouvelle Théologie movement, Balthasar sought a ressourcement, which fuelled his 
Platonic response to the modern understanding of beauty, thus reaffirming, and integrating the 
transcendental ideals of Beauty, Goodness and Truth (in that order). While there is no doubt 
that Balthasar made an extremely valuable contribution to the field, his emphasis on the 
transcendent value of aesthetics became paradigmatic for explorations in theological 
aesthetics.4 The danger of such an approach is that aesthetics becomes again dis-integrated 
from rationality. Here, aesthetic experience is seen primarily as a way of knowing beyond that 
which rationality can access. Whilst this represents a commendable reappropriation of the 
epistemic value of aesthetic experience, it still pits aesthetics against rationality. It also 
positions the primary value of aesthetic experience as oriented toward the transcendent, as 
opposed to a life of faith lived in this world, with the concomitant ethical implications.5 From 
this perspective, aesthetic experience that has epistemic value is limited to explicitly 
transformative, transcendent sensory encounters that shape consciousness. But do everyday 
aesthetic experiences shape our understanding, our beliefs and the way we act in the world? In 
order to explore this question, we need to ask how we come to believe, and subsequently act 
in the first place, from an anthropological point of view. 
The postmodern critique of ratiocentrism is fundamentally an anthropological critique. As 
James Smith points out, the Cartesian perspective of the human person as homo rationale 
seems inadequate, and certainly at odds with a holistic Christian anthropology.6 Smith goes 
on to point out that the Reformed tradition would describe humans as essentially believing 
                                                
4 As Graham Ward notes, “Balthasar’s work breathes in a certain rarefied atmosphere, a post-
resurrection perspective, as if the work was composed on the frosted heights of Thomas 
Mann’s magic mountain.” Graham Ward, Christ and Culture (Malden, MA: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2005), 205. 
5 For a helpful recent exposition from the field of theological aesthetics on the problematic 
nature of the postmodern tendency to disconnect this-wordly, incarnational reality from 
transcendence, see Jeremy Begbie, Redeeming Transcendence in the Arts: Bearing Witness to 
the Triune God (London: SCM Press, 2018). 
6 James K. A. Smith, Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview, and Cultural Formation 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009), 40. 
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beings. Smith rightly questions what this means, offering two critiques. Firstly, does 
understanding humans as fundamentally believing beings not still leave us in the realm of 
homo rationale, preoccupied with propositions and ideas? Consequently and secondly, is the 
brain not still in the vat here, this being a disembodied and individualistic picture of the 
human person? The core question is, how do human beings come to hold particular beliefs? 
Drawing from neuroscience, and an analysis of the distinctive roles of the two hemispheres of 
the brain in particular, Iain McGilchrist argues that belief is first and foremost relational, not 
rational.7 While rationality does indeed have a role to play in belief, belief operates from a 
broader, integrated and embodied orientation toward the world. In this sense, belief (acting 
“as if”) and the imagination (“seeing as”) are not only inextricably connected, but 
fundamental to being human.8  
If this assertion holds true, then it becomes important to consider the way in which the 
imagination is formed, and what role aesthetic experiences play in this formation. For the 
purposes of this research project then, aesthetic experience encompasses far more than 
encounters with the fine arts, or even the broader arts. As the emerging philosophical sub-
discipline of everyday aesthetics illustrates, aesthetic experience is a part of our day-to-day 
lives. Aesthetics is for every person. Further, if aesthetic existence is fundamental to being 
human, then, as Yuriko Saito argues, our aesthetic experiences in everyday life have “moral, 
social, political and environmental” ramifications.9 For the same reasons, there are also 
significant implications for the life of faith, and the embodiment of that faith in the world as 
ethical action. The consequences for understanding the role of aesthetics in personal 
formation are, therefore, significant.   
Thus, the question driving this project is whether aesthetic existence is indeed fundamental to 
being human, and becoming Christian, and if so, in what way? This research will make a 
contribution by taking the approach of engaging theological aesthetics through an existential 
lens, with the concomitant focus on the everyday, for the purpose of shedding further light on 
a theological anthropology, ultimately highlighting the consequences of this for the nature of 
discipleship. This question is important because it has significance for the understanding of 
                                                
7 Iain McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the 
Western World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
8 McGilchrist, 155–56. 
9 Yuriko Saito, Everyday Aesthetics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 2. 
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faith formation, and consequently, for practice within the life of the church as embodied in the 
world.  
1.2 A Key Term: “Aesthetic Existence” 
The key term in the project is “aesthetic existence,” which will be further clarified in chapters 
2 and 3. While originating in the work of Kierkegaard as sensory immediacy, the use of the 
term in this project is further shaped by Bonhoeffer’s taxonomy of the phrase. Bonhoeffer 
locates aesthetic existence in the realm of freedom, unpacking it as art, play, friendship and 
Bildung (formation).10  
As a result, the definition of “aesthetic,” for the purposes of this project, will be a broad one 
that draws from the classical use of the term as “sense perception.” Alexander Gottlieb 
Baumgarten, the founder of aesthetics as a subject of study, initially defined aesthetics as “a 
science of how things are to be known by means of the senses.”11 Mark Johnson, writing on 
the basis of meaning being fundamentally embodied, describes aesthetics simply as “the study 
of how humans make and experience meaning.”12 While these perspectives will form the 
backdrop for the approach to aesthetics taken in this project, the fundamental articulation is 
taken from Frank Burch Brown’s definition, 
Aesthetics should perhaps be nothing less than basic theoretical reflection regarding 
all aesthetic phenomena … The coherence of the field of aesthetics so conceived 
would derive from its central interest in aesthetica … all those things employing a 
medium in such a way that its perceptible form and ‘felt’ qualities become essential to 
what is appreciable and meaningful.13 
1.3 Dialogue as Method 
The project is a philosophical and theological enquiry, anchored in dialogue with a selection 
of seminal texts and framed by the formulated research question. There is no empirical 
component to the project. The method will be to put the research question to five seminal 
thinkers, engaging them on their terms, in order to evaluate what their contribution is to the 
                                                
10 See John de Gruchy’s exploration of Bonhoeffer’s taxonomy in Christianity, Art and 
Transformation: Theological Aesthetics in the Struggle for Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 147–158. 
11 As quoted in Peter Kivy, The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics (Malden, MA: John Wiley & 
Sons, 2009), 15. 
12 Mark Johnson, The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012), 209. 
13 Frank Burch Brown, Religious Aesthetics: A Theological Study of Making and Meaning 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 22. 
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enquiry. As we engage each, their contributions are interpreted and woven together in a 
cohesive argument that responds to the research question.  
Each thinker has been selected due to the unique contribution they bring to the project. There 
is a specific logic to the order in which they will be introduced. We will begin by engaging 
Kierkegaard, and subsequently Bonhoeffer, through the question. They will contribute to 
setting up the question, and thereby frame the project through the lens of human existence, the 
nature of being human and becoming Christian.  
We then proceed to Iain McGilchrist, who engages the question by dealing with the 
relationship between embodiment, affect, imagination and rationality. Here, the question is 
not only the nature of this relationship, but the implications thereof for being human. 
McGilchrist draws from neuropsychology, responding to the question of human existence 
from a physiological point of view. McGilchrist is selected here since his field takes 
embodiment seriously, while he is still working towards a broader, integrated and 
interdisciplinary understanding of aesthetic existence in being human.  
We then turn to the theologian, Graham Ward, with a view to the question of the integration 
of aesthetic existence with ethics and faith. Ward responds to the postmodern context by 
seeking a recovery of the sacramental and analogical nature of Christian life, and thereby 
reframing human meaning. Ward’s engagement with McGilchrist, amidst his work on an 
archaeology and anthropology of belief, allows for an integration of the physiological 
approach to the question within a theological understanding of being. The practical 
implications of this are extrapolated through Ward’s work on integrating the ethical and 
religious. 
The discussion then returns to the question of aesthetic existence and Christian formation 
through the work of Nicholas Wolterstorff on aesthetics and liturgy. Wolterstorff identifies 
aesthetic action as fundamental to being human, while also investigating liturgy as action. His 
work will form the basis for exploring aesthetic existence as a liturgical orientation to all of 
life. 
Finally, the concluding chapter will offer a summation of the argument presented. A critique 
of this method may be the potential for cobbling together disparate and fragmentary elements 
in a haphazard manner. While the challenges of dealing with a diverse range of sources are 
acknowledged, at the forefront of the study is not a selection of thinkers, but a particular 
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problem. It is the problem that unifies the project in that all of these thinkers share an 
integrated understanding of human existence. These thinkers are not the subjects of the study 
themselves; they are the resources that will be used to engage the problem.  
1.4 Locating the Thesis in Contemporary Debate 
The starting point for the project is Kierkegaard’s work on human existence, and in particular, 
the relationship of aesthetic to ethical and religious existence. A superficial reading of 
Kierkegaard seems to suggest that he proposed his three spheres of life as distinct stages, one 
replacing the other, as a person progresses in their existential journey. The very title of 
Either/Or appears to reflect a dualistic understanding of the aesthetic as opposed to the 
ethical.14 Not only does Kierkegaard seem to claim the mutually exclusive nature of the 
aesthetic, as opposed to the ethical stage, he apparently ascribes value to the ethical over the 
aesthetic. It is hardly surprising then, that Kierkegaard is often seen to have very little regard 
for the aesthetic. Hans Urs von Balthasar, for example, laments Kierkegaard’s “tearing apart 
of the aesthetic and ethical-religious dimensions,”15 describing this as “banishment of the 
aesthetic from the realm of theology,” a natural consequence of separating logic and ethics 
from aesthetics.16  
However, such narrow readings of Kierkegaard fail to take the complexity of his engagement 
with the aesthetic into account. As with all of the subject matter Kierkegaard engages, his 
treatment of aesthetics is not systematic. He engages the subject through various pseudonyms, 
contributing to the complexity of his stance. While some see Kierkegaard stressing the 
negative implications of the aesthetic,17 others read him as an aesthetic ironist.18 What does 
not seem to be fully appreciated by all, are the various iterations of the aesthetic with which 
Kierkegaard deals. There is no doubt that he has a negative attitude toward aestheticism, 
defined by John de Gruchy as making “aesthetic value an absolute.”19 But while he rejects 
                                                
14 Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or Part I, ed. Howard Hong and Edna Hong, vol. 3, 
Kierkegaard’s Writings (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
15 Hans Urs von Balthasar, My Work: In Retrospect (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 38. 
16 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: Seeing the Form, The Glory of the Lord: A 
Theological Aesthetics, 1 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982), 50. 
17 George Pattison, Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious (London: SCM, 1999). 
18 Joakim Garff, ‘The Eyes of Argus: The Point of View and Points of View with Respect to 
Kierkegaard’s “Activity as an Author”’, Kierkegaardiana 15 (1991): 29–54; Sylviane 
Agacinski, Aparte: Conceptions and Deaths of Søren Kierkegaard, trans. Kevin Newmark 
(Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1988). 
19 De Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation, 83. 
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aestheticism, as Sylvia Walsh convincingly argues, “living poetically” is at the core of 
Christian existence for Kierkegaard.20 Walsh points out that he is reacting against the 
aestheticism of the German Romantics, and that the nature of the poetic he embraces is the 
aesthetic grounded in the ethical and religious. Thus, as Wessel Stoker suggests, it is probably 
more accurate to distinguish Kierkegaard’s critique of Romantic aesthetics, from his “ethical 
aesthetics” and “theological aesthetics.”21 Stoker further shows, in agreement with David 
Gouwens and Jamie Ferreira, that imagination, as a faculty of the aesthetic life, is a core 
concept for all of Kierkegaard’s spheres of existence.22 Recently, Peder Jothen has gone as far 
as to argue that Kiekegaard’s notions of selfhood are inextricably connected to the aesthetic,23 
in resonance with the statement from one of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, Johannes Climacus, 
“To exist is an art.”24 
At the very least then, according to Kierkegaard, some form of aesthetic existence appears to 
remain integral to the ethical and religious life. The question that follows is regarding the 
nature of it. In a letter from prison, Dietrich Bonhoeffer reflected on this question, in the 
context of Nazi Germany, suggesting a recovery of aesthetic existence in the life of the 
church.25 As John de Gruchy shows, Bonhoeffer’s reflection on, or perhaps even 
reappropriation of, Kierkegaard’s aesthetic existence highlights an interesting correlation 
between Kierkegaard’s “stages” of life and Bonhoeffer’s life and work.26 While it is too 
simplistic to say that Bonhoeffer inverts the stages (beginning with the religious, moving to 
the ethical, and finally the aesthetic), Bonhoeffer does appear to reflect more deeply on the 
aesthetic towards the end of his life journey. Bonhoeffer shares Kierkegaard’s rejection of 
aestheticism, his understanding of costly discipleship and rejection of “cheap grace,” 
                                                
20 Sylvia Walsh, Living Poetically: Kierkegaard’s Existential Aesthetics (University Park, 
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994). 
21 Wessel Stoker, ‘The Place of Art in Kierkegaard’s Existential Aesthetics’, Bijdragen, 
International Journal in Philosophy and Theology 71, no. 2 (2010): 181. 
22 Stoker, 181; M. Jamie Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in 
Kierkegaardian Faith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); David Gouwens, Kierkegaard’s 
Dialectic of the Imagination (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1989). 
23 Peder Jothen, Kierkegaard, Aesthetics, and Selfhood : The Art of Subjectivity (Burlington: 
Ashgate, 2014), 3. 
24 Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, ed. 
Howard Hong and Edna Hong, vol. 12, Kierkegaard’s Writings (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1992), 351. 
25 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. John de Gruchy, vol. 8, Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer Works English (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2010), 268. 
26 De Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation, 147–68. 
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reflecting Kierkegaard’s own stance on discipleship. But for Bonhoeffer, this marks the 
beginning, not the final stage of life. This religious commitment then, demands ethical action, 
which Bonhoeffer not only reflected upon extensively, but also practiced himself. Thus for 
Bonhoeffer, as de Gruchy points out, while “this-worldliness” remained an important value, it 
was a “this-worldliness” marked by discipline and sacrifice rather than self-seeking comfort 
and pleasure.27 For Bonhoeffer, it is not a disinterested, contemplative aesthetic, but a fully 
integrated “polyphony of life,” incorporating the religious, ethical and the aesthetic, thereby 
expressing the totality of being Christian, anchored in the cantus firmus of Christ.28 Larry 
Rasmussen observes that, “Together with the cantus firmus of the love of God, passion for 
earthly existence is the rhythm of the Christian life itself … For Bonhoeffer a Christian 
aesthetic is profoundly earthy and the Christian life utterly worldly.”29 Thus, as de Gruchy 
shows, there is an inherent connection between Bonhoeffer’s “aesthetic existence” and 
“mature worldliness.” His portrait of being “fully human,” encompasses not only the 
aesthetic, but also being “truly of the earth.”30 
While the richness of the interaction between Bonhoeffer and Kierkegaard’s thought offers a 
helpful framing of the enquiry, as noted earlier, the question of the role of aesthetic existence 
in being human and becoming Christian has come to the fore afresh in the postmodern 
context. The rise not only of the existential paradigm, but also a phenomenological approach 
to anthropology, has enriched the field of aesthetics. James K. A. Smith illustrates that the 
work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty has significant implications for understanding the aesthetic 
dimension of being an embodied human. In particular Smith points to Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception to remind us of the basic truth that perception occurs through 
existing as a body in the world. Further, that bodily perception does not simply provide the 
raw data, which is then intellectually engaged as a distinct disembodied process; rather, 
perception is a “way of intending the world, of meaning the world with the body.”31 There is 
distinct resonance here with the burgeoning field of embodied cognition. Shaun Gallagher, 
drawing from a wide variety of interdisciplinary research, argues that it is clear that 
                                                
27 De Gruchy, 150. 
28 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 8:393–94. 
29 Larry Rasmussen, ‘The Whole of Earthly Life’, in Theology in Dialogue: The Impact of the 
Arts, Humanities, and Science on Contemporary Religious Thought, ed. Lyn Holness and Ralf 
K. Wüstenberg (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 69. 
30 De Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation, 167. 
31 James K. A. Smith, Imagining the Kingdom: How Worship Works (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2013), 72. 
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embodiment not only shapes the way we think, but shapes the mind itself. “It may even be 
possible to say that bodily movement, transformed into the level of action, is the very thing 
that constitutes the self.”32 While naturally, an emerging field such as this is marked by lack 
of definition, and some of the claims remain contentious, there is no doubt sufficient evidence 
to justify the claim that embodiment profoundly shapes consciousness.33 Further, there are 
arguments which suggest that the aesthetic nature of experience, in particular, shapes 
meaning. Mark Johnson and George Lackoff produced the classic work, Metaphors We Live 
By, which speaks to the formative nature of aesthetic existence, Johnson building on this with 
an aesthetic approach to embodied cognition.34 Johnson argues that “image schemata” (which 
we will later consider as the paradigmatic production of the imagination) are shaped through 
bodily experience, and that consequently, “human rationality is imaginative through and 
through, insofar as it involves image-schematic structures that can be metaphorically 
projected from concrete to more abstract domains of understanding.”35 Embodied cognition 
thus has obvious implications for the life of faith, underscoring the need to further explore 
how environmental experience shapes belief, through the formation of paradigmatic religious 
frameworks.36  
In chapter four, we will therefore engage this physiological understanding of the integration 
between aesthetic, ethical and religious existence in being human. Neuroscience points 
toward a holistic understanding of human faculties. Sense and sensibility, imagination and 
reason are not poles of opposites as they are often portrayed.37 Drawing from the evidence of 
neuroscience, particularly research into the lateralisation of brain function, Iain McGilchrist, 
in his groundbreaking work, The Master and His Emissary, provides an argument for the 
fundamental integration of embodiment, imagination and rationality in a holistic 
                                                
32 Shaun Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 9. 
33 Lawrence Shapiro, Embodied Cognition (New York: Routledge, 2011). 
34 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2003). Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, 
Imagination, and Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
35 Johnson, The Body in the Mind, 194. 
36 Lawrence W. Barsalou et al., ‘Embodiment in Religious Knowledge’, Journal of Cognition 
and Culture 5, no. 1 (2005): 14–57. 
37 On their integration, see in particular the work of eminent neuroscientists Jaak Panksepp 
and Antonio Damasio. For example, Jaak Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations 
of Human and Animal Emotions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Antonio Damasio, 
The Feeling Of What Happens: Body, Emotion and the Making of Consciousness (London: 
Vintage Books, 2000); Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the 
Human Brain (London: Vintage Books, 2006). 
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understanding of the human person.38 In resonance with Damasio and Panksepp, McGilchrist 
shows that aesthetic existence is not only an expression of being human, but more 
significantly, aesthetic existence plays a key role in the making of meaning, with 
consequences for ethical and religious life. 
The fifth chapter will explore the integrative work of the theologian Graham Ward, who 
responds to McGilchrist and provides interdisciplinary evidence to argue for the link between 
aesthetic existence, meaning, belief and ethics. He identifies the imagination as critical in this 
relational dynamic, as have many others.39 Ward sees the imagination lying somewhere 
between primitive awareness and cognition, “often functioning sub-consciously and 
instinctively,” and yet also clearly a function of the mind, and itself a form of consciousness.40 
Ward shows that reading, for example, is not a mode of perception, but a form of seeing, 
hearing, touching, smelling and feeling that takes place through the work of the imagination, 
thereby creating a sense of belief in a narrative, a process reflecting the workings of 
imagination in the narratives of daily life.41 He reminds us that this is what 
“phenomenologists from Edmund Husserl onwards have recognised, human beings perceive 
intentionally. They see meaning.”42 Ward points out that the imagination, which undergirds 
cognitive thought, is shaped and framed by embodied experience in the world. But it goes 
further than this, since modern neuroscience has illustrated that the imagination has the power 
to activate mirror neurones which “create simulation in the brain’s body maps, of a body state 
that is not actually taking place… belief is not only embodied but inseparable from the 
capacity to imagine.”43  
                                                
38 McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary. 
39 See, for example, Paul Avis, God and the Creative Imagination: Metaphor, Symbol, and 
Myth in Religion and Theology (London: Routledge, 1999); David J. Bryant, Faith and the 
Play of Imagination: On the Role of Imagination in Religion (Macon, GA: Mercer University 
Press, 1989); Garrett Green, Imagining God: Theology and the Religious Imagination (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998). 
40 Graham Ward, ‘Theology as Literature and Ideology’ (28 September 2015); Graham Ward, 
‘Metaphor in Bone’, Modern Theology 31, no. 4 (October 2015): 618–24. 
41 Graham Ward, ‘Narrative and Ethics: The Structures of Believing and the Practices of 
Hope’, Literature and Theology 20, no. 4 (1 December 2006): 438–61; Graham Ward, ‘Why 
Literature Can Never Be Entirely Secular’, Religion & Literature 41, no. 2 (1 July 2009): 21–
27; Graham Ward, ‘How Literature Resists Secularity’, Literature & Theology 24, no. 1 
(March 2010): 73–88. 
42 Graham Ward, Unbelievable: Why We Believe and Why We Don’t (London: IB Tauris, 
2014), 51. 
43 Ward, 96. 
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If the aesthetic dimension of human existence plays a pivotal role in consciousness, then the 
emerging field of everyday aesthetics, marked by a phenomenological approach to aesthetics, 
provides fruitful lines of thought for exploring this dimension of being human.44 Again, as an 
emerging and dynamic field, it faces lack of clear definition and focus,45 but as Christian 
Hainic remarks, “The mere aesthetic experience of understanding one’s being-in-the-world as 
made up by everyday phenomena is in itself overwhelmingly sufficient to constitute a 
foundation for an aesthetics of everyday life.”46 John Dewey’s Art as Experience has had a 
strong influence on the movement.47 As Kalle Puolakka shows, Dewey’s approach has its 
flaws as a systematic foundation, but it remains helpful in that it locates aesthetic experience 
as a fluid imaginative existence within a continuum of time, rather than disconnected aesthetic 
moments strung across memory.48 Everyday aesthetics, since it is not located in the realm of 
disinterested contemplation, has a natural ethical application, the imagination “a central focus 
in ethical theorizing.”49 
Locating aesthetics in the everyday foregrounds its relationship to both the imagination and 
daily practices. As Charles Taylor and others have shown by conceptualising a social 
imaginary, the imagination not only has an impact on personal formation, but on the corporate 
formation of communities and cultures.50 Further, social practices embed these imaginaries in 
everyday life as normative, as has been argued by Alasdair MacIntyre.51 In chapter six, 
Nicholas Wolterstorff helps us, firstly, to understand aesthetic engagement not primarily 
                                                
44 Saito, Everyday Aesthetics; Thomas Leddy, The Extraordinary in the Ordinary: The 
Aesthetics of Everyday Life (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2012). 
45 Kevin Melchionne, ‘The Definition of Everyday Aesthetics’, Contemporary Aesthetics 11 
(2013), http://www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=663; 
Kevin Melchionne, ‘The Point of Everyday Aesthetics’, Contemporary Aesthetics 12 (2014), 
http://www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=700; Ossi 
Naukkarinen, ‘What Is “Everyday” in Everyday Aesthetics?’, Contemporary Aesthetics 11 
(2013), http://www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=675; 
Thomas Leddy, ‘Defending Everyday Aesthetics and the Concept of “Pretty”’, Contemporary 
Aesthetics 10 (2012), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.7523862.0010.008. 
46 Cristian Hainic, ‘The Heideggerian Roots of Everyday Aesthetics: A Hermeneutical 
Approach to Art’, Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics 4 (2012): 247. 
47 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Perigee Books, 2005). 
48 Kalle Puolakka, ‘Dewey and Everyday Aesthetics - A New Look’ 14 (2014), 
http://www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=699. 
49 Steven Fesmire, John Dewey and Moral Imagination: Pragmatism in Ethics (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2005), 60. 
50 Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (London: Duke University Press, 2004). 
51 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2007), 187ff. 
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through the traditional lens of disinterested contemplation, but as social practice; and 
secondly, to consider the ways in which such social practices inform or “script” liturgy.52 
Notwithstanding the work of Wolterstorff, the field of theological aesthetics has not yet 
grappled in much detail with an existential approach to aesthetic experience in everyday life. 
On the surface it may seem that significant work has been done in locating the nature of 
human being within the aesthetic realm. Daniël Louw, for example, founds his ethic, and 
basis for human dignity in his notion of homo aestheticus, the application of imago Dei to the 
aesthetic, rather than the ethical nature of humankind.53 But as helpful as it is to anchor 
theological aesthetics in the imago Dei,54 the application of this for an exploration of aesthetic 
existence is only as rich as the resultant theological anthropology is embodied. While William 
Dyrness, along with Calvin Seerveld, have concerns about locating aesthetic existence in the 
imago Dei,55 both Dyrness and Seerveld have made contributions to the notion of aesthetic 
obedience in the everyday.56 Nevertheless, for the most part, the field of theological aesthetics 
has not taken an existential approach to theological anthropology. Although there have been 
brief and peripheral forays into the question, much remains to be explored.57 This is 
particularly the case at present, considering the wealth of interdisciplinary resources from 
which to draw, particularly recent research in neuroscience, embodied cognition and everyday 
                                                
52 As Smith has argued, such “liturgies” are not confined to ecclesial settings. Human beings, 
as desiring beings, will worship, the question is merely how and where such ecclesial or 
“cultural liturgies” are formed. Smith, Desiring the Kingdom; Smith, Imagining the Kingdom. 
53 Daniël Louw, ‘Identity and Dignity within the Human Rights Discourse: An 
Anthropological and Praxis Approach’, Verbum et Ecclesia 35, no. 2 (2014). See also Daniël 
Louw, ‘“Spiritual Humanism” Within the Realm of Christian Aesthetics: Toward the 
Meaning and Value of Our Being Human within the Theological Framework of an Aesthetics 
of Compassion’, Dutch Reformed Theological Journal 53, Supplement 3 (2012); Daniël 
Louw, ‘Theopoiesis and the Aesthetics of Human Dignity: Towards a Pneumatological 
Approach’, Dutch Reformed Theological Journal 54, no. 3–4 (2013); Daniël Louw, ‘Creative 
Hope and Imagination in a Practical Theology of Aesthetic (Artistic) Reason’, Religion and 
Theology 8, no. 3 (2001): 327–44. 
54 An approach adopted by Dorothy Sayers as well. See Dorothy Sayers, The Mind of the 
Maker (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1970). 
55 William A. Dyrness, ‘The Imago Dei and Christian Aesthetics’, Journal of the Evangelical 
Theological Society 15, no. 3 (Summer 1972): 161–72. 
56 William A. Dyrness, Poetic Theology: God and the Poetics of Everyday Life (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010); Calvin Seerveld, Rainbows for the Fallen World: Aesthetic Life 
and Artistic Task (Toronto: Tuppence Press, 1980). 
57 As an example of a peripheral, but relevant contribution to the question, see Birgit Meyer, 
‘Aesthetics of Persuasion: Global Christianity and Pentecostalism’s Sensational Forms’, 
South Atlantic Quarterly 109, no. 4 (2010): 741–63. 
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aesthetics. The implications for the life of the church are significant. Recently, Gordon 
Mikoski posed the challenge,  
To consider practical theology in terms of category like beauty, the sublime, and the 
underlying aesthetic character of all cognitive and social awareness might open up fresh 
lines of thought. Of course, we probably wouldn’t want to end with Kant even if we might 
begin with him on this matter. We might want to push forward from Kant into Dewey’s 
Art as Experience and Bourdieu’s Distinction. My larger question remains: what would be 
possible for the field of practical theology if it were framed and practiced in the mode of 
aesthetics?58 
This research project aims to provide a theological prolegomenon for such an exploration. 
1.5 Synopsis 
Following this introductory chapter, in chapter two we begin by delineating Kierkegaard’s 
limited and qualified endorsement of aesthetic existence as poetic living. Kierkegaard rejects 
the aestheticized Romantic notion of poetic living as self-creation, located in sensory 
immediacy amidst the play of unending freedom. In particular, he attacks the potent 
combination of aestheticism and comfortable Christendom. However, he embraces the 
formative role of the imagination and the concept of a second immediacy, or an “immediacy 
after reflection” in the Christian life, pointing toward the co-poeticising role that one plays, in 
relationship with Christ, as one becomes Christian. Right at the outset of the project, 
therefore, we are confronted by a theme that we will follow throughout: not all modes of 
aesthetic existence are equal in relation to discipleship. While the aestheticized self-creation 
of Romantic aesthetic existence creates a fantastical and illusory sense of reality, there does 
appear to be a formational role for mature aesthetic existence in discipleship, in coming to 
apprehend Christological reality.  
Bonhoeffer helps us to further discover this role in chapter three by locating aesthetic 
existence firmly within the Christian life, even amidst the self-same challenge Kierkegaard 
faced of Christendom and the consequent call for costly discipleship. His basis for doing so is 
his embrace of this-worldly existence as an incarnational response to imitating Christ. As 
already alluded to by Kierkegaard, it is important to distinguish between, on the one hand, 
mature aesthetic existence, which is a polyphonous celebration of Christological reality in the 
penultimate, and on the other, an aesthetic existence as ultimate, which is simply aestheticism. 
                                                
58 Gordon Mikoski, ‘Practical Theology and Aesthetics’, The Association of Practial 
Theology (blog), 5 March 2011, http://practicaltheology.org/2011/03/practical-theology-
aesthetics/. 
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Further, even though Bonhoeffer does not offer a systematic treatment, his personal embrace 
of aesthetic existence in his own life, particularly in the form of his engagement with music 
from a young age, offers a significant pointer to its formational significance, as seen through 
the impact of musical metaphors on his theology. 
In chapter four, drawing on Iain McGilchrist and his neuropsychological research, we explore 
this formational significance of aesthetic existence as a fundamental aspect of being human. 
McGilchrist argues that the lateralisation of brain function indicates that there are two primary 
ways of attending to the world: abstract, detailed left-hemisphere attention and relational, 
contextual right-hemisphere attention. While both are vital to healthy apprehension of reality, 
the modern world prioritises the former, thereby neglecting the latter. Aesthetic existence 
plays a significant, partially preconscious role in the formation of contextual paradigms, or 
“metaphors we live by,” through embodied and affective interaction with the world, grounded 
in right-hemisphere attention.59 Significantly, however, sensory engagement with the world 
dominated by left-hemisphere attention simply creates self-contained virtualities, the 
“formation” of simulacra.  
We then turn to Graham Ward in chapter five to elucidate the implications of McGilchrist’s 
findings for a life of faith. Ward affirms McGilchrist’s argument that belief is not a weak 
form of knowledge, but a relational disposition, informed, partially on a preconscious level, 
by aesthetic existence. Belief, therefore, is fundamentally connected to embodied action in the 
world, challenging the boundaries between aesthetics, ethics and faith. Making sense, as a 
function of embodied action in relationship to the imagination, brings together both poiesis 
and praxis, aesthetics and ethics. Such formation, or making of belief is universal, not limited 
to religious belief, but again, it can serve either faith-formation or virtualisation. Here we note 
that the vital connection between embodied aesthetic existence and divine reality is 
analogical, discipleship thus demanding a liturgical orientation to all of life, including 
everyday aesthetic experience. 
Using Nicholas Wolterstorff’s analysis of liturgy and art, in chapter six we then consider 
mature aesthetic existence as everyday liturgy. Wolterstorff shows that aesthetic engagement 
does not predominantly belong to the domain of disinterested contemplation, as the modern 
narrative suggests, but that it is essentially action, and is best understood as social practice. By 
integrating this analysis with his exposition of liturgy as informed by social practice, it 
                                                
59 Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By. 
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becomes clear that aesthetic existence has both an expressive and formative role to play in a 
liturgical orientation to all of life. That it is expressive was pre-empted by Bonhoeffer’s 
suggestion that mature aesthetic existence is an incarnational celebration of this-worldliness, 
rightly oriented to God. Wolterstorff adds that such celebration is not merely ornamental, but 
enhances the ordinary as action in the world, thereby furthering shalom. But as with all 
liturgy, there is a circularity that should be noted here. Such expression functions as a 
practice, which is in turn formative, operating as a partially preconscious “script” for the 
liturgy of the everyday. To repeat the theme once more, such “scripting” does not 
automatically play a positive role in faith formation. Aesthetic existence is both an expression 
of worship, and formative for worship, but the object, or orientation of worship is dependant 
upon the mode of aesthetic existence.
 18 
CHAPTER 2: KIERKEGAARD & THE NATURE OF 
AESTHETIC EXISTENCE 
Introduction 
The research question that drives this project asks whether aesthetic existence is fundamental 
to being human, and becoming Christian, bodily engaged in the life of the world. It is a 
question with implications both for the nature of discipleship and consequently also ethics. 
The question is framed by Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s interaction with the work of Søren 
Kierkegaard, specifically Bonhoeffer’s call for a recovery of Kierkegaard’s “aesthetic 
existence” within the life of the church. At first glance, this appears to be a fundamentally 
contradictory notion, for is it not precisely aesthetic existence which Kierkegaard is 
suggesting needs to be rejected in order to embrace religious existence? In the next chapter, 
we will look more closely at Bonhoeffer’s perspective, which emanates from his affirmation 
of this-worldliness, as a penultimate expression of Christological reality. But before we can 
do so, in this chapter we need to clarify Kierkegaard’s perspective on aesthetic existence. As 
noted in the introductory chapter, neither Kierkegaard nor Bonhoeffer (or their interaction for 
that matter) are the focus of this research project. But Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer together 
frame the question that we are working with. In other words, while it is Bonhoeffer’s 
engagement with Kierkegaard’s aesthetic existence that poses, and offers boundaries around 
the question, we will need to move beyond both Bonhoeffer and Kierkegaard to provide a 
robust response.    
This chapter then has two objectives: Firstly, to clarify the research question through 
exploring Kierkegaard’s notion of aesthetic existence. In order to do so, we will need to 
contextualise the concept within Kierkegaard’s reaction to both Romanticism and Danish 
Lutheran Christendom. Kierkegaard’s concern was not constructing a systematic theory of 
aesthetics, but the question of what it meant to become Christian within his cultural context 
(which continues to have relevance to our own cultural context). In other words, to offer an 
accurate understanding of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic existence requires understanding it within 
his larger exploration of genuine Christian formation and living. This therefore offers a 
foundation for the fundamental task of this project as a whole: understanding the role of 
aesthetic existence in discipleship.  
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The second objective of this chapter is to articulate Kierkegaard’s perspective, as a 
preliminary response to the question of the relation between aesthetic existence and 
discipleship. Kierkegaard’s view is complex and defies reductionist readings, which either 
point exclusively to his vilification of the aesthetic on the one hand, or lean towards the 
temptation to massage his embrace of “poetic living” into an unreserved endorsement of the 
aesthetic. However, on close examination it is clear that there is not only an “either/or” but 
also a both/and in his approach to aesthetics.1 While offering a scathing rejection of the 
Romantic notion of self-creation, as a process defined by aestheticism (the either/or), he also 
embraces (his own qualified view of) existence as art, living poetically, and consequently the 
significant role the imagination plays in formation, even religious formation (the both/and). 
Again, his response to the faculty of imagination is complex. While he rejects the Romantic, 
imaginative creation of the ideal (which is disconnected from actuality), he acknowledges the 
role of the imagination in generating possibility for self-development. This healthy use of the 
imagination is anchored in the reality of Christ and his promeity.2 Even if Kierkegaard does 
not explicitly take us that far, arguably, the implication that this raises is that everyday 
aesthetic existence is inherently connected, through our very bodies, to incarnational living as 
imitation of Christ. While we will need to go beyond Kierkegaard to explore this more 
deeply, he offers an important entryway into our exploration of aesthetic existence and 
discipleship. 
2.1  Kierkegaard’s Context: Calling for true discipleship amidst aestheticism 
In order to understand Kierkegaard’s perspective on aesthetic existence we need to briefly 
situate his work within the context to which he was responding. In particular, for our 
purposes, it is his reaction to Romanticism and Danish Christendom (and their interaction) 
that informs his polemic on genuine Christian living. 
                                                
1 Despite this, as we shall see, the perception persists that Kierkegaard drove a wedge 
between aesthetics on the one hand, and the ethico-religious on the other. Hans Urs von 
Balthasar recounts the story of Kierkegaard appearing before the queen for commendation, 
the queen misnaming his work Either/Or as “Either and Or,” a title which Balthasar suggests 
ironically highlights the problematic disjunction in Kierkegaard’s work. See Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, ‘Revelation and the Beautiful’, in Explorations in Theology, Vol. 1: The Word 
Made Flesh (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 95–96. 
2 A point which is further developed by Bonhoeffer, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
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2.1.1 A Reaction to Romantic Self-creation  
At the heart of Kierkegaard’s critique of Romanticism is the inability of the Romantic ideal to 
be integrated with reality.3 While there is ample evidence of his engagement with 
Romanticism in his early papers and journal entries, it is in his academic dissertation, The 
Concept of Irony, where he deals extensively with the Romantic ideal of living poetically.4 
The fragmentary and varied nature of his early papers and journals has led to a diversity of 
interpretations as to Kierkegaard’s initial stance toward Romanticism. While some (Nelly 
Viallaneix and Søren Holm, for instance) see this early work as a manifestation of Romantic 
youth in Kierkegaard, others (David Gouwens and George Pattison, for example) argue that it 
represents reflections on Romanticism rather than an embrace of it.5 Regardless, for our 
purposes the relevant point is that Romanticism, with its conception of the aesthetic self, was 
at the forefront of Kierkegaard’s thinking and writing from early on. Romantics with which 
Kierkegaard engaged, Friedrich Schlegel and Friedrich Schiller for instance, espoused the 
emergence of selfhood through freedom in an “aesthetic state,” while Danish Romantic poets, 
such as Adam Oehlenschläger and Henrik Steffens, “used poetic means to master the 
expression of human truth and freedom … [claiming] it is poetic expression that best reveals 
human freedom as the ideal to which humans should aim.”6 This is the essential demand that 
Kierkegaard understood Romanticism to be making – that one should “live poetically” – and 
which consequently became the principle point of his critique.7  
While there are aspects to the notion of living poetically that Kierkegaard wishes to recover 
(which we will later explore), he rejects aestheticism, as the absolutisation of the aesthetic and 
consequent disconnect from actuality, which lies at the heart of the Romantic version of living 
poetically. As Walsh notes, Kierkegaard’s claim is that the Romantics 
attempt to create themselves by imaginatively playing or experimenting with various 
poetic possibilities in life … But because the romantic ironists flit from possibility to 
possibility, living, in his opinion, in a “totally hypothetical and subjunctive way,” their 
lives lose continuity and lapse under the sway of moods and feelings that are 
themselves subject to sudden and drastic change (Concept of Irony, 284).8 
                                                
3 Walsh, Living Poetically, 49. 
4 Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, ed. Howard Hong and Edna Hong, vol. 2, 
Kierkegaard’s Writings (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 
5 Pattison, Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious, 44. 
6 Jothen, Kierkegaard, Aesthetics, and Selfhood, 15. 
7 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 2:295–99; cf. Walsh, Living Poetically, 43. 
8 Walsh, Living Poetically, 51. 
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The pursuit of “endless possibility” leads to immersion in the fantastical imagination, severed 
from finitude and actuality.9 While it claims pursuit of the ideal, “every ideal is instantly 
nothing but an allegory hiding a higher ideal within itself, and so on into infinity.”10 It is 
precisely because of this that Kierkegaard “concludes that the romantic cannot be ‘captured in 
a definition’… that ‘the romantic lies essentially in flowing over all boundaries’ (Journals 
and Papers, 3:3796).”11 Behind the illusion of the ideal, Kierkegaard alludes to the ultimate 
bankruptcy of Romanticism by describing it as 
restless (JP, 3806),12 lacking integration (JP, 16), incapable of being given a 
permanent stable form (JP, 3815) … a constantly self-surpassing striving (JP, 5131), 
“a continual grasping after something which eludes one.” (JP, 3816) No single image 
or expression can satisfy the Romantic consciousness for the “whole idea cannot rest 
and be contained in the actual expression,” (JP, 3807) since the expression gives only 
“the image of the shadow.” (JP, 3816)13 
For Kierkegaard, there is no substance, “consistent principle of form” or “lifeview” that 
ultimately holds together the Romantic ideal in a sense of wholeness.14 It is, therefore, the 
vacuity of this illusory self-creation that Kierkegaard wishes to confront. But herein lies the 
complexity of Kierkegaard’s aesthetics: on the one hand he wishes to reject Romantic 
aestheticism, while on the other, to show that imaginative possibility and actuality can, and 
should, cohere in development of the self. He wants to affirm “a sense of our historical 
situatedness and finite limitations as well as freedom, and the construction of human 
personality through a process of self-development, rather than self-creation, in relation to the 
infinite or divine.”15 In other words, as Peder Jothen puts it, “his aesthetics is always 
intertwined with becoming a Christian.”16 Or, to put it in the terms of this project, to rightly 
understand his construal of “aesthetic existence” we need to consider it in light of his 
perspective on discipleship.  
                                                
9 Gouwens, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Imagination, 54. 
10 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, 2:306. 
11 Walsh, Living Poetically, 46. 
12 Pattison is referencing Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, ed. Edna Hong and 
Howard Hong, 6 vols. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967-78). Unless otherwise 
indicated, all in-text references to Kierkegaard’s work are to the Hong’s translations. 
13 Pattison, Kierkegaard: The Aesthetic and the Religious, 49. 
14 Gouwens, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of the Imagination, 70–71. 
15 Walsh, Living Poetically, 2. 
16 Jothen, Kierkegaard, Aesthetics, and Selfhood, 8. 
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2.1.2 A Reaction to Danish Christendom and “Cheap Grace” 
Kierkegaard’s aesthetic critique was not merely directed at Romantic philosophers, his 
concern was with existence, lived reality, and the flourishing of aestheticism in the everyday. 
It is the manner in which these ideas affected Danish culture and the church, mutually 
coalescing in Christendom, which particularly provoked his ire. If, on the one hand, 
Kierkegaard is offering a critique of everyday bourgeois Danish aestheticism as expressed on 
the buzzing streets like Østergade,17 the spectacle of the Theatre Royal and ultimately the 
amusement park, Tivoli Gardens.18 On the other, he is deeply troubled by the everyday apathy 
of the Danish church. In his estimation, these two existential realities overlap in the “haute 
bourgeois aestheticism” of leading clerical figures such as Bishop Jacob Peter Mynster, who 
bore the brunt of his “attack on Christendom.”19 In fact, Kierkegaard goes as far as equating 
Danish church leaders with the entertainers of Tivoli, their empty baptisms and confirmations 
being compared to “picnics” and “family delights.”20  
This is the highly respected activity of the pastor, a livelihood that prevents people 
from entering into God’s kingdom. In return, “the pastor” does his best by way of 
performances (for which producer Carstensen [the founder of Tivoli] has a decided 
talent in grand style), beautiful, glorious festivities with – just as a little wine tastes 
                                                
17 The streets of Copenhagen are prominent in “The Seducer’s Diary,” particularly symbolic 
is Østergade (East Street). See George Pattison, ‘Poor Paris!’: Kierkegaard’s Critique of the 
Spectacular City (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 65. 
Østergade was described in 1852 by a British visitor as “the street where everyone walks one 
time of the day or other, where all the ‘shopping’ is done, for it contains the best shops in 
town, where youths go to saunter and smoke, ladies to gossip …” From Andrew Hamilton, 
Sixteen Months in the Danish Isles (London: Richard Bentley, 1852), p. 183, as quoted in 
George Pattison, Kierkegaard and the Quest for Unambiguous Life: Between Romanticism 
and Modernism: Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 13. 
18 Tivoli Gardens, an amusement park, “opened, with nice irony, in the year that saw the 
publication of Either/Or (1843). Tivoli was not simply an empirical fact: it was a cultural 
product, imbued with the means given to it by its founder, George Carstensen… its 
architect… collaborators and by its devotees and critics.” Both the name and concept of 
Tivoli was taken by Carstensen “from pleasure gardens of the same name in Paris, ‘Tivolis’.” 
In its first year, “it attracted 372,237 visitors – over three times the population of Copenhagen 
itself.” It contained “a range of attractions,” including “a steam roundabout, a roller-coaster… 
music… theatre… fireworks” etc., “which created another world in which, for an afternoon or 
an evening, visitors could slip off their everyday identity and become tourists in some vaguely 
defined land… promenading up and down the allées, seeing and being seen.” Pattison, Poor 
Paris!, 2. 
19 Alastair Hannay and Gordon Daniel Marino, eds., The Cambridge Companion to 
Kierkegaard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 27. 
20 Søren Kierkegaard, ‘The Moment’ and Late Writings, ed. Howard Hong and Edna Hong, 
vol. 23, Kierkegaard’s Writings (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 249. 
 23 
good in lemonade – a little religion added, something Carstensen cannot do… but 
perhaps he could be ordained.21 
Similarly, Kierkegaard equates the role of the clergy with “coachmen, hired to take visitors 
out to the Deer Park,22 (implying, further, that the sacraments and offices of the Church are 
themselves no more than Deer Park entertainments).”23 Later, after Carstensen had left Tivoli 
in 1848, “In the journals [Kierkegaard] notes under the heading ‘Protestantism in Denmark’ 
that, ‘It is a shame that Carstensen has left us and that now Bournonville [Director of the 
Royal Ballet] is leaving us: these two would be best suited to serve and manage religion in 
Denmark.”24 This ecclesial connection with the carnival and Tivoli is telling if one correlates 
it with Either/Or’s aesthete “A” and his aspiration of “Copenhagen becom[ing] another 
Athens” as “the greatest artists, actors and dancers… stream to Copenhagen,” to create a 
fantasia wherein, as Pattison puts it, “the fantastic [becomes] the factual and the factual 
[becomes] the fantastic.”25 It is a “fantasia” that is both self-perpetuating and economically 
sustainable since it not only creates a “reality,” but sustains it through the commodification of 
leisure (Tivoli becoming “one of the most successful leisure ‘products’ of the nineteenth 
century”).26 A key point here, which we shall further explore in later chapters, is that the 
religious realm is not immune to the virtualisation of reality that accompanies aestheticism. 
It is the combination of the influence of Romantic aestheticism, alongside the apathy and 
comfort of Danish Christendom, which led Kierkegaard to call for true discipleship and a 
rejection of cheap grace. The church had become aligned with culture for all the wrong 
reasons, succumbing to it rather than critically engaging it. It had become a “culture-
religion.”27 As Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus reflects, if a Dane were to 
question whether they should call themselves a Christian, his wife would say, “Hubby, 
                                                
21 Kierkegaard, 23:249. 
22 An annual, rural fair, described in 1857 as “all that the senses could desire. A motley chaos 
for ear and eye: tents and booths… swings… carousels… equestrian artistes and menageries, 
wheels of fortune and panoramas, wax figures and waffle-sellers, public marionette theaters… 
[and] fire-eaters – in short: shrieking, noise, trumpet-blasts and shouting, as everyone seems 
to want to outbid all others in the art of working miracles and providing spectacles.” C. 
Rosenhoff, København (Copenhagen: Rittendorf and Aagaard, 1857), 207, as quoted in 
Pattison, Kierkegaard and the Quest for Unambiguous Life, 51. 
23 Pattison, 52. In reference to Kierkegaard, ‘The Moment’ and Late Writings, 23:348. 
24 Pattison, Poor Paris!, 24. 
25 Kierkegaard, Either/Or I, 1987, 3:287; Pattison, Poor Paris!, 64. 
26 Pattison, Poor Paris!, 64. 
27 Howard A. Johnson in Søren Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard’s Attack Upon Christendom 1854-
1855, ed. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), xxii. 
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darling, where did you ever pick up such a notion? How can you not be a Christian? You are 
Danish, aren’t you? ... Aren’t you a good subject in a Christian nation, in a Lutheran-Christian 
state? So of course you are a Christian.”28 Central to Kierkegaard’s frustration was the 
“marriage of convenience wherein the government was more than willing to pay clerical 
stipends and provide for the maintenance of church fabrics out of the public treasury in return 
for the modest, reciprocal favor that, on political and social issues, the Church remain 
irrelevant and confine itself to ‘Quiet Hours.’”29 Contrary to Schleiermacher, whose theology 
paved the way for affirming the relation between faith and nationality (and thus the 
established church), Kierkegaard saw the “whole phenomenon of established Christendom 
[as] a monstrous error.”30 “Christendom has done away with Christianity,” Kierkegaard 
proclaimed, and he therefore saw the task before him to “introduce Christianity to 
Christendom.”31 
Kierkegaard launched his “attack on Christendom” through pieces published in the 
periodicals Fatherland and Moment (or Instant), although, as Walter Lowrie notes, his 
journals contain far more, “ten times as much material as he needed.”32 The initial catalyst for 
the attack was an address by Professor Martensen, at the above-mentioned Bishop Mynster’s 
memorial service, where Martensen named Mynster a “witness to the truth.” Kierkegaard 
responded that he was nothing of the sort, but in fact the complete opposite,   
that Bishop Mynster’s proclamation of Christianity (to take just one thing) tones 
down, veils, suppresses, omits some of what is most decisively Christian, what is too 
inconvenient for us human beings, what would make our lives strenuous, prevent us 
from enjoying life – this about dying to the world, about voluntary renunciation, about 
hating one-self, about suffering for the doctrine, etc.33 
To the contrary, Kierkegaard proclaims, there is a cost to discipleship, and a genuine 
understanding of “a truth-witness is a person whose life from first to last is unfamiliar with 
everything called enjoyment …”34  
                                                
28 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 1992, 12:50. 
29 Howard A. Johnson in Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard’s Attack Upon Christendom 1854-1855, 
xxii. 
30 George Pattison, Kierkegaard and the Theology of the Nineteenth Century: The Paradox 
and the ‘Point of Contact’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 6. 
31 Søren Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton University 
Press, 2015), 39. 
32 Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard’s Attack Upon Christendom 1854-1855, xiii. 
33 Kierkegaard, ‘The Moment’ and Late Writings, 23:3–4. 
34 Kierkegaard, 23:5–6. 
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Kierkegaard explored these themes at length, his parable of the geese an example, wherein the 
geese are content to stay within the comforts of home, only talking of flying on Sundays 
(“Christendom’s worship services”), but never actually flying. All the while becoming 
“plump, fat and delicate” (a sign of God’s grace), ridiculing the geese that actually fly, who 
look “poorly and thin” (clearly not enjoying God’s grace).35 
While the “cost of discipleship,” with its rejection of cheap grace, has come to be associated 
with Dietrich Bonhoeffer (as we shall further explore in the next chapter), Bonhoeffer was 
clearly influenced by his engagement with Kierkegaard’s work, amidst their common concern 
with the problem of Christendom. In calling attention to this mutual concern, Geffrey Kelly 
describes Bonhoeffer’s experience of Christendom as “the seductive lure of a comfortable 
Christianity, gliding along with an all-powerful ideology that promised law and order, 
stability and security, state-bestowed benefits that appealed to clerical interests and the 
churches’ passion for survival as an institution enjoying civil privileges.”36 It is a description 
that could be equally applied to Kierkegaard’s context.37 In their mutual frustration, they 
share the rejection of “cheap grace” and the call to a Christian life that comes at a cost. While 
both Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer may have been aware of Luther’s reference to the abuse of 
Christ’s grace being described as “cheap,” there is a strong argument that Bonhoeffer’s use of 
the phrase came from Kierkegaard.38 Kierkegaard’s study of Luther, translated and published 
in German as Der Einzelne und die Kirche: Über Luther und den Protestantismus, “served as 
a direct source for several sections” of Bonhoeffer’s Discipleship (previously published as 
                                                
35 Søren Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, ed. Howard Hong and Edna 
Hong, vol. 3 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), 391. 
36 Geffrey B. Kelly, ‘Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer’, in Bonhoeffer’s Intellectual Formation: 
Theology and Philosophy in His Thought, ed. Peter Frick (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 
147. 
37 Here we should remember the revolutionary European milieu, culminating in 1848, which 
in Denmark saw a bloodless revolution that, for Kierkegaard “was a cataclysmic event for the 
spiritual health of the nation.” Kierkegaard knew this was not the revolution that Denmark 
needed, and the apathy the church showed in its failure to protect the “common man” from 
being used and abused by the revolutionaries angered him. Matthew D. Kirkpatrick and 
Geffrey B. Kelly, Attacks on Christendom in a World Come of Age: Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer, 
and the Question of ‘Religionless Christianity’ (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2011), 30–33. See 
Kirkpatrick’s text for an account of the interaction between Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer, in 
their mutual response to Christendom, which is both comprehensive and insightful. 
38 In Luther’s Rationis Latominae Confutatio of 1521, as pointed out in Kelly, ‘Kierkegaard 
and Bonhoeffer’, 149. 
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The Cost of Discipleship).39 In his text, Kierkegaard uses the terms “cheap grace” and “costly 
grace,” these being amongst the sections underlined by Bonhoeffer in his own copy of the 
book.40 It is not merely a phrase that they share, but the concern that lies behind it. For both 
Bonhoeffer and Kierkegaard, the story of the rich young man in the gospels speaks directly to 
the problem of comfortable Christendom.41 And again, for both, the solution is simple, 
Bonhoeffer later echoing Kierkegaard’s injunction that “if the gospel demands that we 
renounce this world … then the simple thing to do is: do it.”42 But for Kierkegaard, the church 
is so caught up in the concerns of comfortable Christendom that it has lost sight of true 
Christianity, as he laments in For Self-Examination, 
Ah, we who still call ourselves Christians are from the Christian point of view so 
pampered, so far from being what Christianity does indeed require of those who want 
to call themselves Christians, dead to the world, that we hardly even have any idea of 
that kind of earnestness; we are as yet unable to do without, to give up the artistic and 
its mitigation, cannot bear the true impact of actuality – well then, let us at least be 
honest and admit it.43 
 
Kierkegaard’s allusion here, resonating with his rejection of aestheticism, is that “the artistic 
and its mitigation,”44 the fantastical virtualisation of reality, is an imaginative mechanism to 
escape (Christological) actuality. Later, in his “attack,” he again emphasises the disconnect 
                                                
39 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Discipleship, ed. Geffrey B. Kelly and John D. Godsey, vol. 4, 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works English (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 11. Another point of 
commonality worth noting for our project is the mimetic nature of discipleship. Kierkegaard 
commented that in Luther’s context “… as soon as ‘imitation’ is taken away ‘grace’ is 
essentially [the sale of] indulgences,” or as Bonhoeffer would put it, “Gospel = cheap 
indulgence.” See Bonhoeffer, Discipleship, 56 note 25. “Bonhoeffer’s use of ‘discipleship,’ 
‘following Christ’ (Nachfolge), was heavily influenced by Kierkegaard’s extensive use of 
Efterfølgelsen (following-after). English translators of Kierkegaard’s original Danish translate 
Efterfølgelsen as ‘imitation.’” Bonhoeffer, 4: note 3, 40. This relation of mimesis to 
discipleship has significant implications for the role of the imagination, aesthetic engagement 
with reality, and the significance of “mirror neurones” as we shall explore in chapter four. 
See also Brian Gregor, ‘Following-After and Becoming Human: A Study of Bonhoeffer and 
Kierkegaard’, in Being Human, Becoming Human: Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Social Thought, 
ed. Brian Gregor and Jens Zimmermann (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co, 2012), 152–75. 
40 Kelly, ‘Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer’, 149–50. 
41 Kelly, 152. 
42 Journals, vol. 3: 93-95 and Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works English (DBWE) vol. 4: 77, as 
quoted in Kelly, 152. 
43 Søren Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination/Judge For Yourself!, ed. Howard Hong and Edna 
Hong, vol. 21, Kierkegaard’s Writings (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 11–12. 
44 Or, in Walter Lowrie’s translation, “the artistic presentation and its soothing effect,” Søren 
Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination & Judge for Yourselves! & Three Discourses, 1851, trans. 
Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), 37. 
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between, on the one hand, the “unreality” of existence within finite, aestheticized 
Christendom, and, on the other, discipleship as the embrace of Christological reality, 
“Christendom” is by no means Christ’s Church… The kind of existences manifested 
by the millions in Christendom has absolutely no relation to the New Testament, is an 
unreality that has no claim to Christ’s promise concerning the believers; yes an 
unreality, since true reality is present only when a person has ventured decisively in 
this way, as Christ requires… But “Christendom” is this nauseating dalliance, to want 
to remain completely and totally in finiteness and then – to make off with the promises 
of Christianity.45 
Kirkpatrick succinctly sums up Kierkegaard’s perspective, 
In the face of the absolute paradox [of Christ] and its offensiveness, of the extreme 
rigorousness of imitation, the secular world has converted Christianity into the 
palatable affirmation of life in all its peace, comfort, and security. Using a phrase that 
appears through his journals, in the face of anxiety, the fear and trembling of 
Christianity, “The world wants to be deceived” (cf. Judge for Yourself 139; Journals 
and Papers 50)46 
 
2.2 Kierkegaard’s Stages of Existence 
This backdrop helps us to understand the motivation behind Kierkegaard’s apparent rejection 
of aesthetic existence. If the Christian life is one that faces up to Christological reality, 
embracing sacrifice and suffering, and “unfamiliarity with enjoyment,” then the proliferation 
of Romantic aestheticism, intermingled with comfortable Christendom, needs to be rejected in 
order to embrace religious existence. But is the equation as simple as this? In the terms of this 
project, this would seem to imply that aesthetic existence plays no part in discipleship, and 
therefore simply needs to be rejected on the path to becoming Christian. In some ways, 
Kierkegaard is indeed saying this, as we shall shortly consider. But there is a danger in 
reading his apparent rejection of aesthetic existence too superficially, and thereby drawing 
erroneous sweeping conclusions, such as equating aestheticism with aesthetic existence. The 
critical point to note here is that Kierkegaard was responding to a particular context, as was 
Luther, and Bonhoeffer.47 The task therefore befalls us to read Kierkegaard’s perspective on 
                                                
45 Kierkegaard, ‘The Moment’ and Late Writings, 23:215. 
46 Kirkpatrick and Kelly, Attacks on Christendom in a World Come of Age, 154. 
47 In fact, Kierkegaard himself highlights the significance of such contextualisation by 
suggesting that Luther’s message would have been quite different had he delivered it in 
Kierkegaard’s time, a point later affirmed by Bonhoeffer, “Already one hundred years ago 
Kierkegaard said that Luther today would say the opposite of what he said back then. I think 
this is true – cum grano salis [within certain limits].” Kierkegaard, For Self-
Examination/Judge For Yourself!, 21:24. Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 8:173. 
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aesthetic existence carefully, taking into account the rhetoric he employs, as he reacts to what 
he sees as the dangers of his context. 
In doing so, it will become apparent that while Kierkegaard rejects aestheticism, he wishes to 
recover a sense of “poetic living,” which includes aesthetic experience and the subsequent 
role of the imagination in formation (Bildung). In other words, there is a qualified sense of 
aesthetic existence, or a mature aesthetic existence, which is not rejected, but contributes to 
the formation of religious existence. The complexity of such an understanding is vital to this 
project. A binary, reductionist view concerning the role of everyday aesthetic existence in 
faith formation is neither accurate nor helpful.  
It is for this reason that exploring the question of aesthetic existence’s relation to discipleship, 
as framed by Bonhoeffer and Kierkegaard, is particularly fruitful. Rather than engaging the 
question through the entryway of an unreserved embrace of the aesthetic (Romantic theology, 
for example), both Bonhoeffer and Kierkegaard’s starting point of a critique of aestheticism, 
as well as the call to costly discipleship, allows for a sober evaluation of both the positive and 
negative aspects that aesthetic existence contribute to faith formation. The challenges, which 
both Christendom and aestheticism bring, have not disappeared from society. As such, it is 
both Kierkegaard’s critique of aesthetic existence and his subtler embrace thereof, which 
demarcates fruitful terrain for us to explore further. 
2.2.1 Interpreting the “Stages”: The complexity of Kierkegaard’s authorship 
A superficial reading of Kierkegaard would conclude that aesthetic existence is an immature 
stage of life to be passed through, in a linear and progressive manner, as one matures to 
ethical and ultimately religious existence. It is rather obvious how one can come to such a 
conclusion based on reading selected passages and works from his corpus (as we shall shortly 
see). However, such a reductionist reading does not take seriously the complexity of 
Kierkegaard’s authorship. There are a number of aspects to take into account in this regard. 
The most obvious is the pseudonymous nature of much of his work. A critical point here is 
that Kierkegaard’s views cannot be strictly equated with that of any of his pseudonyms. His 
suggestion that “in the pseudonymous books there is not a single word by me” should be 
taken seriously.48 But the pseudonyms point to a deeper complexity: his extensive use of 
irony and Socratic method as a means of communicating indirectly, “without authority.” 
                                                
48 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 1992, 12:626. 
 29 
Rather than presenting his argument systematically, he uses “poet-communication.”49 His 
method reflects his objective, which is not merely to engage the intellect, but to affectively 
and imaginatively provoke the reader toward existential reflection and action.50 While this 
should immediately, in itself, point to the fact that he values the formative role of the 
aesthetic, it also makes the systematising of his work a challenging task. Although the words 
of a pseudonym (Johannes Climacus), describing the work Either/Or, the following quote 
succinctly reflects the existential nature and goal of Kierkegaard’s indirect communication: 
“That there is no conclusion and no final decision is an indirect expression for truth as 
inwardness and in this way perhaps a polemic against truth as knowledge.”51 Nevertheless, 
despite this complexity, by acknowledging his method and through careful reading, it is 
possible to discern a level of continuity in his thought through contextually engaging his work 
in light of his corpus as a whole, approaching his pseudonymous work alongside his non-
pseudonymous, direct communication.52  
2.2.2 Aesthetic Existence as a Stage of Life: Kierkegaard’s rejection of aestheticism 
While we ultimately need to move toward a layered, complex understanding of Kierkegaard’s 
approach to aesthetic existence, it is nevertheless helpful for us to begin with the obvious, by 
encountering his apparent antipathy for aesthetic existence as the initial stage of life, which is 
significant because it points toward his rejection of aestheticism. For Kierkegaard, the central 
aspect of aesthetic existence as a stage of life is immediacy, living in the moment. This is to 
be superseded in the journey towards ethical and then ultimately religious existence. The 
initial stages are exposited at length in the two-part work, Either/Or (the first concentrates on 
the aesthetic and the second on the ethical), and also in Stages on Life’s Way (which refers to 
“spheres” of existence rather than stages). The pseudonym, Frater Taciturnus, outlines the 
stages,  
                                                
49 Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, Volume 6, 6:248. 
50 Jothen, Kierkegaard, Aesthetics, and Selfhood, 46. 
51 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 1992, 12:252. 
52 This is not to say that rigorous scholarship will result in consensus regarding the 
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There are three existence-spheres: the esthetic, the ethical, the religious. …The 
esthetic sphere is the sphere of immediacy, the ethical the sphere of requirement (and 
this requirement is so infinite that the individual always goes bankrupt), the religious 
the sphere of fulfillment, but, please note, not a fulfillment such as when one fills an 
alms box or a sack with gold, for repentance has specifically created a boundless 
space, and as a consequence the religious contradiction: simultaneously to be out on 
70,000 fathoms of water and yet be joyful.53 
In Either/Or II, another pseudonym, Judge William, further clarifies the distinction between 
the aesthetic stage and the ethical stage by locating ethical existence in the realm of volitional 
formation; in the ethical one chooses what one becomes, “to choose is an intrinsic and 
stringent term for the ethical.”54 By contrast, aesthetic existence is captive to the immediacy 
of moods, passions and circumstances. 
But what does it mean to live esthetically, and what does it mean to live ethically? To 
that I would respond: the esthetic in a person is that by which he spontaneously and 
immediately is what he is; the ethical is that by which he becomes what he becomes.55 
We need to once again situate these comments in the context, and larger Kierkegaardian 
project, of self-development and concomitant rejection of Romantic self-creation. While the 
aesthete defines the self through the momentary gratification of desire, the ethical person 
chooses to embrace social responsibility. Existence in the aesthetic stage is simply a 
collection of moments, holding no coherence, as portrayed in Either/Or, through the figure of 
Don Giovanni. He “can become epic only by continually finishing and continually being able 
to begin all over again, for his life is the sum of repellerende [discreet] moments that have no 
coherence, and his life as the moment is the sum of moments and as a sum of moments is the 
moment.”56  
Not only is the immediate paramount, but the aesthetic stage of existence is a mode of 
freedom that aims to create the self by playful experimentation, 
In connection with Tivoli entertainments and literary New Year’s presents it holds true 
for the catch-penny artists and those who are caught by them, that variety is the 
highest law of life. But in connection with the truth as inwardness in existence, in 
connection with a more incorruptible joy of life, which has nothing in common with 
the craving of the life-weary for diversion, the opposite holds true; the law is the same 
and yet changed, and still the same. That is why lovers of Tivoli are so little interested 
in eternity, for it is the nature of eternity always to be the same, and the sobriety of the 
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spirit is recognizable in the knowledge that a change in externalities is mere diversion, 
while change in the same is inwardness.57 [Italics added] 
In the aesthete’s effort to bring coherence to these discrete and diverse moments, a fantastical 
world is created, “It is a fantasy-existence in esthetic passion”58 The attempt to reflectively 
create such a fantastical reality delineates the two types of aesthetic existence. While the more 
primitive mode of aesthetic existence dwells solely in the momentary hedonistic experience, 
the intellect too can be seized by aesthetic existence thereby creating an ideality of ceaseless 
aesthetic reflection. In Either/Or this is most clearly seen in the “The Seducer’s Diary.” As 
George Connell puts it, “It is here that the seducer, the very embodiment of unalleviated 
reflectivity and absolute artfulness, and Cordelia, the unplucked flower of pure immediacy, 
are shown to complement each other perfectly.”59 These two senses of existence in the 
aesthetic stage are explored in the introduction to the diary, 
In the first instance he enjoyed the aesthetic personally, in the second instance he 
enjoyed his own aesthetic personality. In the first instance the point was that he 
enjoyed egoistically and personally what in part was reality’s gift to him and in part 
was that with which he himself had impregnated reality; in the second instance his 
personality was effaced, and he enjoyed the situation. In the first instance he 
constantly needed reality as occasion, as factor: in the second instance, reality was 
submerged in the poetic.60 
In other words, reality disappears amidst the fantastical ideality created by the reflective 
aesthete. Or perhaps more accurately, a pseudo-reality replaces actuality as this “second level 
of enjoyment wins an autonomy for the resulting poetic world that allows it to forget itself as 
poetic so that its writer becomes unselfconsciously his own character and, thus, myth.”61 At 
its most developed, therefore, the life stage of aesthetic existence is not merely a 
preoccupation with momentary, sensory pleasure, but the reflective creation (incorporating 
both intellect and affect) of “reality” which absolutises the aesthetic. 
It is this conception of aesthetic existence, as aestheticism, which Kierkegaard argues should 
be rejected and left behind on the path to becoming Christian. Concluding Unscientific 
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Postscript to Philosophical Fragments and Practice in Christianity (both pseudonymous 
works, the former attributed to Johannes Climacus and the latter Anti-Climacus) clearly 
express this view by arguing that a self wholly devoted to God is not concerned with the 
aesthetic. Anti-Climacus argues that Christendom is full of “admirers” who “will make no 
sacrifices, renounce nothing, give up nothing earthly, will not transform [their lives].”62 But 
being a disciple of Christ requires “imitators,” who are willing to “die to the world, to 
surrender the earthly,” to deny the self, for here lies the transformation of a life, and its 
reality.63 There is no place here for aesthetic simulacra amidst this Christological reality, even 
“admiring” artistic depictions of Christ himself.64 In fact, Johannes Climacus, resonating with 
the problematic nature of being an “admirer,” goes as far as to suggest that not only does art 
and the aesthetic have no place in Christian formation, but its “disinterested” nature means 
that it is not fundamentally a necessary aspect of human existence, 
Poetry and art have been called an anticipation of the eternal. If one wants to call them 
that, one must nevertheless be aware that poetry and art are not essentially related to 
an existing person, since the contemplation of poetry and art, “joy over the beautiful,” 
is disinterested, and the observer is contemplatively outside himself qua existing 
person.65 [Italics added] 
Little wonder then that Kierkegaard has been perceived to drive a wedge between the 
aesthetic and the ethico-religious.66 As Frank Burch Brown comments on Kierkegaard’s 
perspective, “the religious as such is supposedly irrelevant to the aims of art, which are 
aesthetic. Religion calls for a change of life, he believes, whereas art calls for disinterested 
appreciation, or what later theorists would call aesthetic distance.”67 
A cursory reading of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic, therefore, offers two conclusions relevant for 
this project. Firstly, Kierkegaard appears to reject any role for aesthetic existence in 
becoming Christian. While we want to acknowledge that our engagement with Kierkegaard in 
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this section (including all of the quotations above) is via pseudonyms, and therefore needs to 
be understood through the lens of rhetorical irony, Kierkegaard clearly had strong views on 
the dangers of aestheticism for Christian formation (particularly when situated amidst 
apathetic Christendom). Secondly, we will need to read Kierkegaard more carefully, 
particularly alongside his direct communication, to ascertain if he does indeed allow aesthetic 
existence a role in becoming Christian. But even in so doing, we will do well to bear in mind 
the clarity and strength of the first point: his rejection of aestheticism and the virtual reality it 
creates.  
2.2.3 Aesthetic Existence & Poetic Living: A clarification of terms 
In order to appreciate the complexity of Kierkegaard’s perspective on the role of aesthetic 
existence in becoming Christian, it is helpful for us to delineate his multi-faceted approach to 
aesthetics. Clarifying the terminology he uses is important, since it informs the terms, and 
consequent framework we will be working with for the remainder of this project. As already 
noted, Kierkegaard’s engagement with aesthetics is not systematic, resulting in multiple 
interpretations that accentuate particular aspects of his work. The most obvious of these 
selective readings is that which we outlined in the previous section: equating Kierkegaard’s 
aesthetic solely with aesthetic existence as a stage of life, which is superseded on the path to 
ethical and then religious existence. But, as Jothen shows, this is only one of four “fragments” 
of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic that we need to piece together to provide an accurate picture of his 
perspective. In addition to a stage of existence, his aesthetic also includes: an explicit critique 
of art; his authorship style as poet-communicator; and his endorsement of formative “poetic 
living.”68 Interpreters focussing on any one of these four elements in isolation lose sight of the 
“ontological moorings that tie his fragmentary aesthetics together”: the formation of the 
human self.69 As Jothen notes, “These fragments are all part of a rich, tactical method that 
seeks to provoke, awaken and enliven each reader. But to do so, Kierkegaard develops a 
conception of the self built upon the importance of the imagination, will, and passion as 
means to enact human becoming.”70 In other words, as we have already mentioned, we cannot 
approach Kierkegaard’s understanding of aesthetics other than through the lens of self-
formation; his aesthetic is inseparable from his anthropology. 
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2.2.3.1 The “Aesthetic” as the Lived Dimension of Sensory Experience 
For Kierkegaard, therefore, “aesthetics” is fundamentally existential. As Terry Eagleton 
argues, “For [Kierkegaard], as for the originators of the discourse, aesthetics refers not in the 
first place to art but to the whole lived dimension of sensory experience, denoting a 
phenomenology of daily life before it comes to signify cultural production.”71 This is a 
helpful starting point, not only as a lens through which to interpret Kierkegaard, but also as 
the definition of aesthetics that we will be working with throughout the project.  
However, we need to exercise caution as to how we proceed. For Eagleton, “cultural 
production” is the nexus of thought and action. Aesthetic existence is therefore a mode of 
existence that precedes “cultural production” either due to the immediacy that marks the first 
type of aesthete, such as Don Juan (action alone), or the reflectivity of the second, such as the 
Seducer (thought alone). The aesthetic self, devoid of “cultural production,” is then lost either 
through “flattening it out into external reality or plunging it fruitlessly into its own vertiginous 
depths.”72 While these two modes of aesthetic existence may seem polar opposites, Eagleton 
points out that, “Reflectiveness negates immediacy, but thereby shatters it to an infinite 
indeterminacy not wholly untypical of immediacy itself.”73 Either way, the end result is the 
“radically empty” self.74 The danger however, is equating one of the “fragments” of 
Kierkegaard’s aesthetic with his aesthetic as a whole. While Eagleton is offering an accurate 
analysis of Kierkegaard’s critique of the life stage of aesthetic existence, as aestheticism, 
which Kierkegaard certainly sees as hindering self-formation, does it necessarily follow that 
the entire “lived dimension of sensory experience,” (as “phenomenology of daily life” which 
precedes “cultural production”) is vacuous, making no contribution to self-formation? This is 
both a question we need to put to Kierkegaard, as well as a question at the heart of this entire 
project. Clearly, aestheticism, aesthetic existence as absolute, is problematic for Kierkegaard. 
But are the stages of existence mutually exclusive? Or, does he see formative value in a 
qualified, or mature aesthetic existence, as a subset of Christian existence?75 
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2.2.3.2 “Existence” as Lived Reality of Self-Formation 
In order to appreciate the relationship between the stages of existence we need to approach 
Kierkegaard’s work as he intended it to be read, as provocative discourse to be lived rather 
than a systematic treatise. Eagleton’s error, along with others who reduce Kierkegaard’s 
aesthetic to the life stage of aesthetic existence, is a reductionist approach in the interests of 
systematic neatness.76 This fails to take into account both the nature of his “poet-
communication” and the way in which Kierkegaard’s indirect communication was an effort to 
deflect focus from himself to the reader, provoking participation (ideally formation) as a 
living subject. Jothen succinctly notes that, “The stages are about living and breathing, about 
choosing and willing, rather than merely how a self thinks and organizes thought into a 
conclusive system. And by describing the aesthetic as a system, merely one of the stages, the 
aesthetic is thereby reduced in its complexity, relegated to the world of logic and thought.”77 
 This is why “existence” is a key term for Kierkegaard, pointing to the fact that reality is first 
and foremost lived. While seen as the father of existentialism, we should be cautious of 
reading anachronistically into his work. As Walsh points out, for Kierkegaard,  
the term “existential” always connotes the concrete or historical actualization of those 
factors that are essential to the formation of human personality or the qualitative life of 
the individual (Journals and Papers 1:1054, 1059, 1060, 1062, 1063). These factors 
are to be realized in the individual’s own being and personal relations, not merely in 
the form of a conceptual, or ideal, actuality envisioned by the imagination and 
represented in external products of art.78 
 
For the purposes of our project therefore, we are not exploring existentialism as further 
developed in the twentieth century by the likes of Jean-Paul Sartre, but limiting discussion of 
“existence” to the concrete and historical lived reality of self-formation amidst the everyday. 
This is the subjective lens through which Kierkegaard’s aesthetic needs to be read. He is not 
engaging an objective, disinterested approach, as is the case with traditional aesthetics. Even 
his treatment of aesthetic phenomena, from the everyday experience of Deer Park or Tivoli to 
                                                
76 For another example of this approach, see Stephen Dunning, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of 
Inwardness: A Structural Analysis of the Theory of Stages (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2014). 
77 Jothen, Kierkegaard, Aesthetics, and Selfhood, 22. 
78 Walsh, Living Poetically, 5. 
 36 
the products of “literary, plastic and musical art,” is subject to “an existential aesthetics that 
has as its object the edification, or upbuilding and fulfillment, of the human subject.”79  
2.2.3.3 The “Poetic” as an Existential Aesthetic Category 
A key term for understanding Kierkegaard’s existential aesthetic is the “poetic,” which he 
uses in an attempt to recover and rehabilitate the Romantic notion of “poetic living.” He uses 
“poetry” not simply as a literary genre, or even in relation to the classical notion of making an 
external artistic product. But for Kierkegaard, the “poetic” “and its synonym ‘poetry’ are 
generally used in a very broad sense to encompass all forms and expressions of the creative or 
artistic imagination.”80 In a sense, he is alluding back to classical usage, but the poiesis 
(producing, or making) that he is referring to is that of self-formation. In other words, his use 
of digtning (“poeticizing”) “describes the act of becoming a self as a creative, and thus an 
aesthetic, act.”81 There is therefore an obvious overlap in Kierkegaard’s use of the “aesthetic” 
and “poetic” and often they are employed interchangeably.82 Because of the nature of 
Kierkegaard’s authorship, caution should therefore be shown in imposing an artificial, 
systematic distinction, but it may nevertheless be fair to suggest that for the most part, “the 
aesthetic refers to those elements that are constitutive of the immediate, sensate life, whereas 
the poetic connotes sensate representation of an idea or ideal in works of art and in human 
life.”83  
The key point to note is that both his usage of “aesthetic” and “poetic” are inextricably bound 
up within the existential formation of the self, particularly in relation to the human faculty of 
imagination. Kierkegaard’s authorship, as a self-proclaimed poet-communicator, expresses 
precisely this sense of formative “poeticizing,” as opposed to the understanding of a poet who 
is primarily concerned with creating an external artistic product – poetry. While his 
authorship is sometimes divided into an initial aesthetic phase and a subsequent religious 
phase, Kierkegaard himself refutes this.84 “Again and again he declares in the later journals 
that he is essentially a poet, and in several entries he describes himself more specifically as a 
‘poet of the religious’ and even more narrowly as a ‘Christian poet and thinker’ (Journals and 
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Papers, 6:6511, 6521, 6391).”85 His concern to qualify the type of poet he is reflects his 
rejection of Romantic poeticizing, which cannot integrate the ideal with the real. But he 
nevertheless believes that God has ordained him to imaginatively stir “a ‘poetic awakening’ in 
his readers (Journals and Papers, 6:6337, 6528, 6727)” by introducing the productive 
possibility of true Christian existence.86 His pseudonym, Vigilius Haufniensis, suggests that 
psychological development requires “poetic originality” in the imaginative ability “to create 
the totality and the invariable from what in the individual is always partially and variably 
present.”87 
It is Kierkegaard’s framing of the poetic that will offer an on-going contribution for the 
remainder of this project. If the aesthetic, as sensory immediacy, plays any role in becoming 
Christian, then this connection cannot be explored without explicating the creative and 
formative (poetic) role of the imagination therein. Poiesis here is the imaginative production 
of existential possibility in symbiotic relationship with aesthetic existence. The crucial 
question is whether such poiesis leads solely to fantastical ideality, or whether it can 
contribute to a perception, and living, of Christological reality, or Christian existence. Before 
taking this question beyond Kierkegaard, we will briefly survey his concern around the 
danger of the former option, and outline his limited and qualified endorsement of the latter.  
2.3 Christian Poetic Living: The role of mature aesthetic existence in discipleship 
Kierkegaard’s positive affirmation of the aesthetic is reserved for, and situated firmly within, 
the stability, continuity and unity of the absolute paradox of Christological reality. He 
contrasts this Christian mode of poetic living with the vacuous and illusory Romantic 
alternative of perpetual, aesthetic self-experimentation. Failure to take this complex 
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relationship with the aesthetic into account is what lies behind the perception that Kierkegaard 
rejects the aesthetic in the life stages of ethical and ultimately religious existence.  
2.3.1 The Continuity of the Aesthetic in Ethico-Religious Existence 
As we have already seen, a cursory reading provides ample evidence for Kierkegaard’s 
apparent stance that the aesthetic and poetic play no positive role in Christian existence. On 
the surface, and without the broader context of his work, we can point, for instance, to his 
claims that, 
a union between the aesthetic and the ethical is a “misalliance” (Stages on Life’s Way, 
442); that a poetic relation to actuality is a “misunderstanding” and a “retrogression” 
(Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 1:388) … that the poet cannot help one to understand 
life (Works of Love, 63); and that one must move away from the poetical to a religious, 
more specifically a Christian, mode of life (The Point of View, 74 [Lowrie translation]).88 
But, on the other hand, Kierkegaard also claims, seemingly paradoxically, that the aesthetic 
and poetic continue to play a productive role throughout the life stages or spheres. In 
Either/Or II, for example, depicting the ethical stage, Judge William sets out to show that one 
can “preserve the aesthetic even in everyday life.”89 The titles of two long letters from that 
work vividly point toward this end: “The Esthetic Validity of Marriage” and “The Balance 
Between the Esthetic and the Ethical in the Development of the Personality.” Continuity is a 
logical necessity between the stages since “it is the total esthetic self that is chosen 
ethically.”90 Further he expresses the point differently, “the ethical is posited by the absolute 
choice, but it by no means follows that the esthetic is excluded. In the ethical, the personality 
is brought into a focus in itself; consequently, the esthetic is absolutely excluded or it is 
excluded as the absolute, but relatively it is continually present.”91 
It becomes clear on closer inspection that Romantic aestheticism is the problem for 
Kierkegaard, not the aesthetic in its entirety. In fact, the poetic and aesthetic are “continually 
reinterpreted in an ethical-religious manner as essential elements in that sphere.”92 
Kierkegaard’s Judge William suggests that ethico-religious existence reorients the aesthetic; it 
“does not want to destroy the esthetic but transfigure it.”93 Even when rhetorically portraying 
the pinnacle of Christian existence in Works of Love, a direct work published under 
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Kierkegaard’s own name, the immediate inclinations and desires are not to be left behind or 
destroyed but to be “dethroned” and “transformed” as they are subsumed into Christian 
living.94  
George Price suggests that one way of articulating this continuity between the life stages, or 
spheres, is to describe them as “existential attitudes,” the respective ways in which one can 
respond to self-same sensory stimuli. Kierkegaard  
himself answers it clearly. He says Nothing is ever lost. Nothing that we have 
experienced, loved and treasured is ever thrown away. What is discarded in the Leap 
from one level to another is not the content of experience but the mood, the existential 
attitude, in which we hold it. What is changed is the quality, not the content of the self. 
For example, the aesthetic as an attitude towards life must inevitably disappear, but 
the ethical, which replaces it, does not annihilate its content, it simply transforms it, 
gathers it up and redirects it.95 
The continuity of the aesthetic throughout the stages of existence is most clearly seen in 
Kierkegaard’s affirmation that existence itself, as an art, is aesthetic formation. It is important 
to note that it is a qualified aesthetic formation, or mature aesthetic existence, as subsumed 
within ethico-religious existence, but it nevertheless remains a fundamental aspect of being 
human and becoming Christian. Contrary to the earlier quote, which taken out of context in 
pseudonymous isolation, seems to question whether the aesthetic is fundamental to being 
human, his corpus as a whole clearly points to existence being an aesthetic category, with 
faith itself considered a “work of art.”96 Interestingly and significantly, it is amidst a phase of 
authorship particularly marked by a critique of the aesthetic and poetic that the pseudonym 
Johannes Climacus affirms existence as aesthetic formation, even while crystallising 
Kierkegaard’s rejection of Romantic poetic creation.97  
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All existence-issues are passionate, because existence, if one becomes conscious of it, 
involves passion. To think about them so as to leave out passion is not to think about 
them at all, is to forget the point that one indeed is oneself an existing person. Yet the 
subjective thinker is not a poet even if he is also a poet… but is also a dialectician and 
is himself essentially existing, whereas the poet’s existence is inessential in relation to 
the poem… The subjective thinker is not a scientist-scholar; he is an artist. To exist is 
an art. The subjective thinker is esthetic enough for his life to have esthetic content, 
ethical enough to regulate it, dialectical enough in thinking to master it.98 [Italics 
added] 
This expression – of being a poet, even while not being a poet – points to Kierkegaard’s dual 
perspective on “poetic living,” capturing his stance on existence as art.   
2.3.2 Poetic Living as Discipleship 
A key to understanding Kierkegaard’s approach to “poetic living” is the Romantic notion of 
Bildung, a significant concept, not only in framing Kierkegaard’s argument, but also for our 
continuing exploration beyond Kierkegaard.99 Bildung can be understood as “self-
cultivation,” in the sense used within German neoclassicism, which focussed on Bildung “and 
the achievement of wholeness of the individual personality as the goal of life and art.”100 The 
concept is theoretically articulated in Friedrich Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man, 
and artistically in Bildungsromane, “novels of individual development.”101 While on the one 
hand critiquing Romantic “poetic living,” with its perception of Bildung as self-creation, 
Kierkegaard nevertheless does not reject the concept, but rather wishes to recover it by 
arguing that Bildung, as self-development, is an integral part of becoming Christian.102 
While Romantic “poetic living” may be problematic, Kierkegaard still sees the poetic as an 
important aspect of becoming Christian to the extent that it is grounded in actuality, as 
informed by the absolute reality of Christ. Here is it is worth quoting him at length as he 
articulates the essence of this Christian approach to living poetically in contradistinction to 
the poetic living of the Romantic ironists.  
[B]y “living poetically” irony understood… something more than what any sensible 
person… understands by this phrase. It did not take this to mean the artistic 
earnestness that comes to the aid of the divine in man, that mutely and quietly listens 
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100 Walsh, Living Poetically, 31. 
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to the voice of what is distinctive in individuality, detects its movements in order to let 
it really be available in the individual and to let the whole individuality develop 
harmoniously into a pliable form rounded off in itself. It did not understand it to be 
what the pious Christian thinks of when he becomes aware that life is an upbringing, 
an education, which ... is specifically supposed to develop the seeds God himself has 
placed in man, since the Christian knows himself as that which has reality for God. 
Here, in fact, the Christian comes to the aid of God, becomes, so to speak, his co-
worker in completing the good work God himself has begun.103 [Italics added] 
This passage explicates the core of Kierkegaard’s perspective on the role of poetic living, or 
mature aesthetic existence, in discipleship. Becoming Christian by “completing the good 
work” of God, certainly does not reject the aesthetic. To the contrary, it is precisely here 
where the poetic finds its true and most meaningful expression as “artistic earnestness” 
working “harmoniously” with God in the process of formation, as an act of existential co-
poeticization. The crucial point here is the co-poeticizing. Aesthetic existence becomes 
problematic when it plays out in individualistic isolation. However, “life as an upbringing, an 
education,” life as discipleship, is stewarding aesthetic existence, “earnestly” taking this mode 
of living seriously, by both submissively and attentively “quietly listening” to that which God 
has already deposited in both the self and the environment, and subsequently nurturing these 
“seeds” through mature aesthetic existence, thereby co-poeticising with Christ.  
By contrast, the Romantic attempts to create a sense of self through playful experimentation, 
as an expression of freedom, thinking, “everything is possible. Our God is in heaven and does 
whatever he pleases; the ironist is on earth and does whatever he desires.”104 But for 
Kierkegaard, this is ultimately vacuous, and precisely the opposite of true poetic living, since 
the self is lost in virtuality, disconnected from reality. “As the ironist poetically composes 
himself and his environment with the greatest possible poetic license, as he lives in this totally 
hypothetical and subjunctive way, his life loses all continuity. He succumbs completely to 
mood. His life is nothing but moods …”105 In other words, the “reality” which the Romantic 
has created holds no relation to actuality. It is simply the product of aesthetic immediacy in 
isolation, “At times he is a god, at times a grain of sand… He poetizes everything, poetizes 
his moods, too. In order to be genuinely free, he must have control of his moods; therefore 
one mood must instantly be succeeded by another.”106 This is not to say that “moods” are the 
problem. To the contrary, they play a role in “a sound and healthy life” as “an intensification 
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of … life that … stirs and moves within a person.” For the Christian they are grounded in the 
“continuity” of Christ.107 But for the Romantic, moods are disconnected from any grounding 
reality. Amidst this aesthetic immediacy, to sustain the illusion of self-creation requires being 
severed from the givenness of one’s actual material environment, “In so doing, he continually 
collides with the actuality to which he belongs. Therefore it becomes important for him to 
suspend what is constitutive in actuality, that which orders and supports it: that is, morality 
and ethics.”108 Hence Kierkegaard’s depiction of the life stage of aesthetic existence; 
Romantic “poetic living” is here disconnected from ethico-religious existence.  
However, Kierkegaard wishes to show that Christian existence is true poetic living, since self-
development occurs not by disconnecting ideality and actuality, but by uniting the finite and 
infinite in the absolute paradox of Christ, as the true Poet.109 “Romanticism … thinks it is 
living poetically, but … the poetic is the very thing it misses, because true inward infinity 
comes only through resignation, and only this inner infinity is truly infinite and truly 
poetic.”110 Rather than attempting to “compose oneself poetically … the Christian lets himself 
be poetically composed, and in this respect a simple Christian lives far more poetically than 
many a brilliant intellectual.”111 The key difference in the Christian sense of poetic living is 
the submission of aesthetic existence to both the sovereignty of God and the concomitant 
givenness of material actuality. “An individual who lets himself be poetically composed does 
have a definite given context into which he has to fit and thus does not become a word 
without meaning because it is wrenched out of its associations.”112 While the Romantic seeks, 
but fails, to unite the ideal and the actual, merely offering “an emigration from actuality 
[rather] than a continuance in it … only the religious is able to bring about the true 
reconciliation, because it infinitizes actuality …”113 Existential freedom then, is not found in 
fantastical aesthetic experimentation, but through embracing the paradox of the “infinite” 
reality of Christ, as grounded in the historical actuality of material givenness. Anchored in 
this “inner infinity,” one “lives poetically only when [one] is oriented and thus integrated in 
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the age in which [one] lives, [being] positively free in the actuality to which [one] 
belongs.”114  
2.3.3 Imitating Christ: The unification of the infinite with finite aesthetic existence 
The “art of living,” therefore, is to subsume aesthetic existence within Christian existence, 
thereby integrating the material actuality of finite immediacy with infinite Reality in a 
cohesive whole.  Here, existence is an art because, for Kierkegaard, as influenced by the 
Romantics, “every true work of art is an essential unity.”115 It is a theme that is central 
throughout Kierkegaard’s work, as seen in his “‘quest for unambiguous life’, a life figured … 
as involving a sense for ‘the whole’ and which is to be sought not only in isolated moments of 
ecstasy but in ‘every moment’ so as to bring about a lasting and productive inner unification 
of the self.”116 As Connell exposits at length, this is the Kierkegaardian quest “to be one 
thing,” bringing cohesion to the immediacy of life that is an inevitable consequence of being 
historical, sensate beings. “As temporal, the self is forced to live moment by moment. If it 
would exist in such a way as to deserve the description “one,” it must gather all the discrete 
moments of its life into a unity.”117 As the pseudonym Johannes Climacus puts it, “In the life 
of the Individual the task is to achieve an ennoblement of the successive within the 
simultaneous.”118 
Kierkegaard, therefore, wishes on the one hand to reject aestheticism, which may seem to be 
taking material existence seriously, but really devalues material actuality by escaping into a 
fantastical ideal, and ultimately, virtuality.119 On the other hand, he affirms that religious 
existence is embedded in everyday aesthetic engagement with physical actuality. Genuine 
religious existence needs to be integrated with concrete and material daily reality, by being 
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Christian “in the actuality of daily life… here in Copenhagen, in the market on Amagertorv 
[Amager Square], in the middle of the daily bustle of weekday life!”120  Religious “loftiness” 
needs to be integrated with everyday actuality. Recall Kierkegaard’s parable of the geese, a 
scathing critique of Danish Christendom as an expression of Romantic aestheticism, wherein 
the “poet or orator illustrates this loftiness,” affectively moving people for “only one hour” on 
a Sunday – a reflective ideal bearing no connection to everyday reality.121 The consequence is 
a neutering of the Christian message, disconnected from sensory existence in everyday life. 
Such “loftiness” of the gospel is removed from daily life so that “people are not so familiar 
with loftiness that they really dare to believe in it.”122 By contrast, the “absolute paradox” of 
the incarnation points to the essential affirmation of material actuality in Christian existence. 
“It is indeed an enormous contradiction – that the loftiest of all has become the everyday!”123 
As with his aesthetic, Kierkegaard offers no systematic account of his Christology, but as Joel 
Rasmussen puts it, the latter infuses the former through Kierkegaard’s “Christomorphic 
poetics.”124 If we cannot understand the “aesthetic” in Kierkegaard without situating it in the 
context of “existence,” then equally, we cannot approach his perspective of aesthetic 
existence and poetics without situating it, in turn, within Christian existence as the imitation 
of Christ. “God’s initiative in Christ is paradigmatic for Kierkegaard’s many explorations of 
the possibility or impossibility of human fulfilment through artistic creativity.”125 Only in 
Christ is it possible to unite the ideal and actual. It is logically necessary that the discreet 
moments of everyday aesthetic existence can only cohere in the eternal. But as Kierkegaard 
shows, romantic attempts to unite the finite and infinite result unavoidably either in the 
proliferation of sensory immediacy (Don Juan) or fantastical idealism (the Seducer). For it is 
solely within Christ that the finite and infinite cohere since, “Only the eternal can be and 
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become and remain contemporaneous with every age; temporality, on the other hand divides 
within itself, and the present cannot become contemporaneous with the future, or the future 
with the past, or the past with the present.”126  
While Romantic aestheticism, wedded to Danish Christendom, fails to integrate the ideal with 
the actual, it is in imitating Christ, as the prototypical “witness to truth,” that both poetic ideal 
and poetic action are united. Kierkegaard’s attack on Christendom may appear to be a critique 
of the church’s apathy and materialism, as it prioritised this-worldly comfort. In this sense, his 
call to costly discipleship seems to entail a rejection of the aesthetic in favour of the 
“spiritual.” To be sure, he is indeed critical of materialism and aestheticism, but even amidst 
the rhetorical urgency needed to deal with the crisis of his day, it is important to note that 
imitating Christ does not equate to rejecting this-worldly reality, and consequently the 
aesthetic. To the contrary, it is precisely in Christ where the poetic and aesthetic find their 
rightful place.  
In Kierkegaard's Christomorphic poetics the divine poet proclaims true love and also 
manifests it existentially, such that Word and flesh, imagination and will, ideality and 
actuality, all accord perfectly with one another in a reconciliation that, for Christian 
faith, unites truth and art in “true art.”127 
Discipleship, therefore, as the “imitation” of Christ (as opposed to Christendom’s 
“admiration” of Christ), is true poetic living. “By believing in, by becoming contemporaneous 
with, by following and imitating Christ, the self repeats this incarnation within itself … 
[allowing] the self to relate to itself properly and truly, to exist as it was created to exist: 
simultaneously finite and infinite, temporal and eternal …”128 It is only here, in imitating 
Christ, that existence is truly poetic, truly formative, that self-development truly occurs, since 
Christ is the “criterion,” the prototypical human being.129 
In sum, it is only through the incarnation of Christ that the actual and ideal cohere, and thus 
only to the extent that the disciple is “in Christ” that the self is truly living poetically, both 
present in the discreet moments of everyday, this-worldly actuality, but also existing in a 
sense of ultimate coherence through the infinite and eternal grace of God. In this sense, 
aesthetic existence, or sensory immediacy, matters because this is a fundamental aspect of 
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being historical, finite beings; an aspect of being human affirmed by the incarnation. 
Kierkegaard is clear that the everyday, “in the market on Amager Square,” is a fundamental 
aspect of Christian existence. This affirmation is significant, but the question that remains 
unresolved at this point is whether aesthetic existence is formative. What role, if any, does 
sensory immediacy play in faith formation? Kierkegaard does not directly answer this 
question. His focus is on exposing Romantic sensory immediacy as problematic. However, 
there are two concepts that he deals with which offer pointers to the positive role that 
aesthetic existence may play in discipleship. The first is his limited treatment of the notion of 
a “second immediacy,” as an attribute of faith. The second is his more robust engagement 
with the formative role of the imagination. We will delineate his perspective on both briefly 
here, before moving beyond Kierkegaard to explore them more deeply. 
2.3.4 Second Immediacy 
Kierkegaard refers to a “second immediacy” as an attribute of faith, pointing to the passionate 
and aesthetic nature of life in Christ. Yet, precisely what he means here, and the nature of its 
relation to sensory immediacy, is difficult to interpret, due both to his fragmentary treatment 
of the concept and the rhetorical context within which he employs the term. In a number of 
places in his journals he describes faith as a second immediacy; faith being an “immediacy or 
spontaneity after reflection.”130 Some of the pseudonyms also discuss this second immediacy, 
although, unsurprisingly, they do not all concur on the role of immediacy and the aesthetic in 
faith formation. For Judge William, “the poetic is given a higher and more authentic 
expression in the second immediacy of the ethical-religious.”131 For Johannes de Silentio, in 
Fear and Trembling, “Faith is not an ‘esthetic emotion’ or a ‘spontaneous inclination of the 
heart,’ he says, but rather a ‘new interiority’ and a ‘later immediacy,’ that is, a form of 
immediacy or spontaneity that Kierkegaard describes elsewhere as being acquired after 
reflection by virtue of a relation to God (Fear and Trembling 47, 69, 82; Journals and 
Papers, 5:6135).”132 In other works, Kierkegaard offers clues as to the nature of this second 
immediacy, as an expression of the “infinite task” of imitating Christ’s love in material 
actuality, in the here and now, as Connell shows, 
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Anti-Climacus writes that the more the self accepts the infinite task, “the more 
personally present and contemporaneous it becomes in the small part of the task that 
can be carried out at once.” [Sickness unto Death, 32] … the Christian self lives as an 
eternal being within time, as the Paradox writ small. Presence and its corresponding 
concept, the moment, are the common denominators of time and eternity … [Concept 
of Anxiety, 86].133 
While it is difficult to build a conceptual framework on his fragmentary exploration of this 
“second immediacy,” two conclusions are fairly clear. Firstly, Kierkegaard is quite obviously 
keen to rhetorically distinguish the immediacy of Christian existence from that of 
aestheticism, labelling the former a “first immediacy” as opposed to the latter “second 
immediacy.”134 Secondly, however, in spite of this rhetorical agenda, his exploration of faith 
as second immediacy points to the “fundamentally aesthetic nature of faith insofar as it is a 
passion or a form of immediacy.”135 Of course it would be speculation to hypothesize about 
whether Kierkegaard would have explored the notion of a “second immediacy” differently 
had he been writing in a different time, responding to different contextual challenges. But the 
precise nature of this second immediacy, and particularly its connection to aesthetic existence, 
is an important question for us to note as we move beyond Kierkegaard.136  
2.3.5 The Imagination 
The formative role of the poetic and aesthetic in becoming Christian is arguably most clearly 
seen in Kierkegaard’s affirmation of the imagination.137 At the outset though, it needs to be 
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clear that Kierkegaard wants to make a distinction between the imagination (“Phantasien”) 
and the Romantic employment of the imagination as the fantastic (“det Phantastiske”).138 On 
the one hand, he wishes to reject the fantastical imagination of poetic Romanticism, wherein 
the imagination creates a self through playful experimentation, ultimately leading to 
virtuality.139 Here the imagination is simply revelling in the freedom of ideal possibility, 
without any relationship to actuality. However, on the other hand, Kierkegaard shows that, 
rightly employed, the imagination can do the complete opposite: it allows one to see the ideal 
of Christ as Reality, and consequently opens one’s eyes to the possibility of life as imitation 
of Christ.140 For Kierkegaard then, the power of the imagination in faith-formation is its 
ability to move one from the ideal to action. As he writes in a journal entry from 1854 (not 
during his early, so-called “aesthetic phase,” but amidst the “attack on Christendom,” the year 
before he died), “Imagination is what providence uses to take men captive in actuality, in 
existence, in order to get them far enough out, or within, or down into actuality. And when 
imagination has helped them get as far out as they should be – then actuality genuinely 
begins.”141  
The power of the imagination, thus construed, leads the pseudonym, Anti-Climacus, to 
proclaim that the human faculty of imagination is “the capacity instar omnium [for all 
capacities]. When all is said and done, whatever of feeling, knowing and willing a person has 
depends upon what imagination he has.”142 Peder Jothen points out here that readings of 
Kierkegaard that prioritise the will in the formation of self are “overly reductionistic.” 
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Imagination, as the instar omnium, provides the paradigmatic perception of reality within 
which choices are made. The role of volition, then, in self-formation can only be understood 
alongside the imagination and another prominent Kierkegaardian theme, passion. 
“Aesthetically, the imagination can create images of how to exist as well as store images 
received from culture, experience, and education. Passion, a form of desire, moves a self 
towards sensual beauty and images as well as ideas of selfhood.”143 Such a notion of existence 
coheres with contemporary constructions of being human and creating meaning within the 
context of a presiding narrative, as elucidated by the likes of Alasdair MacIntyre, Stanley 
Hauerwas, Charles Taylor, Sallie McFague, William Cavanaugh, and Paul Ricoeur. 
Kierkegaard’s conception of the imagination, therefore, is “poetic” not in the sense of 
Romantic “poetic living,” fantastical self-creation, but in the sense of “poetry as act, ‘living 
poetically,’ [that] not only provides narrative but also testifies to an imaginative ideal by 
putting it to work in real life.”144 
For our purposes, the critical question is the nature of the relation between everyday aesthetic 
experience and the shaping of the imagination. If it is true, as Jothen stated above, that the 
imagination holds a store of images received from culture and experience, then implicitly, by 
acknowledging the role of the imagination in faith formation, Kierkegaard is also thereby 
affirming the role of everyday sensory immediacy in faith formation (or deformation). This is 
a suggestive implication that we will have to further probe and test in moving beyond 
Kierkegaard, for he does not offer any explicit indication that this relation exists, at least in a 
positive sense. However, he certainly holds the inverse to be true: the Romantic imagination, 
as shaped by sensory immediacy creates a virtual reality. Such “free play of fantasy … makes 
life a dream,” thereby “exhaust[ing] and anesthetiz[ing] the soul.”145 Sensory life in Tivoli, 
and the magic of the theatre blurs the boundaries, “the make-believe of masks, disguises, and 
possibilities spills over into real relationships.”146  
While Kierkegaard, then, clearly shows that everyday aesthetic experience shapes the 
imagination in a negative sense, we will have to move beyond his work to enquire more 
deeply into whether it is also possible in a positive sense; whether aesthetic existence can 
indeed not only coexist with imitating Christ, but productively shape such Christian 
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formation. However, before we do so, we will consider two specific examples, or snapshots, 
of aesthetic existence in Kierkegaard’s work: an outing to the amusement of Deer Park and 
listening to a piece of music. The former will help to offer a summary, crystallising 
Kierkegaard’s response to the question of the relationship between aesthetic existence and 
Christian living, while the latter will provide a point of concretion for our on-going discussion 
throughout the project. 
2.4 Summary: Christian existence amidst the sensory immediacy of Deer Park 
The question we have put to Kierkegaard is whether aesthetic existence, as sensory 
immediacy, plays a role in Christian living. His answer is difficult to discern, since his focus 
is on the destructive nature of Romantic sensory immediacy, but nevertheless, the argument 
here is that he offers a tentative and qualified, “yes.” To crystallise his perspective and by way 
of summary, we can consider a helpful passage in Concluding Unscientific Postscript.147 It is 
significant that the author, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus, is not a Christian, 
and is therefore considering religious existence from the outside, an important point to which 
we shall return.  
Climacus considers how religious existence could be lived in the everyday, and not merely on 
a Sunday, in church, or amidst the more earnest moments of life.148  
Nowadays the religious address, although it preaches against the monastery, observes 
the most strict monastic propriety and distances itself from actuality just as much as 
the monastery and thereby indirectly betrays quite adequately that everyday existence 
is actually in other categories, or that the religious does not assimilate daily life.149 
As such, he proposes a thought experiment: how would “Christians” from the different stages 
of life (aesthetic, ethical and religious) respond to the prospect of an outing to enjoy the 
amusements of Deer Park?150 How does the Christian relate to the sensory immediacy of 
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everyday entertainment, such as Deer Park, the “most trivial of trivialities”?151 For the 
aesthete, this is a non-issue. By living entirely in the moment, it matters not whether this is in 
church, for an hour on Sunday, enjoying the idealistic oration of the pastor, or whether it is 
revelling in the sensory thrills of Deer Park. There is no contradiction since these discreet, 
existential moments are entirely distinct. The consequence, however, is a fragmentation of 
self, a complete absence of “poetic living,” as Kierkegaard employs the term. Consumed by 
the individual’s fragmentary enjoyment of the moment, it is an existence entirely void of the 
cohesion offered by “being poetically composed” by Christ, the ultimate poet. 
The subject in the ethical stage also finds no contradiction, embracing an equally fragmented 
perspective, but for different reasons. Ethically, the key question is whether it is permissible. 
Does it contravene moral bounds? If not, it is harmless fun. “To go out to the amusement park 
– if one can afford it, if one's business affairs allow it, if one takes along wife and children, 
yes, and the servants, and comes home at a decent time – is an innocent joy and one ought to 
participate in the innocent joys …”152 The joy is “innocent” because, as spontaneous sensory 
immediacy, it defies ethical evaluation. A theme found both in Either/Or II and Stages on 
Life’s Way is that, “Spontaneity lies within the realm of immediacy and, strictly speaking, 
cannot be ethically judged.”153 Due to this fundamental rift in these two modes of existence, 
the ethical person states that, “It never occurs to me to bring such trifles as going out to the 
amusement park into connection with the thought of God – indeed to me it seems to be an 
insult to God, and I know that it does not occur to a single one of the many people I know, 
either.”154 For Kierkegaard this too represents the self-same problematic fragmentation of 
self. 
Climacus spends the bulk of his time on the religious person, wrestling with the challenge of 
reconciling the absolute with the immediate, in the unity of true poetic living. While the 
principle of embracing everyday actuality may be laudable, “in the concretion of daily life … 
practicing it is so very difficult. Nowadays a pastor hardly dares to speak in church about 
going to the amusement park or even mention the word – so difficult is it even in a godly 
discourse to join an amusement park and the thought of God.”155 But Climacus suggests that 
this is precisely the test of Christian existence, “the absoluteness of the religious placed 
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together with the specific.”156 The pastor, therefore, should be able “to transform even 
speaking about this into an upbuilding discourse. If he is unable to do that, if he thinks it 
cannot be done, he must warn against it.”157 While such integration may be a worthy goal in 
theory, Climacus finds navigating the paradox a weighty task. On the one hand, God 
consumes one “like the fire of the summer sun when it refuses to set,” thereby obliterating the 
“relativity of immediacy.”158 External sensory immediacy ceases to hold traction due to this 
inner, second immediacy. Yet paradoxically, it is in the trivial everyday, in the apparently 
unimportant that “the relationship with God will be known.”159 A rejection of everyday 
materiality is therefore a rejection of given humanness. “The monastic movement is an 
attempt at wanting to be more than a human being, an enthusiastic, perhaps pious attempt to 
be like God.”160 So where does this leave the religious person as he approaches the outing to 
Deer Park, attempting to navigate this paradoxical tension? 
“So he goes out there. ‘But he does not enjoy himself,’ someone may say. Yes, he 
does indeed. And why does he enjoy himself? Because the humblest expression for the 
relationship with God is to acknowledge one's humanness, and it is human to enjoy 
oneself.”161 [Italics added] 
So far, so good: Despite the paradox – embracing the infinite, being consumed by God, while 
living concretely in the finite – everyday Christian existence is possible because of life in 
Christ, the “paradox writ small.” 
Yet, it is here where Climacus falters, as he analytically considers faith from the outside. He 
cannot conceive how it is rationally possible for the religious person to enjoy Deer Park. He 
concedes that it may be possible for someone else, but personally, he would not be able to 
enjoy it. His first problem is a core question for this project: how does one distinguish 
between aestheticism (making the aesthetic absolute) and mature aesthetic experience (a valid 
expression of sensory immediacy in Christian living)? How can he “ascertain that it is not a 
momentary inclination, a fancy of immediacy, that determines him”?162 The only way to 
know with certainty is to delay the outing, thereby proving that his motives are pure. The 
process perpetually repeats itself and the outing to Deer Park never materializes. Even if he 
were in the amusement park, as a religious, Climacus cannot conceive the possibility of 
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enjoying the outing within the absolute conception of God.163 The paradox is too much for 
him to compute.  
Through Climacus, Kierkegaard shows the challenge of incorporating mature aesthetic 
existence into Christian living. In a sense, it is a logical impossibility. It is the attempt to unify 
the absolute and the specific, infinite and finite, divine and human. It is only in the absolute 
paradox of Christ, through an incarnational understanding of existence that this is possible. 
Living in Christ, by grace, allows human momentary immediacy to cohere in Christ’s eternal 
being.  
In sum, Kierkegaard, in principle, affirms being human and the divine givenness of material 
reality that it entails. Based on the absolute paradox of Christ, becoming Christian is not 
merely a “spiritual” exercise, but to be played out in the actuality of daily life, amidst even the 
“most trivial of trivialities.” Faith-formation is here the co-poeticizing of gathering up the 
concrete moments of incarnate living, while attentively and “harmoniously” aligning these 
with the work of Christ in oneself, as an act of aesthetic stewardship.164 But even though such 
everyday discipleship necessarily encompasses sensory immediacy, in practice Kierkegaard 
appears reluctant to fully endorse even mature aesthetic existence as an aspect of Christian 
living.  
As Climacus illustrated above, Kierkegaard’s reticence may be related to the crucial question 
of how one distinguishes between aesthetic existence as aestheticism, and mature aesthetic 
existence, which is a valid expression of Christian living. The impetus of Kierkegaard’s 
rhetorical task (reacting to the problematic nature of Romantic sensory immediacy, 
particularly as it expressed itself in Christendom) clouds his response to this question and the 
clarity of his affirmation of the material world in general. For instance, while, as Pattison 
argues, he “had a very well developed theology of creation,” which is particularly evident in 
his early work, this is often missed amidst his later emphasis on “imitation of the suffering 
Christ.”165 Possibly, Kierkegaard’s attempt to distinguish between aestheticism and mature 
aesthetic existence, thereby validating a mode of aesthetic existence in Christian life, can be 
found in his relatively underdeveloped notion of a second immediacy – immediacy after 
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reflection – but this appears to relate to an “inner” immediacy, again he seems reluctant to 
fully endorse sensory immediacy.  
This leaves us with two questions to take beyond Kierkegaard. Firstly, is it possible to be 
fully immersed in the humanity of sensory immediacy as an expression of being Christian? 
For example, is it possible for a Christian to enjoy an outing to Deer Park? Or to use another 
example from Kierkegaard’s work, can a Christian delight in aesthetic literary immediacy? In 
an early journal entry (1837), Kierkegaard reflects, 
Why does the reading of fairy tales provide such fortifying relaxation for the soul? 
When I am weary of everything and ‘full of days,’ fairy tales are always a refreshing, 
renewing bath for me. There all earthly, finite cares vanish; joy, yes, even sorrow, are 
infinite (and for this reason are so enlarging and beneficial).166  
Pattison labels this an example of “immediate aesthetic reading,” characteristic of how 
Kierkegaard later suggested we not read.167 Granted, there is resonance in this passage with 
the Romantic notion of creating a fantastical aesthetic reality. However, does it follow that the 
experience of aesthetic immediacy in reading is incongruous with Christian living? Does such 
an aesthetic experience of “fortifying relaxation for the soul” have a place in being Christian? 
Secondly, if it does, what are the implications for the formation of faith? As Climacus notes, 
this is not an ethical question; it is not a question of permissibility. Rather, the question is 
related to imitating Christ. Does the celebration of sensory immediacy, in every instance, 
detract from becoming Christian, or are there times when it contributes to discipleship? If it 
can offer a positive contribution to faith-formation, how do we distinguish between these two 
modes of sensory immediacy? Here, we will want to recall Kierkegaard’s distinction between 
first and second immediacy, but we will need to move beyond his rudimentary notion of a 
second immediacy to a more fully developed notion of mature aesthetic existence.  
As a practical example, to crystallise not only these questions which Kierkegaard raises for 
our project, but also to act as an on-going point of concretion in the coming chapters, we will 
consider the aesthetic experience of listening to music.168  
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theological prolegomenon to practical theology. In this sense, while the argument put forward 
here has implications for practical theology, it is beyond the scope of the thesis to explore 
these in depth. The hope, however, in briefly highlighting music, as a specimen of aesthetic 
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2.5 Spotlight on Music: Music as archetypal sensory immediacy 
In Either/Or I, Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, the aesthete “A,” offers a lengthy exposition on 
music in the form of an essay titled ‘The Immediate Erotic Stages or the Musical-Erotic.’ The 
focus of the essay is Mozart’s opera, Don Giovanni, wherein the character Don Giovanni 
(based on the legend of Don Juan), is portrayed as the ultimate aesthete, the pinnacle of 
sensory-erotic immediacy. As is always the case with his pseudonymous work, interpretations 
abound as to Kierkegaard’s intention with this essay. While we will briefly consider the 
significance of these perspectives below, our primary concern is not the possible 
interpretation linking the aesthetic and religious, but a fundamental premise of the essay: A’s 
observation that the aesthetic medium of music best represents sensory immediacy. If this 
project is concerned with the question of the relation between aesthetic existence and 
discipleship, then the ideal point of concretion to return to at regular intervals, as the 
argument develops, is, therefore, its application to music as an instance of everyday aesthetic 
existence.169 
“A” holds that no other art form exhibits sensory immediacy to the extent that music does. 
This is because, on the one hand, the literary arts are too closely related to language, thereby 
associating them with conscious reflection.170 On the other hand, the visual, plastic and spatial 
arts (architecture, sculpture and painting, for example), are manifest as continuity over time. 
Our engagement with them is, therefore, not strictly “momentary,” as is the case with a note 
or chord of music.171 While these notes strung together provide an aesthetic experience of 
“epic character,” music is not truly epic, because it nevertheless represents temporal 
impermanence.172 While music itself “has an element of time… it cannot express the 
historical in time.”173 Hence the connection to the erotic, since “sensuous love is 
disappearance in time … [and] the medium that expresses this is indeed music.”174 It is 
therefore, “only through music … that the sensuous in its elemental originality … [is] 
                                                                                                                                                   
existence at regular intervals throughout the project, is to both crystallise aspects of the 
argument and to allude to trajectories such a practical theology might take.  
169 It should be noted here that to explore the role of music, per se, in discipleship is a 
research project on its own. This is not the intention here, where we are simply using music as 
an example of everyday aesthetic existence, in order to elucidate and crystalize the salient 
points of the broader argument that otherwise might remain somewhat opaque.  
170 Kierkegaard, Either/Or I, 1987, 3:56. 
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presented.”175 If music is the ultimate aesthetic medium of sensory immediacy, then the 
crystallising question, which we will periodically return to in the coming chapters, is the 
relation of music to being human and becoming Christian. We begin here by putting this 
question to Kierkegaard. 
The rhetoric that Kierkegaard employs through this pseudonymous essay is clearly evident, 
although the end to which it is aimed (possibly including an acknowledgement that the 
aesthetic immediacy of music and religious existence can cohere) is not as certain. By 
locating his discussion of music within the context of Mozart’s Don Giovanni, A combines 
both the ideal medium of immediacy and the ideal character of immediacy. He is therefore, 
“dealing with the immediate in its total immediacy.”176 In fact, his rhetorical emphasis is so 
clearly on exploring musical sensory immediacy as aesthetic existence that he deliberately 
misrepresents Mozart’s opera. While his characterisation of Don Giovanni as the archetypal 
aesthete resonates with Mozart’s intention, the same cannot be said of A’s rendering of the 
aesthete in isolation, devoid of the intended broader aesthetic–religious context, both in 
relation to Mozart’s other works, as well as within the narrative arc of Don Giovanni.177 “A” 
deliberately marginalises the religious Commendatore figure in the opera – the character who 
is, by A’s own admission, the only character over whom Don Giovanni “cannot exercise any 
power.”178 This heroic framing of the aesthete, Don Giovanni, is variously interpreted, as 
reflected in the respective readings of Kierkegaard’s objective in A’s essay. 
The heart of the interpretative question is the extent to which the views of A and Kierkegaard 
align. A simplistic, and unlikely, reading aligns Kierkegaard with A’s views on music, 
arguing that Kierkegaard is here ‘against himself,’ that passion and desire for the sensory 
immediacy of music persist in Kierkegaard, despite these being incongruous with his larger 
philosophical project (the religious rejection of the aesthetic).179 A reading more consistent 
with Kierkegaard’s larger project is that A and Kierkegaard’s views do not align, but 
Kierkegaard is rhetorically presenting the perspective of the aesthetic stage of life through A. 
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In this case, one could argue, as Bernard Zelechow does, that Kierkegaard is again driving a 
wedge between the religious and aesthetic, suggesting “the exclusion of the sensuous from 
religious embodiment.”180 Or, as Petr Osolsobe does, that since sensory immediacy is not 
moral or religious, as “pre-ethical” it is “morally neutral.”181 Either way, these interpretations 
do not see Kierkegaard as locating sensory immediacy within religious life. Shao Kai Tseng, 
however, does offer such a reading.  
Tseng’s cogent position is that the essay needs to be understood as a work of satire. He bases 
his argument on evidence of Kierkegaard’s musical literacy and the fact that, through A, 
Kierkegaard is deliberately misrepresenting Don Giovanni, offering a musical treatment 
which is consonant with Romantic composition (in the work of Hector Berlioz, Franz Liszt, 
and Richard Wagner, for example). Kierkegaard’s intentional distortion, then, of Don 
Giovanni through A’s essay, is a satirical tool to provoke reflection on the nature of Romantic 
musical composition, and the relationship between music and religious life. The objective 
being that the omission of the significant religious theme in A’s reading of the opera should 
be startlingly obvious to a musically literate reader, thereby provoking the reader to consider 
the role of the religious in not only the opera Don Giovanni, but in music more generally, and 
sensory immediacy as a whole.  
Tseng’s suggestion is that Kierkegaard may here be alluding to the fact that there are two 
types of immediacy and that a “first immediacy” does not have a monopoly on music.182 “A” 
himself refers to these two types of immediacy in relation to music: sensuous erotic 
immediacy and the Christian embrace of immediacy “qualified by spirit.”183 For A, that which 
is excluded from immediacy, as “qualified by the spirit,” is sensuous immediacy. Tseng posits 
that Kierkegaard makes A’s argument intentionally weak here in order to show that there is 
no valid reason for excluding music from immediacy within religious life. To the contrary, as 
we have seen, when considering his broader work, Kierkegaard does not reject immediacy per 
se, but argues for a second, or later immediacy. The question thus raised, which Kierkegaard 
never resolves, is whether music can be a valid expression of such a second immediacy.  
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Since Kierkegaard does not bring closure to this question, we will need to take it beyond his 
work. However, while his fragmentary treatment of music proves difficult to piece together 
into a coherent whole, it is worth noting the two senses in which he refers to music (perhaps 
representing two modes of aesthetic immediacy). While A’s essay appears to argue for 
musical sensory immediacy as elemental baseness, rejected by a higher religious existence, a 
fascinating quote from Kierkegaard’s journals inverts this hierarchy, 
Everything ends with hearing—the rules of grammar end with hearing—the command 
of the law with hearing—the figured bass ends with hearing—the philosophical 
system ends with hearing—therefore the next life is also represented as pure music, as 
a great harmony—would that the dissonance of my life would soon be resolved in 
it.184 [Italics added] 
2.6 Conclusion 
The primary contribution that Kierkegaard makes to this project is his framing of the research 
question. In this chapter, through Kierkegaard’s work, we have delineated the term “aesthetic 
existence” as sensory immediacy lived in the context of self-formation. The question we are 
asking, which we put to Kierkegaard, is what role, if any, does aesthetic existence play in 
becoming Christian? His response is both negative and positive. For Kierkegaard, Romantic 
aestheticism and Danish Christendom provided a fertile context within which a pseudo-reality 
could be created through the fantastical creation of the self. Such an illusory self-creation 
feeds off both the immediacy and reflectivity of unqualified aesthetic existence, as an 
immature life stage, hence his rejection of this mode of living aesthetically in religious 
existence. Since both aestheticism and Christendom continue to flourish today, Kierkegaard’s 
warning here remains all too relevant. This is particularly notable in relation to postmodern 
deconstruction, which as Walsh suggests “bears a close resemblance to the early German 
romantic mode of living poetically … in the assertion of an endless process of 
experimentation and play with a multiplicity of interpretations and roles in language, or 
writing.”185 But it is the application in the everyday, amidst contemporary expressions of 
Christendom and consumerism, which particularly calls for further analysis. 
On the positive side, Kierkegaard embraces the aesthetic in the life of faith through his 
recovery of poetic living. This points to the integral role the imagination plays in the 
relationship between aesthetic existence and self-development, a relationship we will explore 
more deeply as the project unfolds. Self-development as discipleship, for Kierkegaard, is the 
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imitation of the absolute paradox of Christ in one’s life, thereby embracing life in Christ as 
both finite material givenness and, through the grace of God, the infinite. This entails an 
embrace of faith as a passion to be exercised in embodied actuality, amidst the everyday. 
There is, therefore, a sense of immediacy and embodiment inextricably bound up within 
Christian living.  
However, as is evident in the examples of an outing to Deer Park and engagement with music 
above, while a close reading provides evidence of Kierkegaard’s embrace of the aesthetic in 
Christian living, he does not explicitly endorse sensory immediacy as a fundamental aspect of 
becoming Christian. While it is difficult to discern the extent to which his reticence is: a 
genuine reservation he held; a result of his method of indirect communication; or the 
consequence of the rhetoric he employed in response to his context, it has produced scholarly 
dissonance regarding the interpretation of Kierkegaard’s stance on the matter. Even in 
arguing, as we have here, that Kierkegaard held a qualified and limited endorsement of 
aesthetic existence in Christian living, it is clear that we will need to move beyond 
Kierkegaard to explore whether such a relation is valid, and if so, what the implications are 
for discipleship. It is therefore to Bonhoeffer’s call for a recovery of aesthetic existence in the 
life of the church that we now turn.  
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CHAPTER 3: BONHOEFFER & THE CELEBRATION OF 
AESTHETIC EXISTENCE 
Introduction 
As noted in the previous chapter, Dietrich Bonhoeffer was not only familiar with 
Kierkegaard’s work, but drew from and built upon Kierkegaardian concepts that emanated 
from a mutual concern regarding the nature of discipleship amidst Christendom. In this 
chapter, therefore, we will use Bonhoeffer’s work to further frame the concept of aesthetic 
existence, as it will be used for the remainder of this project. Further, we will explore 
Bonhoeffer’s positive understanding of the relation between aesthetic existence and Christian 
living, grounded in his Christological perspective of this-worldliness and his consequent 
affirmation of penultimate reality. 
 It may not seem immediately obvious why Bonhoeffer can contribute to the question of 
aesthetic existence. After all, his discussion of aesthetics is limited, and he certainly did not 
develop a systematic perspective of theological aesthetics.1 However, in this chapter we will 
see that Bonhoeffer’s theology, in particular his perspective of reality, undergirds his view of 
aesthetic existence, thereby pointing to the fundamental role that aesthetic existence plays in 
being human and becoming Christian. While the contribution that Bonhoeffer explicitly 
makes is primarily limited to the celebration of aesthetic existence in being Christian, 
implicitly, through his embrace of aesthetic existence in his own life, its formative role in 
becoming Christian is clear. This can be seen through the formative role that his experience of 
music played in his theology, by way of the musical metaphors he engaged. 
3.1 Bonhoeffer’s Call for a Recovery of Aesthetic Existence 
In a letter written while in prison, dated 23 January 1944, Bonhoeffer discusses the nature of 
friendship with his close friend, Eberhard Bethge. Bonhoeffer considers under which mandate 
friendship falls: marriage and family, work, state or church.2 His conclusion is that it is 
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probably best to consider friendship within the realms of culture and education (Bildung).3 
However, the natures of culture and Bildung do not fit neatly within any of the mandates. If 
this is so, where do they belong? For Bonhoeffer, the response is that they belong within the 
sphere of freedom (Spielraum) rather than the sphere of obedience.4  
I wonder whether – it almost seems so today – it is only from the concept of the 
church that we can regain the understanding of the sphere of freedom (art, education 
[Bildung], friendship, play). This means that “aesthetic existence” (Kierkegaard) is 
not to be banished from the church’s sphere; rather, it is precisely within the church 
that it would be founded anew… Who in our time could, for example, lightheartedly 
make music, nurture friendship, play, and be happy? Certainly not the “ethical” 
person, but only the Christian. Precisely because friendship belongs within the scope 
of this freedom (“of the Christian person”!?), we must defend it confidently against all 
“ethical” existences that may frown upon it – certainly without claiming for it the 
“necessitas” of a divine command, but by claiming the “necessitas” of freedom!5 
[Italics added] 
This conversation offers a helpful anchor-point for our discussion of Bonhoeffer’s perspective 
on aesthetic existence. There are a few important observations for us to make, pointing to 
questions that we will need to explore in Bonhoeffer’s thought for resolution.  
Firstly, and perhaps most fundamentally, why does Bonhoeffer seem so concerned to regain 
space for aesthetic existence? On the surface it would seem a strange call from a theologian 
who has become popularly known for his rejection of “cheap grace,” which it could be 
argued, would equally be a rejection of aestheticism, and would hardly seem to resonate with 
his endorsement of the “endless manifold struggle of the spirit against the flesh.”6 It appears 
that this call for aesthetic existence goes against the essence of what he stood for. Does this 
represent a reversal of Bonhoeffer’s position, or is there more to it than this superficial 
reading would suggest? How can Bonhoeffer, with integrity, suggest that aesthetic existence 
is an integral part of being Christian? And consequently, what are the implications for this 
understanding of aesthetic existence in the everyday? 
                                                
3 Bonhoeffer refers to Bildung, translated as “education,” which we should recall was a 
pivotal concept in Kierkegaard’s recovery of poetic living. Bildung is thus closely connected 
to the aesthetic and formative process of poeticising (as conceived by Kierkegaard), a point to 
which we will later return. 
4 John de Gruchy notes, “Spielraum literally means ‘room to play’ or ‘leeway.’ The ‘sphere of 
freedom’ thus means a space in which one can be creative, take risks, experiment, in other 
words where ‘aesthetic existence’ becomes possible.” Again, this has a clear relation to 
Kierkegaard’s framing of aesthetic existence as a mode of playful experimentation. See 
footnote 23 in Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 8:268. 
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Secondly, and partly in response to these questions, the relationship between the sphere of 
freedom and the sphere of obedience is critical to our discussion. For the moment, it will 
suffice to note that for Bonhoeffer, friendship is justified through the “necessitas” of freedom. 
Bonhoeffer’s reasoning as to the basis of this “necessitas” is anchored in what it means to be 
fully human, and fully Christian, “Someone who doesn’t know anything of this sphere of 
freedom can be a good parent, citizen, and worker, and probably also be a Christian, but 
whether such a person is a full human being (and thus also a Christian in the fullest sense) is 
questionable to me.”7 To understand why Bonhoeffer would claim that the sphere of freedom, 
and consequently aesthetic existence, plays a humanising role in life, we need to explore his 
description of reality, to which we shall momentarily turn. 
Thirdly, this raises the question of the relationship between aesthetic existence and ethical 
existence. Bonhoeffer’s use of quotation marks regarding “ethical” existences indicates that 
he is here referring to a caricature of the “ethical” person, as described by Kierkegaard’s life 
stages. We need to work towards uncovering Bonhoeffer’s perspective of the truly integrated 
ethico-religious person, as opposed to an ethical caricature based on a reductionist reading of 
Kierkegaard, in order to discern what, if any, contribution aesthetic existence offers ethics. 
Again, starting with Bonhoeffer’s description of reality will help us to do this. 
Finally, Bonhoeffer offers a description (if not definition) of aesthetic existence, which we 
can use to further develop our framing of the term for this project. Understanding aesthetic 
existence within the sphere of Spielraum is a helpful starting point, with expressions of 
aesthetic existence being play, friendship, art and Bildung.8 If Kierkegaard refers to aesthetic 
existence in relation to enjoying life, the “play of unending freedom,” and sensory existence 
purely in the moment, then Bonhoeffer appears to be suggesting that such immediacy should 
be taken up into Christian living. A narrow reading of Kierkegaard (in which aesthetic 
existence is rejected by the more mature stages of ethical and then religious existence) is 
therefore at odds with Bonhoeffer’s position here. As argued in the previous chapter, even 
though a more nuanced reading of Kierkegaard shows that he does indeed embrace the 
aesthetic and poetic in religious existence, it is a qualified and limited affirmation of aesthetic 
existence in Christian living, wherein he appears particularly reticent to explicitly suggest that 
sensory immediacy can play a role in becoming Christian. It can be argued, therefore, that 
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even though Bonhoeffer here is not directly contradicting this nuanced Kierkegaardian 
reading, he appears to be more positive about sensory immediacy in the life of faith. Further, 
by connecting aesthetic existence with not only play and art, but also with friendship and 
Bildung, Bonhoeffer seems to be suggesting that sensory immediacy can be positively 
integrated with formative and relational poetic categories.9 In doing so, he appears to be 
challenging Kierkegaard’s distinction between immature aesthetic existence as a first 
immediacy (outer) and mature aesthetic existence as a second immediacy (inner). Bonhoeffer 
may here be suggesting that mature aesthetic existence in the life of faith is not only inner 
immediacy, but also integrates and embraces outer sensory immediacy.10 This is a hypothesis 
that we will need to test as we further explore his perspective, grounded in his conception of 
reality.  
3.2 The Christological Affirmation of Worldly Reality 
The objective of exploring Bonhoeffer’s conception of reality is twofold: Firstly, to articulate 
his description of reality, which will clarify the role of everyday aesthetic existence in being 
human and becoming Christian. Secondly, to explore Bonhoeffer’s perspective on the process 
of how we come to understand reality and the implications this may have for the formative 
role of aesthetic existence in discipleship. 
3.2.1 Bonhoeffer’s Description of Reality 
In resonance with an objective that underlies Kierkegaard’s rejection of both Romantic 
aestheticism and comfortable Christendom, John de Gruchy notes that the challenge of 
overcoming the gulf between idealism and reality underlies much of Bonhoeffer’s theology.11 
As with Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer’s response to this question is fundamentally Christological. 
To Bonhoeffer, any discussion of reality must inevitably begin with ultimate reality – God. 
Any quest to uncover reality necessarily faces the challenge of distinguishing between reality 
and appearance, and for Bonhoeffer the ability to discern the difference is the essence of 
                                                
9 “Poetic” is here used as we framed the term in the previous chapter through Kierkegaard’s 
conception of poetic living, thus relating to the imaginative and existentially formative task of 
divine-human co-creation. 
10 Recall Kierkegaard’s conception of music as the aesthetic experience that most aptly 
represents sensory immediacy, in conjunction with Bonhoeffer’s endorsement here of 
“lightheartedly making music” as an expression of Christian living. We will return to this 
point when considering the spotlight on music at the end of the chapter. 
11 De Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation, 163. 
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discipleship.12 Knowing reality is not knowing about reality, but rather seeing into the essence 
of things, seeing ultimate reality.13 The only way to know ultimate reality is through 
revelation, in particular, revelation of the Living Word, Jesus Christ. The key point here is 
that this revelation is not doctrine about God, but is itself the essence of all existence: Jesus’ 
word creates existence anew.14  
It then follows that all attempts to comprehend reality must necessarily start with recognition 
of ultimate reality. All else is abstraction.15 This resonates with a common claim in the field 
of theological aesthetics: if we are to understand the world in light of ultimate reality, it 
demands a greater appreciation of the aesthetic sphere of existence.16 This is so because 
ultimate reality lies beyond the finitude of rational comprehension. In other words, ultimate 
reality lies beyond the propositional, within the realm of mystery. As Calvin Seerveld puts it, 
aesthetic experience can offer us allusive pointers to what lies beyond; these aesthetic pointers 
function as signposts for navigating this world.17 Such is the nature of the human experience 
of wonder. Once again, the challenge lies here with the gulf between idealism (that which lies 
beyond) and reality (of this world). If ultimate reality is true reality, but somehow removed 
from us in the pale here and now, how and where do these two worlds, or realities, meet? 
While Bonhoeffer agrees with the fundamental importance of starting with ultimate reality, 
his argument for the revelation of ultimate reality is not nearly as platonic. It is not about 
creating some sense, or image, of ultimate reality as the ideal, removed, but significant for the 
way in which we live. He rejects any notion of idealism as a means of navigating reality. 
Rather, it is “in Jesus Christ that the reality of God has entered into the reality of the world.” 
The disparity between “ought” and “is” is eradicated in Christ.18 Critically, reality can only be 
known by participating in the reality of Christ. Through the incarnation, death and 
resurrection of Christ the two worlds have been united, and by participating in the reality of 
Christ, one participates not only in the ultimate reality of God, but also in the reality of the 
world. If this is the description of reality, then reality and goodness are intertwined. This is 
                                                
12 Bonhoeffer, Discipleship, 2003, 4:178. 
13 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, ed. Clifford J. Green, vol. 6, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works 
English (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 81. 
14 Bonhoeffer, 6:62. 
15 Bonhoeffer, 6:54. 
16 As argued, for instance, in Avis, God and the Creative Imagination: Metaphor, Symbol, 
and Myth in Religion and Theology. 
17 See Begbie’s discussion of Seerveld’s concept of allusiveness in Jeremy Begbie, Voicing 
Creation’s Praise: Towards a Theology of the Arts (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 135ff. 
18 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 6:54. 
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the basis of Bonhoeffer’s ethics. “The question of the good becomes the question of 
participating in God’s reality revealed in Christ.”19 
3.2.2 Bonhoeffer’s Embrace of This-Worldly Reality 
Participation in becoming fully human, as Christ became human, provides the impetus behind 
Bonhoeffer’s encouragement to embrace “this-worldliness.” The Christian life is not defined 
by religion, but rather a mature worldliness. It is “living fully in the midst of life’s tasks, 
questions, successes and failures, experiences, and perplexities.”20 It is only here, 
participating with God in this-worldly, incarnational experiences, located within a particular 
time and a particular place that true faith is learned. “This is how one becomes a human 
being, a Christian.”21 To Bonhoeffer, faith, and how this is lived out in the world, is not a 
matter of systematic doctrine, which is first and foremost articulated through a conceptual 
framework. Rather, faith takes seriously the finitude and fragility of being human within this 
world. Claiming that action is always in response to a carefully considered principle, 
conceptual ideal or ultimate duty “is a misjudgement of historical human existence in which 
everything has its time (Ecclesiastes 3) – eating, drinking, sleeping, as well as conscious 
decision making and acting, working and resting, serving a purpose and just being without 
purpose, meeting obligations and following inclinations, striving and playing, abstaining and 
rejoicing.”22 It is particularly important for us to note here the value that Bonhoeffer places on 
the non-utilitarian expressions of human life. For Bonhoeffer, moments of rest, play, 
enjoyment, and “just being without a purpose” are an important part of what it means to be 
human, and therefore a fundamental aspect of being Christian. Aesthetic existence is thus not 
distinguished from religious existence; rather, they cohere in the life of the Christian. The life 
of the world matters because there is simply no dichotomy between the reality of God and the 
reality of the world, which come together in the reality of Christ; thus Bonhoeffer’s comment, 
for example, that the best “Christological” interpretation of the Song of Solomon is to “read it 
as a song about earthly love.”23 
                                                
19 Bonhoeffer, 6:50. 
20 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 8:486. 
21 Bonhoeffer, 8:486. 
22 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 6:365. 
23 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 8:410. 
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3.2.2.1 Embracing Both Aesthetic Existence and Costly Discipleship 
The objection may be raised at this point that there seems to be a lack of consistency in 
Bonhoeffer’s thinking regarding the value of aesthetic existence. While he clearly does 
embrace the aesthetic in his later writings, particularly Letters and Papers from Prison, in 
some of his earlier writing he appears to be distinctly opposed to the aesthetic life. For 
example, in Discipleship there is an apparent dichotomy between the Christian and the world. 
Christians are “to engage the world in a frontal assault … in order that their ‘unworldliness’ 
might become fully visible.”24 “The world celebrates, and they stand apart. The world shrieks 
‘Enjoy life’, and they grieve.”25 It would seem difficult to integrate Bonhoeffer’s later 
embrace of aesthetic existence with this apparent rejection of the life of the world. However, a 
more careful examination will show that there is continuity in Bonhoeffer’s thought, even 
while there is indeed a significant theological development. This can be illustrated by briefly 
considering: the consistency of his personal aesthetic appreciation across his lifetime; the 
context and style of the respective writings; and the trajectory of his theology.  
While it does indeed appear that Bonhoeffer, through his later writing, expressed greater 
appreciation for the aesthetic, arguably Bonhoeffer always embraced an implicit sense of 
aesthetic appreciation. From a young age, as part of a family with significant social standing, 
Bonhoeffer was exposed to the arts. In particular, Bonhoeffer flourished as a musician, his 
father hoping that Bonhoeffer would choose the career path of concert pianist. Throughout 
Bonhoeffer’s life, his love for music never waned, as evidenced by his regular references to 
music, and his discovery and adoption of African-American “spirituals.” As de Gruchy points 
out, while the earlier years of Bonhoeffer’s life did not include theological reflection on the 
aesthetic, the aesthetic was constantly present as an important part of Bonhoeffer’s life, and 
references to art and aesthetics are scattered throughout his writings.26 De Gruchy therefore 
suggests that “aesthetic existence was an essential part of [Bonhoeffer’s] own education and 
cultural formation (Bildung).”27 The point is confirmed by Bonhoeffer’s niece, Renate 
Bethge, who affirms de Gruchy’s claim, noting that it “was so normal for us and for him, as 
we played music often, even games sometimes, that I did not see that there was much new 
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Bonhoeffer Works English (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 244. 
25 Bonhoeffer, 4:103. 
26 De Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation, 138. 
27 De Gruchy, 150. 
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like a ‘turn to the aesthetic.”28 There is no doubt that during his time in prison Bonhoeffer 
explored the aesthetic more intentionally than before, writing a novel, a play and expressing 
himself through poetry. Nevertheless, there is no discontinuity in Bonhoeffer’s appreciation 
of the aesthetic, but rather explicit reflection and engagement with that which had hitherto 
been largely implicit.29  
Secondly, it is helpful to identify differences in the style of Bonhoeffer’s writing, as dictated 
by context. The context of prison (and all that accompanied this phase of Bonhoeffer’s life: 
separation from fiancé, friends and family; the failed assassination attempt; the war drawing 
to a close, etc.) proved catalytic for a reflective, even at times effusive style.30 By contrast, the 
rhetoric that Bonhoeffer employs in Discipleship makes it clear that he is here concerned with 
“struggle” writing. At the time of its writing, Bonhoeffer would not have identified himself 
with the broader German resistance struggle, but he is writing as an ecclesial activist, working 
to challenge the church to greater faithfulness. The urgency of the task at hand – the health of 
the church amidst the destructive turmoil of Nazi Germany – demanded a stark, binary 
description of the options moving forward. Resonating with the task that befell Kierkegaard in 
his “attack on Christendom,” this was a matter of ultimate concern, with no room for 
compromise.  
Thirdly, theologically, we find both a consistent trajectory as well as a significant new 
development. Bonhoeffer’s close friend, Eberhard Bethge, has insightfully shown that 
Bonhoeffer’s action and thought can be organized around three phases of his life.31 Popular 
works in the middle period, such as Discipleship (previously published as The Cost of 
Discipleship) and Life Together, have been contrasted (as we did above) with writing from his 
                                                
28 De Gruchy, 150 footnote 59. Eberhard Bethge also affirms that even during the years of the 
Finkenwalde Seminary (which provided much of the impetus for the writing of Discipleship), 
Bonhoeffer loved playing games, and “nobody in Finkenwalde was more eager for plays and 
music than he.” See Eberhard Bethge, ‘The Challenge of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Life and 
Theology’, The Alden-Tuthill Lectures, The Chicago Theological Seminary Register LI, no. 2 
(February 1961): 24. 
29 The formative impact of this implicit engagement with the aesthetic should not be 
underestimated, as will be argued in the next two chapters in particular. Even in Bonhoeffer’s 
life it is notable that his everyday engagement with music, for example, significantly shaped 
his explicit theological thinking. This is a point we will consider more closely at the end of 
this chapter. 
30 We would also do well to bear in mind the genre of writing that we are dealing with, Letters 
and Papers from Prison accentuating this difference by virtue of the nature of these 
documents.  
31 Bethge, ‘The Challenge of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s Life and Theology’. 
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final phase, thereby arguing for an aesthetic turn.32 However, Bethge shows that there is clear 
continuity between the first and third phase, the second phase being a reaction necessitated by 
the Church Struggle, as noted above. Bethge points out that right from the start, as a student, 
Bonhoeffer was immersed in the antirationalistic trend of the German Youth Movement with 
its terminology of the philosophy of life.33 “This-worldliness” was therefore not a late 
discovery for Bonhoeffer, even though he may not have used the term at this point. In this 
first phase, a driving concern was the “concrete nature of the message.”34  
If Christology is the consistent core of Bonhoeffer’s theology, then the incarnation is at the 
heart of this from the start.35 To illustrate Bonhoeffer’s this-worldly Christology, even in this 
early phase, Bethge quotes Bonhoeffer, “The community of Christ is not the meeting place of 
those apart from life, but the center of life; the center of men ‘who persevere together in the 
midst of the world, in the depths of it, in its trivialities and bondages.’ This reads like a 
quotation from one of the prisoner letters, but it was said [more than ten years prior to his 
imprisonment] in November, 1932.”36 It is for this reason that the second phase, a necessary 
response to Nazism, is sometimes considered an interruption, a detour from the trajectory of 
Bonhoeffer’s this-worldly theology. Amidst the horrors of the time, “the world becomes the 
threatening jungle which must be passed through.”37 While still Christological in focus, the 
circumstances demanded exposition through the lens of eschatology rather than creation 
theology. Bethge shows that in the third phase, it is not Bonhoeffer’s Christology that 
changes, but rather the conceptual backdrop of “the world come of age.”38 This leads to a 
critique of religion, since it is religion that separates the practice of Christianity from the 
world. Firstly, this is due to the individualistic inwardness of religion (a critique that lies at 
the heart of Bonhoeffer’s rejection of Kierkegaard’s distinction between an “inner” second 
immediacy in the life of faith, as opposed to the “outer” first immediacy of the aesthete). 
Secondly, the metaphysical nature of religion necessarily creates two realms of existence, 
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34 Bethge, 7. 
35 Bethge, 8. 
36 Bethge, 13. 
37 Bethge, 18. 
38 Bethge, 32. 
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which consequently devalues sensory existence. Thirdly, religion as a “province of life” is 
relegated to an increasingly isolated and disconnected sphere of life. Finally, religion is 
entrenched in the deus ex machine concept, “God must be there for providing answers, 
solutions, protection, and help.”39 In this final phase, Bonhoeffer is therefore concerned with 
recovering the worldliness of Christianity, a trajectory established in the first phase with its 
incarnational focus.  
This leads to a critical point for this project: while it may not be completely accurate to 
describe this third phase as a turn to the aesthetic, for the first time in this phase, Bonhoeffer 
begins to explicitly explore theology through the lens of aesthetic reflection. In other words, 
while there is consistency in his thought throughout the three phases, here he approaches the 
Christian life from a slightly different perspective, using different terminology. Whether he 
was consciously aware of this development is not clear. While it is difficult to predict exactly 
how this exploration would have unfolded had he not been executed, it seems reasonable to 
surmise that it would have gone on to play a significant role in his work from this point 
onwards. Careful observation of both the trajectory of the three stages, as well as the nature of 
this new development offers us important clues as to what lay behind Bonhoeffer’s positive 
theological stance on aesthetic existence. 
In light of this, it is most fruitful to explore the phases of Bonhoeffer’s life and thought 
alongside one another. As Bethge has pointed out, the Christological expansiveness of the 
first and third phase is most helpfully perceived alongside the exclusiveness of the second 
phase.40 He points to Bonhoeffer’s assertion in Ethics affirming that, “The more exclusively 
we recognize and confess Christ as our Lord, the more will be disclosed to us the breadth of 
Christ’s lordship.”41 Even amidst the exclusive and binary context of the second phase, a 
close reading of Discipleship makes it clear that behind the rhetoric there is continuity in 
Bonhoeffer’s thinking about the Christological, this-worldly nature of reality. Discipleship is 
this-worldly, but it is a mature, disciplined this-worldliness, as opposed to a self-seeking 
worldliness. This explains apparent oxymorons, such as, “The ‘unworldliness’ of the 
Christian life is meant to take place in the midst of this world.” It is in “daily life” amidst 
“secular vocation” that the Christian life is to be played out.42 The quote mentioned earlier, 
encouraging Christians “to engage the world in a frontal assault” goes on to explain that this 
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41 Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 6:344. 
42 Bonhoeffer, Discipleship, 2003, 4:245. 
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needs to happen in the world, “The world must be contradicted within the world.”43 In other 
words, an accurate vision of Christological, this-worldly reality needs to be lived out amidst 
distorted, self-seeking visions of reality. This is consistent with Bonhoeffer’s description of 
this-worldliness in Letters and Papers from Prison. Here, he contrasts the two senses of this-
worldliness, “I do not mean the shallow and banal this-worldliness of the enlightened, the 
bustling, the comfortable, or the lascivious, but the profound this-worldliness that shows 
discipline and includes the ever-present knowledge of death and resurrection.”44 
Fundamentally, in Discipleship Bonhoeffer is confronting the issue of how to be a Christian 
in the world, in light of being a Christian against the world, while in Letters and Papers he is 
dealing with the issue of being a Christian in and for the world. 
Bonhoeffer’s two senses of this-worldliness are a helpful clue to understanding his 
endorsement of aesthetic existence. He is clearly arguing for the fact that everyday life in the 
world is a fundamental part of being human, yet he is also qualifying the claim. It is a 
disciplined life in the world, or mature worldliness, that he is presenting as a vision of the 
Christian life, in contrast to a self-seeking worldliness. In the terms of our enquiry, this would 
be Bonhoeffer’s distinction between mature aesthetic existence and aestheticism. Rather than 
aesthetic existence being ultimate reality itself, mature aesthetic existence is lived in light of 
ultimate reality. A question follows: How does this distinction play out in practice, in the 
everyday? What does mature aesthetic existence look like? We shall return to this important 
query shortly. In order to explore it, we need to first deal with Bonhoeffer’s distinction 
between the “ultimate” and “penultimate.” 
3.2.3 Ultimate and Penultimate Reality 
As we have seen, although there is continuity in Bonhoeffer’s thinking around worldliness, 
there is also a maturing process, cultivated by changing circumstances, which leads to a 
significant shift in his approach. We can see this in the very same letter from prison we 
referred to above, discussing “this-worldliness.” Here, while standing by the essential 
message of Discipleship, Bonhoeffer reflects on the “dangers” of the book, intimating that he 
would have written it differently had he to write it again. He explains that for a long time he 
thought he “could learn to have faith by trying to live something like a saintly life,” writing 
“Discipleship at the end of this path.” Later he discovered that “one only learns to have faith 
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by living in the full this-worldliness of life.”45 Prior to writing Discipleship, Bonhoeffer had 
spent much of his energy working within the realm of the church. Following the book, he 
spent more time collaborating with others, outside of the church, in the resistance movement. 
Here he engaged with non-Christians committed to the fight for human dignity. This appears 
to have stimulated his thinking around what it means to be fully human in the world. As 
noted, his focus was shifting from the binary struggle of being a Christian amidst the war, to 
envisioning the future of Christianity after the war. Or, using Bonhoeffer’s terminology, it is 
helpful to consider Discipleship as a work dealing primarily with the “ultimate,” while later, 
particularly when exploring the “sphere of freedom,” Bonhoeffer spends more time on the 
“penultimate.”  
Bonhoeffer describes the “ultimate” as “justification of the sinner by grace alone.”46 God’s 
mercy to a sinner is God’s final word. It is ultimate in two senses. Firstly, it is qualitatively 
ultimate, “There is no word of God that goes beyond God’s grace.” Secondly, it is temporally 
ultimate, “Something penultimate always precedes it, some action, suffering, movement, 
intention, defeat, recovery, pleading, hoping – in short, quite literally a span of time at whose 
end it stands.”47 Bonhoeffer explores the question of what the relationship is between the 
ultimate and penultimate. He points to two unhelpful responses: Firstly, a radical response can 
see only the ultimate of value, the ultimate and penultimate being “in mutually exclusive 
opposition.”48 From this perspective “everything penultimate in human behavior is sin and 
denial.”49 Secondly, the compromise response asserts that since the ultimate and penultimate 
are distinct, “The penultimate retains its inherent rights, but it is not threatened or endangered 
by the ultimate.”50 These are both problematic responses because, “They make the 
penultimate and the ultimate mutually exclusive… One absolutizes the end, the other 
absolutizes what exists.”51  
It is helpful to illustrate how this concept has been applied to a theological perspective of 
politics, and then to draw a parallel to aesthetics. Robin Lovin applies Bonhoeffer’s 
description of the penultimate in articulating the approach of a Christian realist, a political 
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strategy which acknowledges that it is often more helpful to focus on “limitation and balance” 
than “final victory.”52 
Concentration on the penultimate requires, according to Bonhoeffer, a rejection both 
of the radical politics that is willing to destroy anything and everything for the sake of 
ultimate truth and of the compromises that, by suspending judgement until ultimate 
truth is fully present, slip by degrees into relativism. The Christian realist shares the 
radical’s dissatisfaction with injustice, but focuses on responsible choices among the 
concrete possibilities now available.53 
Lovin is here echoing Reinhold Niebuhr’s suggestion (amidst the context of social and 
political action in Nazi Germany) that, “An adequate religion is always an ultimate optimism 
which has entertained all the facts that lead to pessimism.”54 Politically then, hope is found by 
embracing the penultimate in light of the ultimate. The same applies to aesthetics. The 
ultimate (beauty, as the vision of God) informs the penultimate (aesthetic existence). 
If the ultimate and penultimate are both important, Bonhoeffer suggests that the key to their 
integration is a Christological understanding of reality, incorporating the incarnation, death 
and resurrection of Christ. “A Christian ethic built only on the incarnation would lead easily 
to the compromise solution; an ethic built only on the crucifixion or only on the resurrection 
of Jesus Christ would fall into radicalism and enthusiasm. The conflict is resolved only in 
their unity.”55 Jesus Christ, the human being, “lets human reality exist as penultimate, neither 
making it self-sufficient nor destroying it.”56 The penultimate matters because it is in Christ 
that “the reality of God encounters the reality of the world and allows us to take part in this 
real encounter.”57 Bonhoeffer points out that, logically, nothing can be self-referentially 
penultimate; it is always penultimate in relation to the ultimate. In other words, while the 
penultimate precedes the ultimate, it “does not determine the ultimate; the ultimate determines 
the penultimate.”58 Concretely, from the perspective of the ultimate, “two things are 
addressed as penultimate: being human and being good.”59 A critical assertion necessarily 
follows this claim: “the penultimate must be preserved for the sake of the ultimate. Arbitrary 
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destruction of the penultimate seriously harms the ultimate. When, for example, a human life 
is deprived of the conditions that are part of being human, the justification of such a life by 
grace and faith is at least seriously hindered, if not made impossible.”60  This does not mean 
that anything done in the penultimate can guarantee, or even initiate the ultimate, but it does 
mean that preparation can be made for the reception of the word. Herein lies the importance 
of this concept for our discussion of the role of aesthetic existence in Christian life.  
The realm of freedom – encompassing play, friendship, the arts, etc. – is an expression of the 
penultimate. While the realm of freedom is not the ultimate, it retains significance in light of 
Bonhoeffer’s Christological view of reality; this affirmation of the penultimate means that 
aesthetic existence is an important aspect of Christian life. However, as we have noted, it is a 
qualified endorsement of aesthetic existence. The error lies in making aesthetic existence 
absolute. Or, in other words, allowing the penultimate to become the ultimate. As long as 
aesthetic existence is considered penultimate, Bonhoeffer not only affirms it, but calls for its 
recovery, because it is a celebration of what it means to be human. It is an embodiment of 
Christological this-worldliness.  
We could describe this as Bonhoeffer’s explicit affirmation of aesthetic existence. 
Bonhoeffer, however, also infers an implicit affirmation of everyday aesthetic existence, as an 
agent in the process of formation [Bildung]. The penultimate prepares the way for the 
ultimate. We cannot control the ultimate, for we engage reality in the penultimate. We cannot 
bring in the kingdom, but we can act in anticipation of it. We cannot initiate the word of 
grace, but we can either nurture a receptive environment, or hinder it. In Bonhoeffer’s words, 
“There are conditions of the heart, of life, and in the world that especially hinder the receiving 
of grace, that is, which make it infinitely difficult to believe.”61 Which gives rise to the 
question, does everyday aesthetic existence create “conditions of the heart” which nurture or 
hinder belief?62 In order to explore Bonhoeffer’s implicit response to this question, we will 
shift from discussing his description of reality, to his view on the process whereby we 
comprehend Christological reality and participate in it, in other words “discipleship.”  
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3.3 Discipleship as Seeing and Partaking in Reality 
While Discipleship is hardly the first work one would think to turn to in order to consider 
Bonhoeffer’s validation of aesthetic existence, it contains an implicit understanding of the 
fundamental role that the aesthetic plays in being human and becoming Christian. We will 
initially consider this in relation to the book as it stands, before exploring how this may have 
been developed had Bonhoeffer had the opportunity to elaborate further on his thinking 
regarding aesthetic existence. 
3.3.1 Imagining Reality 
As we have discussed, Bonhoeffer suggests that reality should be seen in light of the ultimate. 
In other words, when confronted by identical this-worldly stimuli, a Christological perception 
of worldly reality differs from a non-Christological perception. Bonhoeffer describes this as 
seeing into the essence, or the depth of things, seeing reality in God.63 This is significant 
because what Bonhoeffer is describing here is an imaginative act – the human ability to “see 
as.”64 In Discipleship, a repeated theme is sight/image/vision/the eye, etc. For Bonhoeffer, 
discipleship is the ability to see reality in light of Christ, to see beyond appearances, to see the 
kingdom, which is the real. “The disciples always see only Christ. They do not see Christ and 
the law, Christ and piety, Christ and the world … so their vision is simple … If the eye sees 
something other than what is real, then the whole body is deceived. If the heart clings to the 
appearances of the world, to the creatures instead of the creator, then the disciple is lost”65 
The path of costly discipleship is understanding reality in light of Christ, “no longer seeing 
oneself, only him who is going ahead…”66 Earlier we quoted Bonhoeffer speaking of the 
world celebrating life, while Christians stand apart, as a potential example of Bonhoeffer’s 
rejection of this-worldliness. But in that passage, as in the other example we considered, 
Bonhoeffer goes on to illustrate that it is the two senses of this-worldliness that he is 
contrasting. “The world celebrates, and they stand apart. The world shrieks ‘Enjoy life,’ and 
they grieve. They see that the ship, on which there are festive cheers and celebrating, is 
already leaking. While the world imagines progress, strength, and a grand future, the disciples 
know about the end, judgment, and the arrival of the kingdom of heaven, for which the world 
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is not at all ready.”67 [Italics added] Faced with the same sensory stimuli, Bonhoeffer is 
presenting two ways of imagining the world, two ways of “seeing as.”  
However, Bonhoeffer wants to make it clear that these are not simply two equally valid 
perspectives on the way things are, he is contrasting an illusory understanding of the world, 
which is nothing but appearances, with a perception of the real. Discipleship is learning how 
to tell the difference.68 In other words, again echoing Kierkegaard, the imagination is a human 
faculty which can either aid our perception of reality or distort it. As we can see in the quote 
just mentioned above, Bonhoeffer is highly critical of the fantastical use of the imagination 
when it comes to perception of reality. Even with the noblest intentions of living a good life, 
if this is not grounded in reality it is the “craziest Don Quixotry.”69 It is the equivalent of Don 
Quixote riding into battle with imaginary armour for “the chosen lady of his heart who 
doesn’t even exist.”70 It is mere fantasy.71 Disconnecting goodness from Christological reality 
leads to a distorted vision of what it means to live the good life. In terms of aesthetic 
existence, aesthetic experience easily becomes the absolute measure of goodness, leading to 
aestheticism, and the concomitant rift between aesthetics, ethics and faith – with faith 
relegated to the “spiritual” realm of existence. 
If then, on the one hand, the distortion of reality by a fantastical use of the imagination is 
problematic, on the other, the productive imagination plays an important role in discipleship; 
seeing Christological reality requires this paradigmatic function of the imagination.72 To see 
the kingdom of God is to see reality through the paradigm of Christ. Seeing this-worldly 
reality in light of ultimate reality requires a way of seeing that is not limited to finite, rational 
proposition. In other words, imaginative constructs such as metaphor, symbol, and story 
become indispensable tools for such envisioning of reality. This is evidenced by Jesus’ use of 
parables to describe the kingdom of God. For example, to communicate the essence of costly 
grace, Bonhoeffer draws on the metaphors Jesus employs: It is “the hidden treasure in the 
field, for the sake of which people go and sell with joy everything they have. It is the costly 
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pearl, for whose price the merchant sells all that he has…”73 Bonhoeffer’s description of 
discipleship is founded on the importance of a new way of seeing reality, in which the 
imagination plays a critical role. It is a vision of reality, fuelled by aesthetic phenomenon such 
as story, metaphor and symbol, encompassing both this-worldly and divine reality.    
3.3.2 Participating in Reality 
Yet, if Bonhoeffer is arguing for an imaginative way of seeing the world, it would be a 
mistake to equate this with a conceptual, idealist image disconnected from the earthiness of 
reality. He is not suggesting that discipleship is the process of moving from idea to action. As 
previously noted, engaging Christological reality is not a question of proceeding from ideal to 
realisation, but is about participation in such reality.74 This participation is, first and foremost, 
a question of obedience. It is in the act of obedience that perception of reality is shifted. In the 
act of obedience, as Peter steps out of the boat into the waves – a this-worldly, bodily 
experience – Peter’s reality changes. Just as Kierkegaard rejected the notion that disciples can 
be “admirers,” but need to be “imitators” of Christ, Bonhoeffer proclaims that, “Any intended 
discipleship without this step [of obedience] to which Jesus calls becomes deceptive 
enthusiasts’ illusion.”75 In other words, obedience is not the consequence of seeing rightly, 
but the precursor. This is not to say that perception of reality cannot change without literal 
obedience. Bonhoeffer explains this through the story of the rich young man who Jesus 
commands to give away all his possessions as an expression of faith. The point here is not the 
giving of possessions, but rather seeing reality through Christ, so that even if we have the 
possessions, “we have them as if we did not have them.”76 As long as we understand that “it 
would be the infinitely easier way to understand Jesus’ commandment simply and obey it 
literally,” there is room for a Christological conversion of the imagination that does not entail 
literal obedience (while acknowledging that such a conversion of the imagination will 
necessarily involve a consistent form of action in the world).  Bonhoeffer therefore describes 
an organic, symbiotic and two-way relationship between obedience and perception of reality, 
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action and imagination.77 Such a relationship has clear implications for the connection 
between ethics and aesthetics. Just as any exercise of the imagination (perception of the 
kingdom) without obedience is illusion, so too aesthetics disconnected from the ethico-
religious is mere aestheticism, having lost all reference to reality.  
3.4 Implications for Everyday Aesthetic Existence 
During this brief excursus into Bonhoeffer’s description of discipleship as a process of 
coming to perceive Christological reality, we have not yet explicitly considered the role of 
everyday aesthetic existence. If a conversion of the imagination, grounded in this-worldly 
obedience is at the core of discipleship, we can return to the question of whether aesthetic 
existence hinders or nurtures this process. Bonhoeffer does not answer this question. He was 
just beginning to explore the concept when his life was cut short. What would it have looked 
like if he had further developed his thinking around aesthetic existence? Of course, we cannot 
know with certainty, but it may be helpful to further extrapolate the trajectories we have 
uncovered thus far. 
We can start with what is clear: Bonhoeffer affirmed aesthetic existence because he argued 
for the Christological nature of reality. Jesus Christ, as human, calls us to take our this-
worldly humanity seriously. Celebration of being fully human is an important task in the 
penultimate, as it paves the way for the ultimate. Bonhoeffer argued that aesthetic existence – 
friendship, play, art, Bildung – has a role to play in the affirmation of human dignity.  
However, Bonhoeffer is not endorsing this-worldliness unreservedly. As we have seen, it is a 
mature, disciplined sense of this-worldliness for which he is arguing. It follows that this 
should therefore apply to aesthetic existence, Bonhoeffer calling for a mature, disciplined 
aesthetic existence as opposed to mere aestheticism. It is tempting to borrow a phrase from 
Calvin Seerveld, and suggest that “aesthetic obedience” is what Bonhoeffer is suggesting.78 
After all, Bonhoeffer’s emphasis on obedience is grounded in a distinct sense of this-
worldliness. This means that embodiment and the senses are an integral part of this 
obedience.79 But this would be to misrepresent what Bonhoeffer is calling for in a recovery of 
aesthetic existence. It would be to impose Kierkegaard’s ethical life-attitude of permissibility 
onto a category that should be more fully understood in terms of the relational interactions of 
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becoming and being Christian. It is not the “necessitas” of obedience or divine command that 
drives Bonhoeffer’s embrace of aesthetic existence, but the “necessitas” of freedom. He is 
specifically contrasting this realm of freedom with the realm of obedience. The latter is 
marked by the response to a command or mandate, while the former is an expression of 
human freedom, not engaged for a particular purpose, outcome, or utility, but for its own 
sake, purely for the gift of “being in the moment.”80 
Bonhoeffer offers us a clue as to how he would qualify aesthetic existence by describing his 
relational understanding of freedom. “[F]reedom is not a quality that can be uncovered; it is 
not a possession, something to hand, an object … instead it is a relation and nothing else … 
Being free means ‘being-free-for-the-other’, because I am bound to the other. Only by being 
in relation with the other am I free.”81 If relationship provides the conceptual framework 
within which we should understand the realm of freedom, and consequently aesthetic 
existence, then it follows that a Christological basis of relationship should guide this 
understanding. The Christian life is a participation in Jesus’s “being-for-others.”82 If 
aestheticism is the end result of self-centred aesthetic existence, perhaps Bonhoeffer would 
argue that mature aesthetic existence is guided by love. A kenotic approach to aesthetic 
existence may appear to be an oxymoron, but it is worth exploring whether a selfless 
approach to aesthetic experience is not more likely to lead to wonder (and an accurate vision 
of reality), rather than the self-centred titillation of aestheticism (and an illusory perception of 
the real). In this sense, aesthetic existence is not only a celebration of being human, but it also 
plays a fundamental role in the revelation of reality. Bonhoeffer suggests that if love is the 
compass that orients action in the world, such action provides a new vision of reality, “love 
makes the disciple able to see.”83 Drawing from Bonhoeffer’s musical metaphors, we could 
say that love of Christ is the cantus firmus grounding the polyphony of mature aesthetic 
existence in Christological reality. To explore this more fully we need to turn to Bonhoeffer’s 
engagement with music and the way in which this influenced his own personal and 
theological formation. 
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3.5 Spotlight on Music: Sensory immediacy generates “living” metaphors 
Bonhoeffer’s love for music provides fertile ground for an investigation into the relationship 
between music, as the archetypal aesthetic experience of sensory immediacy, and Christian 
living. There are two particular aspects we will explore here, again as we did in the last 
chapter, using a focus on music to crystallise and substantiate key points in the argument 
presented.84 Firstly, based on his musical experience, Bonhoeffer draws on musical 
metaphors, which elucidate his argument, thereby offering further clarity on his embrace of 
mature aesthetic existence. Not only are these metaphors insightful, but they imply that the 
realm of free play, being in the moment musically, contributed to his explicit theology. 
Secondly, therefore, we need to consider the nature of this aesthetic contribution to his 
theology. The suggestion here is that the metaphors which Bonhoeffer employs may not 
merely be the consequence of theological reflection on aesthetic existence (music, here), but 
the inverse, that his theology may be, at least partially, the consequence of formative 
paradigms created through his musical experience. 
3.5.1 Bonhoeffer’s Personal Embrace of Music 
Here we should recall that Bonhoeffer was a proficient musician. As already noted, music was 
a constant presence in the Bonhoeffer home throughout his formative years and at one stage it 
appeared to both him and his parents that he may pursue a career as a concert pianist. By the 
age of ten he was performing Mozart sonatas, and not long after, began composing cantatas 
and trios. Saturday evenings were spent accompanying his mother and sister in “songs by 
Schubert, Schumann, Brahms and Hugo Wolf.” At seventeen, he was accompanying his sister 
on the lute as they performed at parties.85 This musically saturated existence continued 
throughout his life, references to music appearing regularly in his work. His time in Harlem 
expanded his musical appreciation, where he collected gramophone recordings of “spirituals,” 
which he would later use to introduce students at Finkenwalde to the musical genre.86 Bethge 
notes that at Finkenwalde, the “two Bechstein grand pianos … were in constant use,”87 while 
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Bonhoeffer’s extensive “collection of gramophone records, remarkable for those days, was at 
everyone’s disposal,” often playing the little-known spirituals.88 Both the Bechstein piano, as 
well as the gramophone collection had previously travelled with him to England, for his time 
there as a parish minister. Again, England was a new cultural context in which Bonhoeffer did 
not hesitate to expand his musical appreciation, adding to his gramophone collection, 
prompted by his enthusiasm for “the quality of the English choirs.”89 His rooms, here too, 
were bustling with musical activity, “playing trios and quartets” or listening to music.90 On 
occasion, notably, it was through music that he developed friendships here (recall 
Bonhoeffer’s alliance of music and friendship as modes of aesthetic existence).91  
Even in prison, deprived of these instruments and recordings, music continued to pervade 
Bonhoeffer’s existence. His letters are scattered with musical notation as he imaginatively re-
experienced these pieces “inwardly.” Hearing music “from within,” gave him “an existential 
appreciation of Beethoven’s music from when he was deaf,” and helped him to more clearly 
attune himself to the beauty of a piece.92 One particular instance of such an imaginative re-
experiencing points to the impact of music as aesthetic existence in his life. It is a portrait that 
exemplifies the experience of music as sensory immediacy. Bonhoeffer recalls leaving a 
seminar, in which the highly respected Adolf von Harnack lauded his work. He admits to still 
being “full with this” as he entered the Philharmonic Hall for a performance of Bach’s Mass 
in B minor. “Then the great ‘Kyrie eleison’ began, and at that moment everything else sank 
away completely. It was an indescribable impression. Today I am moving through it by 
memory, section by section… [It] is for me Bach’s most beautiful music.”93 [Italics added] It 
is here, in prison, that Bonhoeffer begins to think about music and aesthetic existence 
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explicitly, in theological terms, but it is a reflection built on a lifetime of implicit existential 
embrace; as Robert Smith notes, “for Bonhoeffer, music was essential to the ‘good life.’”94 
3.5.2 Bonhoeffer’s Musical Metaphors 
Bonhoeffer’s explicit reflection on music produces a handful of overlapping musical 
metaphors which he uses theologically in his prison letters. The way in which Bonhoeffer 
employs these metaphors – fugue, Grundton, polyphony and the related notions of cantus 
firmus and counterpoint – resonates with Kierkegaard’s description of poetic living, or mature 
aesthetic existence in terms of “harmony” with Christ as divine poet.95  
3.5.2.1 The Metaphor of Fugue in Response to Fragmentation 
Both Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer lament the fragmentary nature of existence. For 
Kierkegaard, as we have seen, Romantic existential aesthetics merely accentuates the 
fragmentary nature of life by locating the self in discreet and disconnected sensory moments. 
His call to “be one thing” is ultimately only to be actualised in Christ, as manifestation of 
both the finite and infinite. For Bonhoeffer, it is particularly the context of war – and the 
intensification of human finitude, mortality and corruption which war brings – which 
provokes his concern. In a reflection, which mirrors Kierkegaard’s observation on the radical 
vacillation of Romantic “moods,” Bonhoeffer laments the behaviour of his fellow prisoners in 
a letter to Bethge, noting that, “When bombers come, they are nothing but fear itself; when 
there’s something good to eat, nothing but greed itself… They are missing out on the fullness 
of life and on the wholeness of their own existence. Everything… disintegrates into 
fragments.”96 In a letter to his parents, he mourns the brokenness that war brings “both 
professionally and personally” and the feeling this arouses of “how unfinished and 
fragmentary our lives are.”97  
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However, further in the same letter, he adds a pivotal reflection which emanates from his 
Christology, “But precisely that which is fragmentary may point to a higher fulfilment, which 
can no longer be achieved by human effort.”98 In a letter written just two days later, with 
these thoughts obviously still in his mind, he turns to his love of Bach’s music to convey the 
sentiment to Bethge. Again, he bemoans that “we experience… our professional and personal 
lives… as fragmented,” but here he notes that it is not merely the consequence of the war, but 
extends the experience of fragmentation to the demise of the polymath and concomitant rise 
of the “specialist” in intellectual life, producing mere siloed “technicians,” even in the arts.99 
What matters, it seems to me, is whether one still sees, in this fragment of life that we 
have, what the whole was intended and designed to be … After all, there are such 
things as fragments that are only fit for the garbage … and others which remain 
meaningful for hundreds of years, because only God could perfect them, so they must 
remain fragments – I’m thinking, for example, of the Art of the Fugue. If our life is 
only the most remote reflection of such a fragment, in which, even for a short time, the 
various themes gradually accumulate and harmonize with one another and in which 
the great counterpoint is sustained from beginning to end – so that finally, when they 
cease, all one can do is sing the chorale “Vor Deinem Thron tret’ ich allhier”[I come 
before thy throne]100 – then it is not for us, either, to complain about this fragmentary 
life of ours, but rather even to be glad of it.101 
 Bonhoeffer is here using the musical concept of fugue, and in particular Bach’s Art of Fugue, 
in an attempt to capture the theological assertion that the fragmentary nature of human 
finitude only has meaning within the larger divine composition of life. It is not only that a 
fugue, which weaves multiple voices into a musical tapestry, is a metaphor which captures 
this integration well, but this is particularly so in the famed fugues of Bach, and here, 
significantly, the Art of Fugue, which remained unfinished at the time of Bach’s death, and 
therefore, fragmentary.102 Even here, amidst the limitations of human finitude, in de Gruchy’s 
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words, “The fragments do not fly apart but find their coherence in Christ, in whom the broken 
themes of praise are restored.”103 In contrast to those overcome by the fragmented immediacy 
of fear, greed, or desperation amidst the bombing raids Bonhoeffer observed above, he goes 
on in that letter to assert that, “Christianity, on the other hand, puts us into many different 
dimensions of life at the same time; in a way we accommodate God and the whole world 
within us.”104 To try to capture what he means by this, he refers to another musical metaphor, 
describing it as multidimensional polyphony. 
3.5.2.2 Polyphony, Cantus Firmus and Counterpoint 
Bonhoeffer introduces his well-known metaphor of polyphony in a letter concerning the 
rightful place of erotic love. Amidst his own loneliness in prison, and in response to Eberhard 
Bethge’s longing and love for his wife, Renate (particularly when separated due to military 
service), Bonhoeffer considers the right orientation of these worldly desires. In the previous 
section it was posited that, for Bonhoeffer, being founded in love of Christ distinguishes 
mature aesthetic existence from Romantic aestheticism. This proposal is best explicated 
through his framing of Christian living as polyphony, which applies equally to the 
fragmentation of life amidst war, silo-ization of intellectual pursuit, and the fragmentation that 
emanates from absolute sensory immediacy.  
Mature aesthetic existence, marked by a commitment to loving relationships (with creation, 
God and humankind), could be described as a polyphonous celebration of Christological 
reality. There is perhaps no more powerful aesthetic experience than sensual love. As 
Bonhoeffer considers how to respond well to earthly, erotic love, he describes the polyphony 
of life, anchored in the cantus firmus of love for God.  
What I mean is that God, the Eternal, wants to be loved with our whole heart, not to 
the detriment of earthly love or to diminish it, but as a sort of cantus firmus to which 
the other voices of life resound in counterpoint … Even in the Bible there is the Song 
of Solomon, and you really can’t imagine a hotter, more sensual, and glowing love 
than the one spoken of here (cf. 7:6!). It’s really good that this is in the Bible, 
contradicting all those who think being Christian is about tempering one’s passions … 
Where the cantus firmus is clear and distinct, a counterpoint can develop as mightily 
as it wants.105 
“God, the Eternal” is the cantus firmus, and love of God does not negate, or obliterate the 
earthly sensory-erotic (to use a term from Kierkegaard). Recall Kierkegaard’s challenge of an 
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outing to the amusements of Deer Park. Climacus could not conceive how one could be 
consumed by “God, the Eternal” and at the same time be present in the “trivial” of this-
worldly existence. Bonhoeffer’s response here is that God-given, earthly aesthetic existence 
does not need to be controlled by the “necessitas” of obedience (Kierkegaard’s ethical sphere 
of permissibility), but can freely flourish “as mightily as it wants” in counterpoint to the 
cantus firmus of love of God. Bonhoeffer reads these two – the divine cantus firmus and the 
earthly counterpoint – as reflecting the nature of Christ.106 
The two are “undivided and yet distinct,” as the Definition of Chalcedon says, like the 
divine and human natures in Christ. Is that perhaps why we are so at home with 
polyphony in music, why it is important to us, because it is the musical image of this 
christological fact and thus also our vita christiana? 107   
As disciples of Christ then, in “following-after,” the Christian life too embraces these 
“undivided and yet distinct” aspects of cantus firmus and counterpoint. As such, the disciple 
should not draw back from engagement with earthly reality, but as the cantus firmus is given 
whole-hearted expression, the counterpoint of this-worldly existence is not only validated, but 
maintains its own identity and integrity, thereby providing the existential unity to which 
Kierkegaard aspired in his call “to be one thing.” Bonhoeffer continues, 
I wanted to ask you to let the cantus firmus be heard clearly in your being together; 
only then will it sound complete and full, and the counterpoint will always know that 
it is being carried and can’t get out of tune or be cut adrift, while remaining itself and 
complete in itself. Only this polyphony gives your life wholeness. 108 
In a sense then, we could say that Bonhoeffer is here building upon and expanding 
Kierkegaard’s notion of poetic living as harmonious co-creation with Christ. For Bonhoeffer, 
a mature approach to aesthetic existence would be one anchored, first and foremost, in love 
for God, as the cantus firmus, which would enable celebration of the realm of freedom, within 
the bounds of harmony and resonance. Such an exploration of aesthetic existence could be 
described as an embrace of all that is good and human in the penultimate, preparing the way 
for the ultimate. 
3.5.3 Music as Paradigm-Forming 
While the Art of Fugue and polyphony elucidate Bonhoeffer’s argument for this-worldly 
Christian existence, a third musical metaphor, Grundton, speaks to the paradigmatic nature of 
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these metaphors. In other words, up until this point we have been considering the illustrative 
value of these metaphors; helpful linguistic tools to clarify the point. However, while this is 
valid, the question we need to engage at this point is whether these metaphors function solely 
as ornamental tropes – useful for painting a vivid mental picture, but not fundamentally a 
necessary aspect of the argument – or whether these musical experiences shaped Bonhoeffer’s 
imagination, being paradigmatically formative, and thereby contributing to his perception of 
reality.109  
3.5.3.1 Grundton and Formation through Music 
In a letter to Eberhard and Renate Bethge, Bonhoeffer offers thoughts for the day of the 
baptism of their son (his godson). Amidst his reflections, prayers and blessings, he affirms 
that, “Music, as your parents understand and practice it, will bring you back from confusion to 
your clearest and purest self and perceptions, and from cares and sorrows to the underlying 
note [Grundton] of joy.”110 There are three observations we can make here: Firstly, 
Bonhoeffer ties music to self-formation and perception. The suggestion here is that music, as 
archetypal sensory immediacy, has the ability to influence the way we see reality and our 
sense of self therein. Secondly, Bonhoeffer carefully qualifies that it is specifically music, “as 
your parents understand and practice it,” which offers this positive influence. This appears to 
be an allusion, once again, to the fact that it is mature aesthetic existence that offers a positive 
formative influence, as a celebration of aesthetic this-worldliness in polyphonous 
counterpoint to the divine cantus firmus. Thirdly, Bonhoeffer refers to the musical metaphor 
of a “Grundton” of joy. Translated here as “the underlying note,” it refers to the English 
“tonic” (or “key note … the ‘first degree of a major or minor scale’ or ‘the main note of a key 
… after which a key is named’”).111 While this metaphor resonates with Bonhoeffer’s 
description of the cantus firmus in polyphony, the significant point to note here is that the 
existential “Grundton of joy” is experienced by way of music itself. 
Bonhoeffer’s use of Grundton, therefore, points to the fact that he is not merely using these 
musical metaphors as illustrative cognitive concepts, distinct from sensory experience, but 
that aesthetic experience shapes his conceptualisation. A clue to this can be seen in his 
attempt to draw from these living metaphors in an effort to capture implicit truth, and his 
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consequent struggle to capture their meaning in the abstraction of language. Both here in this 
letter (“It hasn’t turned out the way it should have”)112 and in the polyphony letter (“Do you 
understand what I mean?” and “I don’t know whether I have said this clearly”),113 he appears 
to be drawing on these metaphors in an effort to express a lived truth that lies beyond the 
limitations of language.  
3.5.3.2 The Formative Impact of Music on Bonhoeffer’s Theology 
As Andreas Pangritz shows, Bonhoeffer’s experience of music, and his subsequent reflection 
on music while in prison, prepares the way for his theological thinking in this period.114 The 
chronology here is particularly worth noting; most of his allusions to music in his letters 
appear prior to his pivotal theological question of what Christianity really is, “or who is Christ 
actually for us today?”115 Many of these musical references relate to Heinrich Schütz, “the 
‘father of German music’ in the seventeenth century.”116 Bonhoeffer’s love of Schütz 
stemmed from the latter’s ability to unite music and word in the liturgical settings of the 
Psalms, for example. While Bonhoeffer’s love of music in the romantic tradition remained 
constant throughout his life, initially he rejected the place of such romantic music, Beethoven 
in particular, in the church.117 As he notes, some ten years prior for instance, Beethoven’s 
music “seems to be nothing but the eternal expression of human suffering and passion,” thus 
not suited for church use.118 In other words, it appears that Bonhoeffer initially had 
reservations regarding the place of musical sensory immediacy in becoming Christian, like 
Kierkegaard, limiting this to a “second immediacy,” or the immediacy after reflection, 
wherein word and music unite. Yet, ironically, as de Gruchy notes, it is precisely through 
Schütz that Bonhoeffer finds himself grappling with the unity of this-worldly desire and 
                                                
112 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 8:382. 
113 Bonhoeffer, 8:395. 
114 Pangritz, Polyphonie des Lebens. 
115 Pangritz, ‘Point and Counterpoint’, 29; Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 
8:362. 
116 Pangritz, Polyphonie des Lebens, 30. 
117 During the time at Finkenwalde, Bethge notes that “[Bonhoeffer’s] romantic heritage was 
strongly evident in his playing of Chopin, Brahms, and excerpts from the delightfully stylish 
Rosenkavalier.” Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 429. 
118 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: London, 1933-1935, ed. Keith Clements, vol. 
13, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works English (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 356. 
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divine reality.119 Months before engaging the question of who Christ is for us today, 
Bonhoeffer writes a letter to Bethge in which he reflects on a composition by Schütz, the 
Augustinian “O bone Jesu.”120 In particular, he imaginatively re-experiences the music of the 
line, “o how my soul longs for you,” writing out the musical notation of the seven notes for 
the singing of the “o.” This is significant, because, as Pangritz explains, “In Schütz’s setting 
the melismatic figure on ‘o’ is repeated four times, each time a fifth higher (e flat-b flat, b 
flat-f, f-c, c-g) so that the musical expression is intensified in an extraordinary measure. 
Moser underscores the fact that by means of transposed repetition of the melismatic motif, the 
‘ecstatic cry of longing’ forms the ‘center and climax’ of the composition.”121 Bonhoeffer 
then comments, “Doesn’t this passage in its ecstatic longing combined with pure devotion, 
suggest the ‘bringing back’ of all earthly desire?”122 Is this an example of Bonhoeffer’s 
sensory-erotic experience of music shaping his theology?123 Pangritz suggests that it is, pre-
empting Bonhoeffer’s later Christological this-worldliness.124 Bonhoeffer’s “fresh 
appreciation” for Beethoven during this period may well point toward a fuller understanding 
                                                
119 John de Gruchy, ‘The Search for Transcendence in an Age of Barbarism: Bonhoeffer, 
Beethoven, Mann’s Dr Faustus and the Spiritual Crisis of the Present Time’ (Unpublished 
article, due in press 2019), 10. 
120 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 8:30–31.  
121 Pangritz, ‘Point and Counterpoint’, 32. Pangritz elaborates further on the hymn as “colored 
by erotic associations.” 
122 Pangritz’s own translation. Pangritz, 33. 
123 It is worth noting that in the same letter, in fact, in the very next paragraph, Bonhoeffer 
offers an example of the impotence of music which is not “polyphonous,” in contrast to the 
formative musical experience of Schütz’s “O bone Jesu.” Bonhoeffer describes how “a sweet 
old man” comes to the prison on Christmas Eve to play carols on his trumpet. Clearly, he has 
good intentions, but the effect on the prisoners is only “demoralising” and they try to drown 
out his playing with whistles and noise. Bonhoeffer notes that in “this misery” [his italics] of 
prison life, such music is only “playfully sentimental” and therefore unhelpful. Bonhoeffer 
appears to be suggesting through these contrasting examples that music, as mature aesthetic 
existence, should be in harmony with both the ultimate hope of God (the cantus firmus) as 
well as a sober acknowledgement of the penultimate temporal context (whether that be prison 
or a more joyful context). Failure to account for both of these in aesthetic expression simply 
produces sensory stimuli that titillate, while being disconnected from the Christological 
vitality of life incarnate and life divine.  
124 Thereby initiating a Christological trajectory that would ultimately lead Bonhoeffer to 
affirm that, “Our relationship to God is no ‘religious’ relationship to some highest, most 
powerful, and best being imaginable – that is no genuine transcendence. Instead, our 
relationship to God is a new life in ‘being there for others,’ through participation in the being 
of Jesus. The transcendent is not the infinite, unattainable tasks, but the neighbor within reach 
in any given situation. God in human form!” Consequently, Bonhoeffer’s this-worldly 
aesthetics, as his embrace of mature aesthetic existence, proves distinctive from theological 
aesthetics that harnesses the aesthetic as a means of engaging the (other-worldly) 
transcendent. Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 8:501. 
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of mature aesthetic existence in the life of this-worldly Christianity.125 He appears to 
“overcome the divisions between the various musical traditions (Reformation, classical, 
Romantic) which he had hitherto always kept in separate compartments.”126 
If this holds true, then Bonhoeffer’s embrace of mature aesthetic existence is not merely a 
consequence of his this-worldly Christology (which it is), but his Christological this-
worldliness is equally a consequence of his mature aesthetic existence.127 His experience of 
music, and his consequent reflection on music while in prison, at the very least, operated “in 
tandem” with his theological reflection, but may well also have provided categories of 
thought which he would not otherwise have had access to.128 As Begbie puts it, it is 
“conceptuality arising from music [which] enables him to elucidate critical fields of 
doctrine.”129 It is a conceptuality that does not draw from music as an illustrative tool, but 
music is the very constitutive means through which the concepts are formed. Bonhoeffer is 
not drawing on music, he is thinking musically. “Bonhoeffer’s musical experience, 
specifically his aural experience of simultaneously sounding and mutually resonating tones … 
extended in time and woven around a cantus firmus … is ‘made available’ to the theological 
conceptuality and language concerned with the multidimensionality of the Christian life.”130 
Begbie is here rejecting the understanding of concepts as “isolated mental units” that provide 
a bridge between words and “things-in-the-world.”131 Rather than three discreet elements – 
words, concepts and things-in-the-world – Begbie draws on Kathleen Callow in describing 
concepts as “‘habitual events’, habits of thought that order human experience in various 
configurations. Concepts are ‘thought-in-action’. We do not attend thoughtfully to them; we 
attend with them, by means of them.”132 There is “every reason to believe” that this 
                                                
125 De Gruchy, ‘The Search for Transcendence in an Age of Barbarism’, 10. 
126 De Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation, 146. 
127 Schleiermacher affirms this fundamentally formational aspect of aesthetic existence when 
he states that, “Music is one great whole; it is a special, self-contained revelation of the 
world.” He argues that even though a multitude of cultural and individual musical expressions 
are possible, great music is akin to a religious a priori, moving musicians and hearers beyond 
the particular, beyond the systems of music (or religion), toward a common essential reality. 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1994), 51. 
128 De Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation, 145. 
129 Begbie, Music, Modernity, and God, 208. 
130 Begbie, 210. 
131 Begbie, 206. 
132 An example clarifies Begbie’s point: The “concept evoked by the word ‘vacation’ is 
formed out of a huge variety of direct sensory experiences of holidays, as well as a complex 
of associations garnered from elsewhere – sun, time to read, family reunions, and so on. There 
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paradigmatic conceptual formation is happening through our sensory experience of music.133 
Consequently, theology is not merely limited to the realm of “mental units,” but is 
“inseparably bound up with … the communal life of the Church … [and] its manifold 
embodied ‘forms of life,’” including our everyday aesthetic experiences.134  
3.5.4 Summary 
Bonhoeffer’s engagement with music and the metaphors that ensue, therefore, elucidate two 
important contributions that he makes to this project. Firstly, the metaphors themselves, 
particularly polyphony, point toward a helpful model for distinguishing between self-centred 
aestheticism (an impediment to discipleship) and mature aesthetic existence (as integral to 
becoming Christian). Mature aesthetic existence operates in the realm of free play, not in the 
Kierkegaardian sphere of ethical obedience. A counterpoint can “develop as mightily as it 
wants” if grounded in the existential cantus firmus of love for God.135 Sensory immediacy 
only becomes problematic when it is pursued as a means to the absolute, rejecting the cantus 
firmus. Whether such absolute aesthetic existence is approached via the aestheticism of 
Kierkegaard’s Don Juan, the reflection of his Seducer (or, Nietzsche’s Dionysian movement 
                                                                                                                                                   
may be something like a firm, central ‘core’ to the concept; however, the concept is not a 
mental picture of a tidily bounded object but pertains to the world-as-experienced …” Begbie, 
206. 
133 Begbie, 207. 
134 Begbie, 207. 
135 As both Pangritz and David Moseley show, Bonhoeffer’s point is affirmed by Karl Barth’s 
perception of Mozart’s music, the essence of which he described as “playing.” Barth’s 
description is significant in light of Kierkegaard’s choice of Mozart to illustrate that music is 
fundamentally sensory immediacy. Barth, however, suggests that such play is integral to 
Christian life, “Our daily bread must also include playing. I hear Mozart … at play. But play 
is something so lofty and demanding that it requires mastery. And in Mozart I hear an art of 
playing as I hear it in no one else. Beautiful playing presupposes an intuitive, childlike 
awareness of the essence or center – as also the beginning and the end – of all things. It is 
from this center, from this beginning and end, that I hear Mozart create his music.” (Barth, 
Mozart, 16) Rather than binding word to music, Mozart’s music is a playful expression, a 
“free counterpart” to the word. (Barth, Mozart, 38) As such, Barth perceives “Mozart’s music 
as ‘parables of the kingdom’ … as ‘theology’ … ‘mediating’ the praise of the cosmos … 
witness[ing] to the theonomous perichoresis of the triune life.” (Moseley, 264) For Barth, this 
mastered playfulness carries significant theological weight, “the golden sounds and melodies 
of Mozart’s music have from early times spoken to me not as gospel but as parables of the 
realm of God’s free grace as revealed in the gospel – and they do so again and again with 
great spontaneity and directness.” (Moseley, 264) See Pangritz, ‘Point and Counterpoint’, 41. 
David J.R.S. Moseley, ‘“Parables” and “Polyphony”’, in Resonant Witness: Conversations 
Between Music and Theology, ed. Jeremy Begbie and Steven Guthrie (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2011). Karl Barth, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, trans. Clarence K. Pott (Eugene: 
Wipf and Stock, 2003). 
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“beyond good and evil” for that matter, which we will turn to in the next chapter), the 
common deficiency here is the attempt to turn fragmentary finitude into the infinite absolute. 
By contrast, as de Gruchy puts it, in mature aesthetic existence, “the mystery of the ultimate is 
glimpsed not grasped, for it is always mediated in the penultimate polyphony of life.”136 The 
fragmentary nature of human finitude, therefore, is not to be rejected but embraced, as it 
offers grounding bounds and limits to mature aesthetic existence amidst the “restlessness for 
the ultimate,” which drives powerful aesthetic expression. Within the frame of this 
Christological polyphony, aesthetic existence can, and should, freely flourish in the Christian 
life. 
Secondly, Bonhoeffer’s musical metaphors are not merely illustrative, but his very aesthetic 
experience of music appears to play a formative role in his theological conceptualisation. If 
this is accurate, then it challenges Kierkegaard’s distinction between a first and second 
immediacy. Kierkegaard distinguishes a second immediacy as being “after reflection,” thus an 
engagement with the aesthetic consequent to conceptualisation. However, if conceptualisation 
is organically and symbiotically in relation to sensory experience in the world, then such a 
distinction is not valid. To explore this further we will need to move beyond Bonhoeffer. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Bonhoeffer then, leaves us with both a theological affirmation of everyday aesthetic 
existence, grounded in his Christology, as well as questions we need to further explore around 
the relationship of aesthetics, ethics and faith. What relationship does aesthetic existence have 
to the shaping of the imagination, and consequently the way we see reality, even when these 
aesthetic experiences are not engaged for utilitarian purposes? Do everyday aesthetic 
experiences – celebrations of the realm of freedom such as play, friendship, music, a crafted 
meal, etc. – affect the way we see the world, and consequently how we act in it? If they do, 
then everyday aesthetic existence is not only something to be celebrated in the penultimate as 
                                                
136 De Gruchy, ‘The Search for Transcendence in an Age of Barbarism’, 10. De Gruchy notes 
that, “As deafness increased and death approached, Beethoven delved deeper into his 
subconscious, not just for his own sake, but also for the sake of universal harmony. But as he 
is about to experience transcendence – towards the end of his final piano sonata (Op. 111) – 
there is a moment of pregnant silence. He has entered holy ground and, overtaken by awe, he 
draws back from grasping the infinite to remain in the penultimate.” The question Beethoven 
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existence, not only in music, but amidst the frenetic consumerism and grasping materialism 
which marks contemporary aesthetic experience. 
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an expression of goodness in fully-human, this-worldly existence, it is also fundamental to 
meaning and action, ethics and faith.  
At the beginning of this chapter, we noted Bonhoeffer’s association of aesthetic existence 
with art, play, friendship and Bildung. As relatively obvious expressions of aesthetic 
existence, it is not difficult to understand why he connected art and play with the sensory 
immediacy of Christian living. “Friendship” here is interesting, since it affirms the contention 
above that aesthetic existence is best understood and lived out in the context of relationality. 
Friendship is, at times, an expression of sensory immediacy, but there is more to it than that, 
and including it here, within the category of aesthetic existence, is illustrative of the guiding 
cantus firmus of love for mature aesthetic existence. However, it is “Bildung” to which we 
need to pay particular attention. As noted, this resonates with Kierkegaard’s description of 
poetic living, Bildung being the outworking of mature aesthetic existence. We should recall 
that Bonhoeffer too was exposed to the German Romantic thinkers, his understanding of 
Bildung entailing far more than the term “education” captures. Difficult to translate into a 
single English word, if we understand Bildung as cultural formation, the process (engaging all 
the faculties) whereby a person is educated to maturity, then what is the role of everyday 
aesthetic existence in the formation of a person? It seems clear that Bonhoeffer was 
suggesting such a connection, but he does not explicitly expand on the nature and mechanics 
of this relationship. The work of Iain McGilchrist offers insight into this query, and it is to his 
research that we now turn.
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CHAPTER 4: MCGILCHRIST & AESTHETIC EXISTENCE 
AS FUNDAMENTAL TO BEING HUMAN 
Introduction 
Is aesthetic existence fundamental to being human, and therefore to being a Christian, bodily 
engaged in the life of the world? This is the research question guiding this project. We have 
seen that Bonhoeffer would answer this in the affirmative, based on his embrace of the 
Christological nature of reality. Firstly, and most clearly seen in Bonhoeffer’s late work, the 
celebration of everyday aesthetic existence is a necessary expression of living incarnational 
lives in the penultimate. Secondly, a close reading of Bonhoeffer and the trajectory of his 
work seems to point to a connection between aesthetic existence and formation [Bildung]. If 
such a connection is valid, then the implications for the role of aesthetic existence apply to 
being human in the world, not only to being a Christian in the world. In other words, an 
exploration of the relationship between everyday aesthetic existence and formation is an 
engagement with the first and fundamental aspect of the research question framed above: Is 
aesthetic existence fundamental to being human? Here we turn to the work of Iain 
McGilchrist.  
McGilchrist is not a theologian. While anchoring his work in neuropsychology, McGilchrist 
also draws from a range of other disciplines, including his work as a literary scholar to inform 
a broader philosophical, perhaps fundamentally anthropological, project. It is the 
interdisciplinary nature of his approach which makes his work so well suited to the questions 
we have at hand. 
Both Bonhoeffer and McGilchrist endorse aesthetic existence on the basis of our relationship 
to reality. In this regard, perhaps we could suggest that Bonhoeffer’s contribution to our 
exploration is primarily ontological while McGilchrist’s is essentially epistemological. 
Bonhoeffer embraces aesthetic existence because the nature of reality is Christological, 
thereby validating the penultimate as incarnational, embodied existence. McGilchrist’s focus 
is not on the nature of reality, but on how we know it. He suggests that if we look closely at 
this process, we cannot but acknowledge that a ratiocentric approach to reality provides a 
distorted view of the world. Drawing from McGilchrist’s research, this chapter argues that 
aesthetic existence can play a pivotal role in our perception of the world, and thereby our self-
understanding in relation to reality. Consequently, the nature of our everyday aesthetic 
existence affects our formation as human beings. 
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4.1 Apollonian and Dionysian Perception of Reality 
Although Bonhoeffer and McGilchrist may seem worlds apart, a mutual catalyst for their 
work is Nietzsche’s insightful critique of the modern world in relation to aesthetics. For our 
purposes here, this is best explained through Nietzsche’s exploration of the classical tension 
between an Apollonian and Dionysian approach to life.  
4.1.1 Apollo and Dionysus 
Much has been written in western thought on the archetypal pair of ancient Greek gods, 
Apollo and Dionysus (the Greek Bacchus), largely because they capture so well two 
fundamental, seemingly contradictory, ways of being human in the world. As John de Gruchy 
succinctly explains,  
Apollo … was the god of wisdom whose prophetic oracle at Delphi encouraged the 
virtues of civilised living, harmony, self-knowledge, rhetoric, and moral earnestness, 
amongst all who sought counsel … Apollo represented human rationality and 
denigrated the world of passion … If Apollo represented “masculine” virtues of 
rationality and order, the Dionysian cult had its roots in the more ancient cult of the 
Divine Mother with its emphasis on the power of nature, the instincts and the non-
rational. Dionysian worship or bacchanalia, as the dramatist Euripides described it, 
was characterised by its devotees “in ecstasy flinging back the head in the dewy air.” 
Induced by wine and usually sexually promiscuous, it gained an enthusiastic following 
even if only on the fringes of decent society, the society of Apollo. Such was its 
attraction that the Roman senate passed a decree against bacchanalia as a serious 
threat to the well being of society. Yet Euripides discerned that inspired religious 
emotion cannot be ignored, for while it may menace the good order of the polis and 
dissolve the bonds of society, it is an elemental force that has to be taken into 
account.1 
The relevance to this project should be immediately apparent. Certainly on face value 
Kierkegaard’s perception of aesthetic existence was largely, if not completely Dionysian, as 
existence purely in the moment, revelling in the “play of unending freedom.”2 The critical 
question, which we are engaging, is whether the Dionysian is to be equated with a superficial 
reading of Kierkegaard’s aesthetic stage of life, and therefore to be discarded as soon as one 
has matured sufficiently to embrace the Apollonian. Or, is the Dionysian an important aspect 
of being human, just as important as the Apollonian, and could it possibly play a role, perhaps 
                                                
1 De Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation, 14. 
2 Ultimately, even such a reading of Kierkegaard’s aesthetics must acknowledge that the 
“indeterminacy” of such a Dionysian sensory immediacy has a fundamental relationship to 
the “determinacy” of the imagination. See Smyth’s discussion of Kierkegaard’s “eros 
aesthetics” in John Vignaux Smyth, A Question of Eros: Irony in Sterne, Kierkegaard and 
Barthes (Tallahassee: University Presses of Florida, 1986). 
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even a crucial role, in our personal formation? These are the questions we are exploring in 
this chapter. Nietzsche’s critique of modernity and Christianity, through this mythological 
lens, is a helpful starting point. 
4.1.2 Nietzsche’s Modern Cult of Dionysus 
To Nietzsche, the modern western world, largely at the behest of centuries of Christian 
dominance, suffered from Apollonian hegemony. As Stephen Williams rightly points out, 
while we may ascribe some of Nietzsche’s critique to his limited and particular experience of 
Lutheran Christianity, it would be a mistake to therefore dismiss his observations out of 
hand.3 There is indeed truth to the fact that, from its early history, Christianity has tended to 
align itself with the Apollonian, rather than Dionysian. As de Gruchy notes, perhaps “an 
inbred Christian sensing of the risk of releasing uncontrollable, even demonic, energies has 
generally preferred the values of Apollo to those of Dionysus.”4 Much of this tone was set 
early on, through the likes of the asceticism of the Desert Fathers, with their renunciation of 
the body and this-worldliness, and Augustine’s suspicion of the senses and their ability to 
rouse fleshly passions.5 For Nietzsche, this rejection of the Dionysian is a rejection of life 
itself, and Augustine therefore epitomises all that is problematic about Christianity; Nietzsche 
naming him a “monster of morality,”6 whose filth you could “smell” by reading him.7 By 
contrast, Nietzsche himself has no desire to be a “saint,” but rather a “disciple of the 
philosopher Dionysus.”8  
Duncan Forrester echoes the evaluation that the root of this early Christian Apollonian 
emphasis was a consequence of the need for control over “dangerous” feelings and emotions, 
                                                
3 Stephen N. Williams, The Shadow of the Antichrist: Nietzsche’s Critique of Christianity 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 104. 
4 De Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation, 16. 
5 On Augustine, de Gruchy notes, “See his discussion of the delights and snares of the various 
senses in Book x of the Confessions. Saint Augustine, Confessions and Enchiridion. The 
Library of Christian Classics, vii (London, SCM, 1955), 225ff. See also Margaret R. Miles, 
Desire and Delight: A New Reading of Augustine’ ‘Confessions’ (New York: Crossroads, 
1992).” De Gruchy, 16. 
6 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, ed. Bernard Williams, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff and 
Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 224. 
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘The Anti-Christ’, in Nietzsche: The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight 
of the Idols: And Other Writings, ed. Aaron Ridley, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 63. 
8 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Ecce Homo’, in Nietzsche: The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of 
the Idols: And Other Writings, ed. Aaron Ridley, trans. Judith Norman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 71. 
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particularly with regard to sexuality. He quotes from Gregory of Nyssa to illustrate the point, 
“Any action, thought or word which involves passion is out of harmony with Christ and bears 
the mark of the devil, who makes muddy the pearl of the soul with passions and mars that 
precious jewel.”9 The irony is that for a religion built upon the bedrock of the doctrine of 
creation and with the incarnation at its core, celebration of the material, of the body and the 
senses is notable by its absence, or at least as a somewhat muted presence, in the history of 
Christianity. As the faith aligned itself with the Roman ideals of a harmonious, moral and 
orderly society (indeed, Nietzsche called Christianity “the last Roman construction”),10 a 
trajectory was established which owes more to a classical heritage than it does the biblical 
text.11  
Nietzsche offered a scathing critique of what he saw to be the Christian rejection of the 
Dionysian. To Nietzsche, Christian “slave morality” simply represents the rationalisation of 
weakness by justifying and making noble the state of inescapable inferiority.12 He saw this 
type of moralising as a mere coping mechanism, which inhibits engagement with fullness of 
life. Nietzsche proposes that “art – and not morality – is the true metaphysical activity of man 
… the existence of the world is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon.”13 By contrast, 
Christianity leaves no space for the aesthetic, condemning it as illusory in contradistinction to 
the absolutes of morality. To which Nietzsche responds, 
Behind this mode of thought and valuation, which must be hostile to art if it is at all 
genuine, I have never failed to sense a hostility to life – a furious, vengeful antipathy 
to life itself: for all of life is based on semblance, art, deception, points of view … 
Christianity was from the beginning, essentially and fundamentally, life’s nausea and 
disgust with life, merely concealed behind, masked by, dressed up as, faith in 
“another” or “better” life. Hatred of “the world,” condemnation of the passions, fear of 
beauty and sensuality, a beyond invented the better to slander this life, at bottom a 
craving for the nothing, for the end …14 
                                                
9 Gregory of Nyssa, On Christian Perfection, PG 46.283-6, as quoted in Duncan B. Forrester, 
Truthful Action: Explorations in Practical Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 11. 
10 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 221. 
11 De Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation, 16–17. 
12 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 151ff. He expands further in his essay ‘On 
the Genealogy of Morality’ in Friedrich Nietzsche, Nietzsche: ‘On the Genealogy of Morality’ 
and Other Writings, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
13 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘The Birth of Tragedy’, in Nietzsche: The Birth of Tragedy and Other 
Writings, ed. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 8. 
14 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy (New York: Vintage, 1967), 22–24. 
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Nietzsche concludes that for the Christian, “The body is an object of hatred, hygiene is 
rejected as sensuousness … [on the Christian closure of public baths] … It is Christian to hate 
spirit … it is Christian to hate the senses, to hate enjoyment of the senses, to hate joy in 
general …”15 Thus his call to reject this insipid morality, to move “beyond good and evil,” 
severing aesthetics from ethics, a vision impelled by the momentum of Romanticism and 
shared with the composer Richard Wagner and the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer.16 
Nietzsche’s insightful critique provoked reaction from Bonhoeffer and McGilchrist alike, 
whose responses we will turn to in a moment. But before we do so, it is important to take a 
moment to acknowledge that, as Bruce Benson has shown, at the heart of Nietzsche’s 
argument is a significant warning about the dangers of modern idolatry: making God in our 
own image.17 While a safe, controlled faith that fits neatly within the bounds of an ordered life 
may seem appealing, the question needs to be asked as to whether such a faith is 
fundamentally able to allow for genuine otherness, and thus whether such a Christian faith is 
indeed biblical? Do the bounds of an exclusively-rational faith not necessarily limit it to the 
finite? Is the aesthetic not a gateway, perhaps even the sole gateway, to the mystery that is an 
inevitable consequence of engaging the divine? Does the Christian rejection of the Dionysian 
usher in Apollonian idolatry – Jesus made in Apollo’s image? These are some of the 
important questions that Nietzsche raises, and they have direct bearing on our project at hand. 
We will return to them at the end of the chapter, but they lie in the background throughout. As 
we work towards resolving them, we would do well to note that the unhinging of the aesthetic 
from ethics is clearly not the solution, as Nietzsche’s role in the rise of Nazism, and even 
South Africa’s apartheid, makes evident. In the words of de Gruchy, “Nietzsche’s 
Romanticism remains a constant reminder of the inevitably horrendous and tragic political 
consequences of placing the mythologically inspired interests of ‘blood and soil’ over the 
constraints of reason and morality.”18  
                                                
15 Nietzsche, ‘The Anti-Christ’, 18. 
16 De Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation, 15, 65–66. De Gruchy exposits the 
danger of such a Romantic aesthetic in, De Gruchy, ‘The Search for Transcendence in an Age 
of Barbarism’.  
17 Bruce Ellis Benson, Graven Ideologies: Nietzsche, Derrida & Marion on Modern Idolatry 
(Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2002). 
18 De Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation, 66. 
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4.1.3 Bonhoeffer’s Response to Nietzsche 
While it should be apparent that our exploration of Bonhoeffer’s work in the previous chapter 
is directly applicable here, a few brief comments are in order, which highlight his specific 
reaction to Nietzsche, providing a helpful platform for McGilchrist’s response.  
In a sense, the whole corpus of Bonhoeffer’s work is a reaction to Nietzsche’s critique, since 
at the core of Bonhoeffer’s theology is an incarnational Christology. Or, as de Gruchy puts it, 
“his response to Nietzsche, with whom he shared a ‘lust for life’, was to show how life in its 
fullness was to be found in Jesus Christ.”19 Bonhoeffer acknowledges that Lutheranism’s 
rejection of the natural is cause for valid Nietzschean critique. But through the themes that 
pervade his work, he clearly shows Christianity’s this-worldliness: “Hence his affirmation of 
the body and the earth; his ‘theology of the cross’ in which joy is only discovered through 
struggle and suffering; and his celebration of human freedom and life.”20 Bonhoeffer 
challenges Nietzsche’s claim that Christianity rejects the Dionysian celebration of life by 
showing that aesthetic existence is fundamentally a part of living incarnationally in the 
penultimate as a Christian. 
As we have seen, Bonhoeffer’s direct reflections on aesthetic existence take place toward the 
end of his life, in his letters from prison. It is here too that he responds to the duality of 
Nietzsche’s mythological lens, 
We go along too easily with Nietzsche’s primitive alternatives, as if the “Apollonian” 
concept of beauty, and the “Dionysian,” the one we call demonic nowadays, are the 
only ones. But that isn’t the case at all. Take, for example, Brueghel or Velázquez, or 
even Hans Thoma, Leopold Kalckreuth, or the French Impressionists. They have a 
beauty that is neither classic nor demonic, but simply earthly in its own right; and I 
must say that this is the only sort of beauty that speaks to me personally.21 
Bonhoeffer is making a significant point here, one that is central to our project, which we will 
further explore as we move forward. The “primitive alternatives” of Apollo and Dionysus 
represent two typical, contrasting approaches to the aesthetic. The Apolline represents the 
other-worldly pursuit of the platonic ideal of beauty. This is marked by an emphasis on form, 
harmony and unity, attributes that are, if not quantifiable, at the very least, rationally 
comprehensible and are worthy of the reasonable ideal. While the appeal of such an ordered 
aesthetic lies in escape from the pain and brokenness of life, ultimately such a perfect ideal 
                                                
19 De Gruchy, 165. 
20 De Gruchy, 152. 
21 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 8:331. 
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can seem disconnected from tangible, earthly existence and consequently prove impotent, as 
Bonhoeffer himself personally expressed, 
Presumably we are made in such a way that perfection is boring to us; I do not know 
whether that was always the case. But I have no other way to explain the fact that 
Raphael remains as distant and indifferent to me as Dante’s paradise. Likewise, 
neither eternal ice nor eternal blue sky appeals to me. I seek “perfection” in what is 
human, living, earthly, that is, neither in the Apollonian nor in the Dionysian or 
Faustian.22 
In contrast to the Apolline, the Dionysiac represents earthy celebration of the sensory, that 
which is out of control, visceral, in the moment, which can be transcendental in its own right, 
but through ecstatic experience rather than ordered form. At worst, approaching aesthetics 
through the lens of this “primitive alternative” creates a binary wherein the one is pitted 
against the other, with a single approach preeminent. At best, it offers a duality to be 
navigated by holding these two approaches to life in healthy tension. Bonhoeffer is suggesting 
that we reject the polarity in favour of an incarnational approach to life, which is integrative 
in its own right. In fact, this is the very reason which allows him to call for a recovery of 
aesthetic existence, even from a prison cell amidst Hitler’s atrocities. What he is presenting is 
not a Dionysian hedonism, nor an Apollonian escape from this world to an otherworldly, 
utopian ideal of beauty, but rather a celebration of this-worldly, Christological reality; “a 
‘worldly Christianity’ rooted in God’s revelation in Christ yet able to celebrate the polyphony 
of life amidst the tragedies of our time.”23 
The challenge that lies before us is to articulate what this incarnational approach to everyday 
aesthetic existence could look like. Everyday aesthetic existence is largely dismissed by an 
Apollonian approach as insignificant. Play, or revelling in an aesthetically pleasing moment, 
for example, only has value to the extent to which it is rationally comprehensible as a pointer 
to an otherworldly, platonic ideal. By contrast, a Dionysian approach makes the aesthetic 
experience absolute, resulting in an aestheticism, which, while seemingly validating everyday 
aesthetic existence, ironically devalues it by disconnecting it from ethics and personal 
formation. The question lying before us, which Bonhoeffer raises in response to Nietzsche, is 
whether an incarnational approach to aesthetic existence is fundamentally integrative, 
                                                
22 Bonhoeffer, 8:494–95. On the relationship of the Faustian to the Romantic sense of 
idealistic transcendence, again see, De Gruchy, ‘The Search for Transcendence in an Age of 
Barbarism’. 
23 De Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation, 137.  
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encapsulating both an Apollonian and Dionysian approach to life, while also superseding the 
polarity. 
Bonhoeffer could only take us to a certain point in this exploration, both because his life and 
work were cut short, but also because of the milieu within which he thought and wrote. We 
have to remember that although Bonhoeffer had a profound intuitive appreciation for the 
aesthetic, his explicit approach was fundamentally scientific. With his father being a 
nationally renowned psychiatrist, both his familial and formal education embedded him in a 
scientific approach to engaging the world. Little wonder then that as his brother became a 
leading chemist, Bonhoeffer would go on to grapple with Christ amidst the modern progress 
of “a world come of age.” In other words, even while acknowledging the revelatory role 
music played, alongside his criticism of an Apollonian approach to life, in many respects the 
modern, ratiocentric “tools” with which Bonhoeffer worked could only take him so far in his 
attempt to validate the role of aesthetic existence in the Christian life.  
If Bonhoeffer’s claim regarding the this-worldly nature of incarnational reality is accurate, 
thereby validating the senses and the body, then the human body itself should offer insight 
into the nature and workings of formation. In other words, if the task that lies before us in this 
chapter is to explore the relationship between aesthetic existence and formation, the 
connection between embodiment and the formation of meaning is an important link to probe. 
Or, to put it in mythological terms, western society has long valued a largely Apollonian 
approach to the formation of moral citizens of the polis, built on the ancient Greek embrace of 
paideia. Over the centuries this approach became increasingly ratiocentric, which led to 
Nietzsche challenging this artificial perception of reality and the subsequent insipid morality 
that ensues. Here, Iain McGilchrist picks up the baton, his research offering a fundamentally 
embodied response to Nietzsche’s critique. Through his work we can ask what the human 
body, and the brain in particular, tells us about the formation of meaning, and what role, if 
any, the Dionysian plays. 
4.1.4 McGilchrist: The human brain is inherently both Apollonian and Dionysian 
While Bonhoeffer suggests that the Christian life not only brings together a Dionysian and 
Apollonian approach to life, but supersedes them, McGilchrist argues for a more universal 
and foundational anthropological truth: The Dionysian and the Apollonian are both 
indispensable aspects of a human being. Consequently, aesthetic existence is fundamental to 
being human in the world, to the creation of meaning and personal formation. If Bonhoeffer 
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wants to reject the “primitive alternative” of Apollo and Dionysus in favour of an 
incarnational approach to reality, McGilchrist endeavours to show that this mythological 
dichotomy is actually a helpful tool for understanding human perception, even if ultimately 
the ideal is to overcome the dichotomy and cultivate integration. He bases his argument on 
research from the field of neuroscience, and particularly neuropsychology, concerning the 
lateralisation of the human brain.24 
Valid research into the hemispheric differences of brain function is clouded by popular 
misconceptions that need to be rejected. It is neither helpful nor accurate to suggest that “the 
left hemisphere is … gritty, rational, realistic but dull, and the right hemisphere airy-fairy and 
impressionistic, but creative and exciting.” Or even worse, “that the left hemisphere, hard-
nosed and logical, is somehow male, and the right hemisphere, dreamy and sensitive, is 
somehow female.”25 Hemispheric difference is a lot more complex than these crude, 
stereotypical generalisations. However, McGilchrist’s argues that there are indeed important 
distinctions between the hemispheres, which have significant implications for how humans 
                                                
24 It should be noted at this point that it is obviously beyond the scope of this project to 
engage and evaluate the science that lies behind McGilchrist’s findings. A brief note is 
therefore in order regarding the credibility of his research. While not without critics, 
McGilchrist’s work is widely seen to be grounded in robust scientific observation and his 
argument has been met with engaged interest from the neuroscientific community. Leading 
neuroscientists have endorsed his work, including “the Marco Polo of neuroscience,” V.S. 
Ramachandran, Jaak Panksepp (who defined the field of affective neuroscience), Colwyn 
Trevarthen, James Wright (both Trevarthen and Wright worked alongside the famed brain 
lateralization expert and Nobel laureate, Roger Sperry), Michael Trimble, Alwyn Lishman, 
Jurg Kesselring and Todd Feinberg. McGilchrist’s position on brain lateralization is 
meticulously researched, drawing from around 2 500 papers. Critics, such as long-time brain 
lateralization opponent, Michael Corballis, point not so much to McGilchrist’s work in 
particular, but to our limited, fluid, and ever-developing understanding of the human brain, 
and the modalities of brain function in particular. As such, for our purposes at hand, we are 
working from the assumption that his scientific conclusions are valid.  
For a detailed interrogation and defense of his argument, see Jonathan Rowson and Iain 
McGilchrist, ‘Divided Brain, Divided World’ (London: RSA Action and Research Centre, 
2013), 27ff. See also McGilchrist, ‘Split Brain, Split Views – Debating Iain Mcgilchrist’, 
https://kenanmalik.com/2013/02/24/split-brain-split-views-debating-iain-mcgilchrist/, 
accessed 10 September 2018; ‘Comments: Some Responses To The Master And His 
Emissary’, http://iainmcgilchrist.com/comments/, accessed 10 September 2018; Michael 
Trimble, ‘The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western 
World’, Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 16, no. 3 (1 May 2011): 284–88; Michael C. Corballis, 
‘Left Brain, Right Brain: Facts and Fantasies’, PLoS Biology 12, no. 1 (21 January 2014); 
Michael C. Corballis and Isabelle S. Häberling, ‘The Many Sides of Hemispheric 
Asymmetry: A Selective Review and Outlook’, Journal of the International 
Neuropsychological Society 23, no. 9–10 (October 2017): 710–18. 
25 McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary, 2. 
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attend to the world, and we should not lose sight of these valid differences amidst the 
inaccurate oversimplifications.26 In fact, echoing Nietzsche’s mythological dichotomy, he 
argues that “there are two fundamentally opposed realities, two different modes of 
experience; that each is of ultimate importance in bringing about the recognisably human 
world; and that their difference is rooted in the bihemispheric structure of the brain.”27 
McGilchrist suggests that the hemispheric differences are best understood through noting the 
distinctive attention each give to the world. “The right hemisphere underwrites breadth and 
flexibility of attention, where the left hemisphere brings to bear focussed attention. This has 
the related consequence that the right hemisphere sees things whole, and in their context, 
where the left hemisphere sees things abstracted from context, and broken into parts, from 
which it then reconstructs a ‘whole’: something very different.”28 The key point to note here 
is that both hemispheres have a role to play in an accurate perception of reality, subsequent 
creation of meaning and then action in the world.  
We will take a closer look at these hemispheric differences in a moment, since this has clear 
implications for the role of aesthetic existence. But first, it is worth pointing out that 
McGilchrist is responding to Nietzsche by suggesting that the left hemisphere offers a largely 
                                                
26 Much critique of McGilchrist’s argument stems from not reading his work closely enough 
to observe the careful nuances and complexities he highlights regarding a robust 
understanding of the lateralisation of brain function. He is careful to show that all research on 
brain modularity can become reductionist if it does not firstly acknowledge the variability and 
plasticity in brain function. As such, he acknowledges that it is clear (and has been clear for 
some time) that there are other brain modularities in operation (not merely right/left 
hemisphere modularity). In responding to Kosslyn and Miller’s Top Brain, Bottom Brain, he 
asserts that, “The existence of one doesn’t in any way suggest the absence of the others: they 
are not independent, but interconnected in such a way that each is, in fact, implied in the 
others.” Ellis and Solms argue that these modularities are more complex and variable than 
previously allowed for, some being “hard-wired” while others are “soft-wired” as determined 
through environmental factors. The key point to note here (apart from the observation that 
neuroscience has hardly reached consensus on these matters, and that it remains a rapidly 
developing field) is to heed McGilchrist’s encouragement not to be reductionist in our 
application of the hemispheric lateralisation of brain function. Stephen Kosslyn and G. Wayne 
Miller, Top Brain, Bottom Brain: Harnessing the Power of the Four Cognitive Modes (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2015); Iain McGilchrist, ‘Exchange Of Views. Top Brain, Bottom 
Brain: A Reply To Stephen Kosslyn & Wayne Miller’, accessed 10 September 2018, 
http://iainmcgilchrist.com/exchange-of-views/; George Ellis and Mark Solms, Beyond 
Evolutionary Psychology: How and Why Neuropsychological Modules Arise (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
27 McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary, 3. 
28 McGilchrist, 27. 
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Apollonian perception of reality, while the right presents a Dionysian.29 The very title of his 
book, The Master and His Emissary, is taken from a Nietzschean parable.30 The essential idea 
being that the human mind functions best when the left hemisphere, the emissary, with its 
attention to detail, serves the right hemisphere, the master, which offers context and a sense of 
the whole. McGilchrist’s central thesis, following Nietzsche, is that in recent history the 
emissary has assumed the role of master, with dire consequences.  
We have now reached a point where … the balance has swung too far – perhaps 
irretrievably far – towards the Apollonian left hemisphere, which now appears to 
believe that it can do anything, make anything, on its own. Like the emissary in the 
fable, it has grown tired of its subservience to the Master, and as a result the survival 
of the domain they share is, in my view, in the balance.31 
Contrary to the popular perception that “the right hemisphere may add a bit of colour to life 
[but] the left hemisphere … does the serious business,” McGilchrist argues that the right 
hemisphere, and the Dionysian tendencies associated with it, is vital to an accurate perception 
of reality, and our subsequent formation as human beings.32 In order to understand the 
implications of this for aesthetic existence, we need to take a closer look at the distinctive 
types of hemispheric attention. 
4.2 Brain Lateralisation and the Hemispheric Differences in Attention 
As already noted, McGilchrist is careful to point out that brain lateralisation is complex, so 
the danger of a brief summary here is reductionism, reflecting an inaccurate representation of 
brain function.33 In order to mitigate this danger, right at the outset, it is important to point out 
                                                
29 Although his argument draws from robust neuropsychological research, McGilchrist makes 
it clear that the science is simply a means to an end. His core purpose is to argue that there are 
two ways of being in the world, following in the footsteps of Goethe’s Faust, Schopenhauer, 
Henri Bergson, Max Scheler (‘Die Formen des Wissens und die Bildung’) and others. In this 
sense, his scientific exploration serves a dual purpose, being both literally evidential while 
also the means for articulating a metaphor of two ways of attending to the world, represented 
by the two hemispheres. It is the latter which is his (and our) primary concern. As such, 
McGilchrist’s ultimate conclusion is that even if the neuroscience which he draws from is 
ultimately shown to be flawed, and that brain lateralisation does not neatly fit these two ways 
of being in the world, he would still hold to the truth of the fact that human attention can be 
understood in these two ways, “it seems like a metaphor that might have some literal truth. 
But if it turns out to be ‘just’ a metaphor, I will be content. I have a high regard for metaphor. 
It is how we come to understand the world.” McGilchrist, 462. 
30 McGilchrist, 14. 
31 McGilchrist, 240. 
32 McGilchrist, 92. 
33 Further, it is important to note here what is not being argued in this chapter: there is no 
implication that lateralisation of the brain is the cause of these two ways of attending to the 
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that aesthetic existence is not only to be associated with the right hemisphere; it is more 
nuanced than that. While many aspects of aesthetic existence are related predominantly to 
right hemispheric brain function, there are aspects also related to the left hemisphere. A 
healthy approach to aesthetic existence should necessarily involve both hemispheres. In fact, 
it appears that aesthetic existence becomes unhinged from ethics and faith precisely when it is 
dominated by the left hemisphere, as self-seeking titillation in a closed system of sensory 
stimulation. As we shall see, this is the type of immature aesthetic existence that Kierkegaard 
sought to discard, and is contrary to the aesthetic existence Bonhoeffer embraced. 
McGilchrist describes a vast range of hemispheric distinctives, based on the respective roles 
that the two hemispheres play in our engagement with the world. These binary roles, even 
though they often seem contradictory, ideally function as complementary, held in tension with 
each other. While the right hemisphere’s attention is broad and flexible (as in a bird scanning 
the environment, predominantly with their left eye, for a mate or a predator), the left is 
focussed and grasping (as in a bird identifying and pecking at seed, predominantly using their 
right eye).34 The left largely deals with what is already known, while the right deals with the 
new. Significantly, “it follows that in almost every case what is new must first be present in 
the right hemisphere, before it can come into focus for the left.”35 Thus, the right is stronger in 
dealing with possibility (hence its connection with creativity, being more capable of a “frame 
shift”), while the left deals largely with predictability.36 While the left is responsible for 
division, unpacking sensory data into meaningful information, the right brings integration, 
synthesising experience with broader reality.37 Consequently, the left deals primarily with the 
abstract, while the right connects this with context.38 The left then, organises and categorises, 
while the right allows for individuality.39 Hence, the right “sees individual entities … as 
belonging in a contextual whole … from which they are not divided. By contrast the left sees 
parts” as belonging to a category.40 Little wonder then that McGilchrist describes the left as 
                                                                                                                                                   
world. Following McGilchrist, the argument here is not for a causal connection, or an attempt 
to explore the mind-body problem. Regardless of whether brain lateralisation is the cause or 
the effect of two ways of attending to reality, the brain offers a helpful lens for understanding 
these two types of attention we can give the world.   
34 McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary, 37. 
35 McGilchrist, 40. 
36 McGilchrist, 40. 
37 McGilchrist, 42. 
38 McGilchrist, 49. 
39 McGilchrist, 51. 
40 McGilchrist, 54. 
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impersonal versus the right as personal;41 the strength of the left dealing with the non-living, 
versus the living of the right.42 Although the left is also involved in emotion, it is the right that 
deals with emotional recognition and expression, and consequently empathy.43 It should 
already be apparent that aesthetic existence, as embodied and emotive engagement with 
reality, draws heavily on the nature of the often-preconscious attention that the right 
hemisphere offers the world.  
Before we look at the implications for everyday aesthetic existence, we need to further 
explore this right hemisphere connection by taking a closer look at three specific hemispheric 
distinctives, with direct connection to aesthetic existence: the temporal hierarchy of attention; 
explicit certainty versus implicit fluidity; and embodiment versus abstraction. 
4.2.1 The (Temporal) Hierarchy of Attention 
At the core of McGilchrist’s argument, as well as the relevance of his work for this project, is 
the temporal, and thus ontological hierarchy of attention between the two hemispheres of the 
brain. He shows how that which is new is first presented in the right hemisphere of the brain, 
before being passed over to the left hemisphere for processing, following which it returns to 
the right again for contextual application, “the right → left → right progression.”44 The 
implication of this is that the right hemisphere does not only have temporal primacy, but also 
“ontological supremacy. Whatever the left hemisphere may add – and it adds enormously 
much – it needs to return what it sees to the world that is grounded by the right hemisphere.”45 
In other words, the left hemisphere takes what is presented by the right, organises and 
categorises it, making sense of it, before re-presenting it to the right for integration with the 
world. This vital process enables the brain to cope with the changing, fluid nature of reality. 
McGilchrist articulately describes the ideal interaction between the hemispheres, which has 
significant implications for the formative role of aesthetic existence, 
One can never step into the same river twice – Heraclitus's phrase is, I believe, a 
brilliant evocation of the core reality of the right hemisphere's world – one will always 
be taken unawares by experience, since nothing being ever repeated, nothing can ever 
be known. We have to find a way of fixing it as it flies, stepping back from the 
immediacy of experience, stepping outside the flow. Hence the brain has to attend to 
                                                
41 McGilchrist, 54. 
42 McGilchrist, 55. 
43 McGilchrist, 66. 
44 McGilchrist, 46. It is for this reason that “conscious awareness lags behind unconscious 
apprehension by nearly half a second.” McGilchrist, 164. 
45 McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary, 195. 
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the world in two completely different ways, and in so doing to bring two different 
worlds into being. In the one, we experience – the live, complex, embodied, world of 
individual, always unique beings, forever in flux, a net of interdependencies, forming 
and reforming wholes, a world with which we are deeply connected. In the other we 
“experience” our experience in a special way: a “re-presented” version of it, 
containing now static, separable, bounded, but essentially fragmented entities, grouped 
into classes, on which predictions can be based. This kind of attention isolates, fixes 
and makes each thing explicit by bringing it under the spotlight of attention. In doing 
so it renders things inert, mechanical, lifeless. But it also enables us for the first time 
to know, and consequently to learn and to make things. This gives us power. 46 
To the extent that the ontological primacy of the right hemisphere is maintained, this power is 
subject to the context of a person’s lived reality, their existence in the world. In other words, 
the right hemisphere offers the critical sense of “betweenness,” or relationality, which both 
enables the power and control that the attention of the left hemisphere offers, but also limits it, 
as it is tested in the context of the Other. Initially, in the right hemisphere “we experience the 
world pre-reflectively, before we have had a chance to ‘view’ it at all, or divide it up into 
bits,” thus offering a sense of “togetherness,” which precedes even the left-hemisphere 
awareness of subject and object.47 This provides a vital context for the abstract, analytical 
work of the left hemisphere.  
The right hemisphere needs the left hemisphere in order to be able to “unpack” 
experience. Without its distance and structure, certainly, there could be, for example, 
no art, only experience … But, just as importantly, if the process ends with the left 
hemisphere, one has only concepts – abstractions and conceptions, not art at all. 
Similarly the immediate pre-conceptual sense of awe can evolve into religion only 
with the help of the left hemisphere: though, if the process stops there, all one has is 
theology, or sociology, or empty ritual: something else. It seems that, the work of 
division having been done by the left hemisphere, a new union must be sought, and for 
this to happen the process needs to be returned to the right hemisphere, so that it can 
live.48 
The respective roles of the hemispheres point toward the vital connections between: pre-
reflective, embodied, sensory, lived experience (right hemisphere); which is then consciously 
processed and systematised (left hemisphere); before being applied to contextual reality (right 
hemisphere). It is too reductionist to suggest that this right → left → right progression equates 
to aesthetic existence → rational reflection (belief) → action in the world (ethics), for it is 
more complex and nuanced than such a neat formula allows.49 Nevertheless, based on 
                                                
46 McGilchrist, 30–31. 
47 McGilchrist, 31. 
48 McGilchrist, 199. 
49 Here, we can recall Kierkegaard’s distinction between a first and second immediacy, his 
articulation of a first immediacy lacking left-hemispheric processing. 
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McGilchrist’s work, it is difficult to deny the pivotal formative role of aesthetic existence in 
this process.50 
If this progression is the ideal, then along the same lines as Nietzsche’s Apollonian critique of 
modernity, McGilchrist suggests that the modern orientation to the world is decidedly 
imbalanced, originating not in right-hemisphere concretion, but left-hemisphere abstraction.  
What if the left hemisphere were able to externalise and make concrete its own 
workings – so that the realm of actually existing things apart from the mind consisted 
to a large extent of its own projections? Then the ontological primacy of right-
hemisphere experience would be outflanked, since it would be delivering – not ‘the 
Other’, but what was already the world as processed by the left hemisphere. It would 
make it hard, and perhaps in time impossible, for the right hemisphere to escape from 
the hall of mirrors, to reach out to something that truly was ‘Other’ than, beyond, the 
human mind. In essence this was the achievement of the Industrial Revolution.51 
McGilchrist contends that the evidence of this externalisation of the left hemisphere’s 
artificial categories is evident in our “rectilinear urban environments”; our mechanistic, 
grasping engagement with the natural world (and consequent “despoliation, exploitation and 
pollution”); the isolation of individuals and the increasing virtualisation of all of life, 
including leisure, often enjoyed by an immersion into “a largely insubstantial replica of life” 
through TV, the internet, gaming, etc.52 (The latter point is again a reminder that all aesthetic 
existence is not equal.) Thus the danger of such an over-reliance on left hemisphere attention 
to the world is that it becomes entirely self-referential. 
It has long been acknowledged in the field of theological aesthetics that this is exactly why 
engagement with the aesthetic is vital to comprehension of reality: the aesthetic draws one 
beyond oneself (outside the left hemisphere’s self-referential system of signs) into wonder, 
mystery, awe and the acknowledgement of the divine Other. While McGilchrist’s research 
confirms such an argument as neuropsychologically valid, it goes beyond this, pointing to 
significant implications for everyday aesthetic existence. It is not only aesthetic experiences 
marked by wonder and awe which offer a sense of contextual reality. All everyday sensory 
                                                
50 For the remainder of this project, we will at times refer back to this right → left → right 
hemispheric progression. The point here is not the hemispheric progression itself, but the 
principle that underlies it. Other neuroscientists have argued for the same point, without 
referring to hemispheric progression. Panksepp, for instance, has shown that affect is primal, 
while Ellis and Solms draw from the latest research to argue that the cognitive is “soft-wired,” 
built upon the sensory which is “hard-wired” in neurological development. See Panksepp, 
Affective Neuroscience. Ellis and Solms, Beyond Evolutionary Psychology. 
51 McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary, 386. 
52 McGilchrist, 387. 
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existence is presented initially to the right hemisphere, offering a paradigmatic sense of the 
whole. In other words, while it is accurate to say that the role of the right hemisphere is to 
draw one outside of oneself into relationship with the Other, this is a fundamentally 
incarnational process. It is not merely a divine “Other” which one occasionally encounters 
through wondrous aesthetic experience, but the this-worldly “Other” of neighbour and nature, 
Creator and created world encountered through everyday aesthetic existence.53 This echoes 
Bonhoeffer’s incarnational rejection of the binary between the real and ideal, which in turn is 
a response to Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity’s rejection of this-worldly life.  
4.2.2 Explicit Certainty Versus Implicit Fluidity 
Ultimately, what McGilchrist is exploring is the process of how we know reality, and the 
question we are considering is whether everyday aesthetic existence is involved. As we have 
seen, both hemispheres have a role to play in this epistemological process, which is 
compromised if undue reliance is placed on one of the modes of attention. While the right 
hemisphere engages directly with the fluidity and changing nature of everyday life, sensitive 
to all that is implicit in this experience, the left seeks to make this explicit through abstract 
conceptualisation which can be linguistically expressed as certainty. While the system of 
signs that is language (the domain of the left hemisphere) is crucial for expressing meaning, 
not all meaning is reducible to explicit language. McGilchrist points out that the right 
hemisphere, responding to implicit meaning, governs many of our unconscious responses. It 
deals with non-verbal communication, for example, responding unconsciously to facial 
expressions and body language, at the level of milliseconds.54 While the right hemisphere 
reads the whole, which is implicit, the left builds towards meaning by piecing together 
explicit parts. 
Using the familiar information-processing terminology, the left hemisphere favours 
analytic, sequential ‘processing’ [incrementally constructing “certainty”], where the 
right hemisphere favours parallel ‘processing’ of different streams of ‘information’ 
simultaneously … there is an ‘aha!’ moment when the whole suddenly breaks free and 
comes to life before us. For it, though, knowledge comes through a relationship, a 
                                                
53 While considering Bonhoeffer’s description of transcendence as connected with the 
everyday (“The transcendent is not the infinite, unattainable tasks, but the neighbor within 
reach in any given situation”), it is intriguing to place alongside it the work of 
neuroanatomist, Raymond Tallis, who exposits the embodied nature of transcendence, our use 
of a forefinger for pointing being one such example, illustrating “everyday transcendence.” 
Raymond Tallis, Michelangelo’s Finger: An Exploration of Everyday Transcendence (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2012). 
54 McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary, 71. 
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betweenness, a back and forth reverberative process between itself and the Other, and 
is therefore never finished, never certain.55 
As helpful as the right-hemisphere process may be for perceiving a holistic sense of reality 
(including the divine, and all that is bound to remain implicit), the challenge is that this way 
of knowing the world can never be transferred to another via explicit language, hence the 
reticence of the modern, left-hemisphere dominated world to acknowledge it.  
To make matters worse, the left hemisphere will claim certainty, even if the information 
available from the right is inconclusive or absent altogether. McGilchrist references 
remarkable research to illustrate the point. In split-brain patients (where the two hemispheres 
are not connected as they should be, via the corpus callosum), if visual stimuli is presented 
solely to the right hemisphere, which subsequently prompts reaction from the subject, the left 
“without batting an eye” offers an explanation, with certainty, as to the cause of the reaction 
“as a statement of fact,” even though it clearly could not know the (implicit) reasoning 
involved by the right hemisphere.56 While the left hemisphere’s ability to extract explicit 
meaning is crucial to human understanding and communication, it is merely an intermediate 
step; it should neither be the starting point nor the end point in healthy engagement with 
reality, and subsequent formation of knowledge.  
As previously noted, both hemispheres have a role to play in aesthetic existence, but 
unquestionably, engaging the world through everyday aesthetic existence is, at the very least, 
significantly pre-reflective, intuitively engaging the implicit. Aesthetic existence then, with its 
Dionysian tendencies, plays a role in formation since it offers a way of knowing the world 
that the Apollonian does not have access too. Further, if an attempt is made to reduce its 
implicit knowledge of the world to the explicit certainty of the left hemisphere, much of its 
value is lost. 
Many important aspects of experience, those that the right hemisphere is particularly 
well equipped to deal with – our passions, our sense of humour, all metaphoric and 
symbolic understanding (and with it the metaphoric and symbolic nature of art), all 
religious sense, all imaginative and intuitive processes – are denatured by becoming 
the object of focussed attention, which renders them explicit, therefore mechanical, 
lifeless.57 
Ideally, “the implicit grounds the explicit,” which has the interesting implication that feelings 
are not the consequence of cognitive assessment, rather affect comes first and thinking 
                                                
55 McGilchrist, 228. 
56 McGilchrist, 81. 
57 McGilchrist, 209. 
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follows, as research shows.58 The question then, is how the formative value of right-
hemisphere attention influences conscious knowledge. In essence, the answer to this is found 
in the connections between embodied, aesthetic engagement with reality, the formation of 
living metaphors and the subsequent paradigmatic shaping of the imagination, a process we 
shall explore shortly. In order to do so, we need to look briefly at the connection between 
embodiment and the right hemisphere. 
4.2.3 Embodiment Versus Disembodied Abstraction 
Aesthetic existence is fundamentally sensory and embodied. For the abstract processing of the 
left hemisphere, this is marginal to knowing reality; sensory experience is processed as data 
for systematic categorisation, explicit certainty being the goal. That which does not contribute 
to this goal is discarded. By contrast, for the right hemisphere, the body is inextricably bound 
up in a sense of self and our existence in the world; our body is “something we ‘live’.”59 Of 
course, it is true that each hemisphere is connected to the contralateral half of the body when 
it comes to motor and sensory function, but it is only the right hemisphere which has a sense 
of the whole body in relation to self. The left hemisphere knows only of the existence of the 
right side of the body. If the right hemisphere does not function, the left side of the body 
ceases to exist to the individual involved.60 While the right hemisphere perceives the body to 
be that through which we live, a part of our identity, the left is detached from the body, seeing 
it as a thing among other things, “devitalised, a corpse.”61 “If the right hemisphere is not 
functioning properly, the left hemisphere may actually deny having anything to do with a 
body part that does not seem to be working according to the left hemisphere's instructions. 
Patients will report that the hand ‘doesn't belong to me’ or even that it belongs to the person 
in the next bed, or speak of it as if made of plastic.”62 Further, since the right hemisphere is 
attuned to the body it makes sense that it also “is far more closely linked to the physiological 
changes that occur in the body when we experience emotion,” thereby contributing to the 
superiority of the right regarding affect.63 
Again, if the hemispheres work harmoniously, complementing one another, these respective 
strengths allow for: bodily engagement with lived reality (as temporally and ontologically 
                                                
58 McGilchrist, 184. 
59 McGilchrist, 67. 
60 McGilchrist, 66. 
61 McGilchrist, 67. 
62 McGilchrist, 67. 
63 McGilchrist, 69. 
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primal); as well as subsequent disinterested contemplation; which ideally then converges in 
wise action in the world. However, if the left hemisphere rejects the ontological primacy of 
the right, thereby rejecting embodiment as foundational to knowing reality, meaning is locked 
within hermetic abstraction, the body simply being a means through which this meaning is 
imposed on the world. Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue with the fact that we are 
fundamentally connected to reality through our body, which the mediated awareness of the 
left hemisphere is utterly reliant on for engagement with the world (whether the left 
hemisphere acknowledges this or not cannot change this necessary connection). Existence is 
rooted in the body and senses. Consequently, this is the nexus of a primal awareness of the 
world, which both temporally and ontologically precedes conscious engagement, contributing 
to a way of knowing reality that cannot be reduced to the explicit certainty of the left 
hemisphere. McGilchrist draws from Heidegger to articulate this point,  
We do not inhabit the body like some alien Cartesian piece of machine wizardry, but 
live it … In trying to convey the “otherness” of a particular building, its sheer 
existence or essent prior to any one act of cognition by which it is partially 
apprehended, Heidegger speaks of the primal fact of its existence being made present 
to us in the very smell of it, more immediately communicated in this way than by any 
description or inspection. The senses are crucial to the “presence” of being, “to our 
apprehension of an is in things that no analytic dissection or verbal account can 
isolate.”64 
As fundamental as this embodied sense of being is, and despite its temporal and ontological 
primacy, the fact that it remains largely implicit means that it can be undervalued since it is a 
somewhat “transparent” contribution. “It is the most essential characteristic of the body that it 
disappears as an independent thing the more it fulfils its service … In this the body performs 
like a work of art. Just as Merleau-Ponty says that we do not see works of art, but see 
according to them, so that although they are vital for what we see, it is equally vital that they 
become transparent in the process, we live in the world according to the body, which needs its 
transparency, too, if it is to allow us to be fully alive.”65 If the left hemisphere predominates, 
treating the body merely as an assemblage of parts, the body loses this transparency, 
becoming explicit, and thus functioning merely as a tool for utilitarian purposes. In the realm 
of sexuality, for example, pornography is a manifestation of this left-hemisphere 
explicitness.66 (This once again highlights the fact that aesthetic existence can become 
hijacked by the left hemisphere, which is arguably no less formative, although it merely 
                                                
64 McGilchrist, 153. 
65 McGilchrist, 439. 
66 McGilchrist, 439. 
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reinforces, through embodiment, the closed system of signs which the left hemisphere has 
labelled reality.)  
In summary then, the right hemisphere offers an ontologically primal account of reality, 
grounded in embodied, affective and implicit knowledge of the world. It should be apparent 
from this brief survey that aesthetic existence plays a role in this paradigmatic attention that 
the right hemisphere gives to the world. Brain lateralisation, therefore, offers us important 
clues to understanding how we come to know reality, and the dangers of acknowledging only 
the Apollonian in the epistemological process. While these complementary ways of attending 
to the world both offer vital components of the epistemological process, when either one 
dominates, the net result is a distorted apprehension of reality, if not a completely artificial 
one. McGilchrist’s concern is ultimately to show that a left-hemisphere, self-referential, 
hyper-self-conscious manner of attending to the world marks modernity. McGilchrist suggests 
that there are “points of weakness” to break out of this “hall of mirrors,” which has become a 
culturally engrained mode of being in the world: 
the body, the soul and art (which relies on body and soul coming together) … the 
“lived” body, the spiritual sense, and the experience of emotional resonance and 
aesthetic appreciation are all principally right-hemisphere-mediated. What is more 
they each have an immediacy which bypasses the rational and the explicitness of 
language, and therefore leads directly to territory potentially outside of the left 
hemisphere’s sphere of control.67 [Italics added] 
This nexus of body, soul and the aesthetic is precisely the realm of aesthetic existence. In 
order to elucidate the formative role of everyday aesthetic existence we need to take a closer 
look at the epistemological implications of this right-hemispheric manner of attending to the 
world. 
4.3 Implications for the Formative Nature of Aesthetic Existence 
To recap: Nietzsche critiques modernity for its artificial construction of Apollonian reality 
and the rejection of a Dionysian embrace of life itself. To Nietzsche, Christianity is at the 
heart of this distortion, which is consequently seen to dismiss, or at the very least undermine, 
the value of aesthetic existence. In response, Bonhoeffer argues that Christianity is 
fundamentally incarnational, thereby calling for a celebration of aesthetic existence, as a 
penultimate expression of faith, amidst the goodness of this-worldly life. In the process, 
Bonhoeffer briefly draws a connection between formation (Bildung) and aesthetic existence, 
although he does not explore this further. Thus our turn to McGilchrist, who in sharing 
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Nietzsche’s critique of modernity, shows that the Dionysian tendencies of right-hemisphere 
attention are vital to human formation and perception of the world. McGilchrist does this by 
showing that within the process of apprehending reality, there are unconscious, implicit, 
affective, embodied elements, all of which are aspects of aesthetic existence. Both Bonhoeffer 
and McGilchrist, therefore, are responding to Nietzsche’s critique of Apollonian modernity by 
suggesting that reality is fundamentally embodied, and thus of the senses. Bonhoeffer 
suggests that to reject this is to reject Christological life itself, while McGilchrist shows that 
devaluing the Dionysian tendencies of the right hemisphere creates a circular, self-referential 
and artificial knowledge of the world. The way out of this “hall of mirrors” is to recover the 
value of body and soul and their engagement with the aesthetic, in which everyday aesthetic 
existence plays a significant part. Doing so will demand an appreciation of the formative role 
of metaphor and the imagination. Everyday aesthetic existence is bound up with the implicit 
and unconscious formation of meaning-making metaphors and the shaping of the 
paradigmatic imagination. Before we take a closer look at the significance of metaphor and 
the imagination to this project, a few introductory comments regarding the apprehension of 
reality are in order. 
4.3.1 Knowing Reality through Everyday Aesthetic Existence 
Even though the epistemological process is undeniably conscious, rational and explicit, as we 
have seen, it would be erroneous to assert that it is exclusively so. Brain lateralisation and the 
nature of right-hemisphere attention clearly shows that unconscious, implicit, affective and 
embodied engagement with the world also plays a role. In fact, as McGilchrist argues, it is a 
pivotal role, a grounding one, which provides the context within which the abstract rationality 
of the left hemisphere can flourish. If knowing reality were merely a question of systematic 
arrangement of abstract concepts, the organisation of information, then aesthetic existence 
would be irrelevant. It would merely be a bit of fun on the side, the insular and frivolous 
excitement of the senses, entertainment that has no bearing on knowledge of the world and 
self. However, if reality is fundamentally relational, as Bonhoeffer asserts, it follows that our 
embodied experience of being in the world, of engaging the other, is the basis for meaning. 
McGilchrist suggests that the abstract, conceptual knowing of facts is a left-hemisphere 
endeavour, while the right knows though experience as a living being in relationship. The 
former is fixed and certain, while the latter is individual and relies on personal engagement 
with the Other. The former can be commodified, and transferred via propositional language, 
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the latter can only be known through experience.68 “In many languages other than English 
[these two ways of knowing] are referred to by different words: the first by, for example, 
Latin cognoscere, French connaître, German kennen; the second by Latin sapere, French 
savoir, German wissen.”69 McGilchrist’s critique is that the way in which we attend to the 
world leans far too heavily toward the information-harvesting, disembodied kennen of the 
left-hemisphere, encroaching even on the way in which we engage living beings as utilitarian 
commodities. Rather than kennen encroaching on the realm of wissen, McGilchrist suggests 
that kennen should be grounded in the context of wissen. Or, in the words of philosopher 
Martha Nussbaum, we should embrace a fundamentally relational approach to knowing – 
“love’s knowledge.”70 
In fact, to illustrate the problem of apprehension dominated by kennen, McGilchrist considers 
the extreme, in which knowledge of reality is gained exclusively via a left-hemisphere mode 
of attention, and notes that the symptoms are identical to schizophrenia “in all its major 
predilections – divorce from the body, detachment from human feeling, the separation of 
thought from action in the world, concern with clarity and fixity, the triumph of representation 
over what is present to sensory experience, in its reduction of time to a succession of 
atomistic moments, and in its tendency to reduce the living to the devitalised and 
mechanical.”71 It is thus important to emphasize that these two ways of attending to the world 
do not merely represent an inconsequential choice of two modes of knowing, as though either 
will do, the choice simply being a matter of personal preference.  
To be clear then, there are two senses in which aesthetic existence is significant for our 
perception of the world. Firstly, since the right hemisphere’s sensory and affective 
engagement with the world is largely unconscious and implicit, it is possible, and highly 
likely, that we are unaware of the extent to which aesthetic existence shapes our apprehension 
                                                
68 McGilchrist, 95. 
69 McGilchrist, 96. 
70 Nussbaum asserts that at its core, knowledge “might be a complex form of life … 
Knowledge cannot be gained through intellectual grasping – through the greedy, controlling, 
manipulative employment of intellectual force … Knowledge cannot be merely intellectual. 
Intelligence cannot ‘know’ apart from feeling and commitment and ways of being that are 
consistent with what is known.” As quoted in Craig R. Dykstra, Growing in the Life of Faith: 
Education and Christian Practices (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 
142. 
71 Schizophrenia itself “as John Cutting has shown, appears to be a state in which the sufferer 
relies excessively on (an abnormally functioning) left hemisphere.” McGilchrist, The Master 
and His Emissary, 335. 
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of reality, regardless of whether we embrace an Apollonian or Dionysian approach to life. In 
this sense, aesthetic existence is formative for all, whether it is acknowledged as such or not. 
But secondly, conscious affirmation of the aesthetic creates an avenue to break out of the self-
referential system of signs by acknowledging the value of that which cannot be reduced to the 
explicit, thereby including the Other (and all that cannot be reduced to the explicit) in 
apprehension of reality. To expand on both of these points we need to look more closely at the 
meaning-shaping nature of metaphor and the imagination. 
4.3.2 Meaning-Making Metaphor 
McGilchrist argues that metaphor is closely related to reason,72 which only seems paradoxical 
because we have inherited an enlightenment view of reason as rationality.73 Clearly, he is not 
referring here merely to the use of metaphor as a flowery figure of speech. The enlightenment 
perspective of metaphor holds that, at best, it is a helpful linguistic tool to convey emotion; at 
worst, it is an unnecessary ornament, easily discarded should one choose to express the same 
concept literally. Either way, “metaphor can have nothing directly to do with truth.”74 But the 
power, and necessity, of metaphor is that it is a connection to embodied reality, a means of 
connecting abstract conceptualisation with the material world. There is thus a sense in which 
all language is metaphorical. 
Every word, in and of itself, eventually has to lead us out of the web of language, to 
the lived world, ultimately to something that can only be pointed to, something that 
relates to our embodied existence. Even words such as ‘virtual’ or ‘immaterial’ take us 
back in their Latin derivation – sometimes by a very circuitous path – to the earthy 
realities of a man's strength (vir-tus), or the feel of a piece of wood (materia). 
Everything has to be expressed in terms of something else, and those something elses 
eventually have to come back to the body.75 
In other words, the metaphorical nature of language is evidence of the “betweenness,” or 
relationality, which pervades a right hemisphere apprehension of the world. However, the vast 
majority of the “metaphors” that we use as part of daily language are dead metaphors, their 
connection to embodied existence in the world lost amidst the abstraction of language. But 
this does not deny the primacy of embodiment in the very formation of these metaphors, and 
thus language itself. In fact, McGilchrist suggests that poetic use of language (hearkening 
                                                
72 McGilchrist, 332. 
73 While explicit, abstract, linear and sequential argument is the realm of rationality; 
McGilchrist suggests that valid, deductive problem-solving incorporates a broader range of 
mental processing, which involves both hemispheres. See McGilchrist, 65. 
74 McGilchrist, 332. 
75 McGilchrist, 116. 
 115 
back to the origin of language in music) is an attempt to recover the living, right-hemisphere 
connection with reality, which abstract language has lost. Here we can turn once again, with 
McGilchrist, to music, to substantiate his point and illustrate that aesthetic existence is primal 
in engaging reality. 
4.3.3 Spotlight on Music: Metaphor and the musical origins of language  
Kierkegaard helped us to frame music as archetypal sensory immediacy. We then saw, 
through Bonhoeffer’s life and work, that music, as a form of aesthetic existence, is not merely 
ornamental to life, but formative. His musical metaphors were not simply helpful illustrations, 
but theological concepts formed though his musical experience. McGilchrist argues that this 
is because music is a primal means of capturing the affective relationality that pervades 
human life. Music is not peripheral to the serious business of life, but can implicitly capture 
reality in a fuller sense than words can ever do. 
This must be what Mendelssohn meant by his otherwise paradoxical pronouncement 
that “the thoughts that are expressed to me by music I love are not too indefinite to be 
put into words, but on the contrary too definite.” Language returns us inevitably to the 
worn currency of re-presentation, in which the unique qualities of everything that 
exists are reduced to the same set of terms. As Nietzsche put it: ‘Compared with music 
all communication by words is shameless; words dilute and brutalise; words 
depersonalise; words make the uncommon common.’76 
Further toward capturing the fullness of reality, McGilchrist suggests that, contrary to 
Kierkegaard, musical sensory immediacy is not the aesthetic moment, temporally isolated 
from other moments, but rather a moment saturated with eternity. It is a moment which 
paradoxically 
partakes of eternity … it does not so much use the physical to transcend physicality, or 
use particularity to transcend the particular, as bring out the spirituality latent in what 
we conceive as physical existence, and uncover the universality that is, as Goethe 
spent a lifetime trying to express, always latent in the particular. It is also a feature of 
music in every known culture that it is used to communicate with the supernatural, 
with whatever is by definition above, beyond, ‘Other than’, our selves.77  
When considering this participatory, affective and intuitive engagement with reality which 
music offers, it is hardly surprising that the right hemisphere is crucial for musical 
                                                
76 McGilchrist, 74. 
77 McGilchrist, 77. McGilchrist appears here to be struggling toward an analogical and 
participatory account of sacramental reality, which Graham Ward will help us articulate in the 
next chapter. 
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engagement.78 Amusia, the condition of being unable to understand, perform or appreciate 
music, is associated with damage to the right hemisphere of the brain.79 Music then, rather 
than being peripheral to life, is a manifestation of right-hemisphere relationality, an affective 
and implicit engagement with the “betweenness” of reality. 
In fact, McGilchrist’s contention is that language itself has its genesis in music.80 Here he 
follows the lead not only of contemporary theories of language, such as put forward by Steven 
Mithen, but points out that the theory has been explored by “Rousseau in the eighteenth 
century, von Humboldt in the nineteenth century and Jespersen in the twentieth.”81 
Archaeological evidence appears to indicate that early humans made music before language 
existed.82 Further, as Salomon Henschen points out, “The musical faculty is phylogenetically 
older than language; some animals have a musical faculty – birds in a high degree. It is also 
ontogenetically older, for the child begins to sing earlier than to speak.”83 As human infants 
learn language, “Intonation, phrasing and rhythm develop first; syntax and vocabulary come 
only later.”84 Hence the parenting phenomenon of “‘baby talk’ – which emphasises what is 
                                                
78 While both hemispheres of the brain are involved in musical performance, in amateur 
musicians it is associated predominantly with right hemispheric brain activity. 
Unsurprisingly, but interestingly, this is not the case with professional musicians wherein the 
“play” of music demands disciplined abstraction. However, professional musicians playing 
Bach’s polyphonic music produce strong right-hemisphere activity, perhaps pointing to the 
heightened somatic and affective awareness of the “other” in contrapuntal music. 
McGilchrist, 75. 
79 McGilchrist, 74. 
80 McGilchrist is less concerned here with the precise nature or chronology of language 
development, as he is to show that language had a musical and perhaps also gestural origin. 
Thus, whether language developed from music, or if both developed independently from what 
has been called “musilanguage” matters little. Likewise, if gesture played a significant role in 
this development it would only further affirm the embodied nature of language, music being 
“deeply gestural in nature: dance and the body are everywhere implied in it.” McGilchrist, 
102, 119. 
81 Steven Mithen, The Singing Neanderthals: The Origins of Music, Language, Mind, and 
Body (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); McGilchrist, The Master and His 
Emissary, 104. 
82 Archaeological research shows that the anterior condylar canal at the base of the skull, as 
well as the thoracic vertebral canal are essentially the same size in modern humans as the 
earliest human skeletons discovered. These canal sizes point to articulatory and respiratory 
nerve control associated with speech long before humans used language. “The explanation of 
this sophisticated control and modulation of the production of sound, in the absence of 
language as we know it, has to be that it was for a sort of non-verbal language, one in which 
there was intonation and phrasing, but no actual words: and what is that, if not music?” 
McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary, 102. 
83 McGilchrist, 103. 
84 McGilchrist, 103. 
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called prosody, the music of speech.”85 As McGilchrist notes, “Perhaps the most striking 
evidence, though, is that there are extant tribes in the Amazon basin, such as the Pirahã, a 
hunter-gatherer tribe in Brazil, whose language is effectively a kind of song, possessing such 
a complex array of tones, stresses, and syllable lengths that its speakers can dispense with 
their vowels and consonants altogether and sing, hum or whistle conversations.”86 
These musical origins of language point to the ability of music to facilitate aesthetic 
attunement to the relational nature of reality.87 While the left-hemisphere construction of 
abstract language can become disconnected from embodied life, the somatic and affective 
nature of music opens the possibility of engaging the fullness of lived reality.88 Our affinity 
for music then, is not merely a craving for insignificant and disposable entertainment, or a 
tickling of the senses like “auditory cheesecake,” as Steven Pinker claims.89 Rather, it is 
deeply embedded in what it means to be human. “Neurological research strongly supports the 
assumption that ‘our love of music reflects the ancestral ability of our mammalian brain to 
transmit and receive basic emotional sounds’, the prosody and rhythmic motion that emerge 
                                                
85 McGilchrist, 103. 
86 McGilchrist, 106. The Pirahã are indeed striking, not only because of the musical nature of 
their language, but also because their language contains no numbers or colours. Daniel 
Everett, a linguist who has spent much of his life studying the tribe, suggests that since they 
are “committed to an existence in which only observable experience is real, the Pirahã do not 
think, or speak, in abstractions.” Intriguingly, in resonance with what appears to be a life 
dominated by sensory immediacy, he names this the “immediacy of experience principle.” 
The cognitive anthropologist, Brent Berlin, suggest that Everett’s work points to the fact that 
the “Pirahã may provide a snapshot of language at an earlier stage of syntactic development.” 
Or, to put it in McGilchrist’s terms, are the Pirahã an example of a reliance, or even 
overreliance on right-hemisphere attention, just as modernity subscribes to an overreliance on 
left-hemisphere attention? Daniel L. Everett, ‘What Does Pirahã Grammar Have to Teach Us 
about Human Language and the Mind?’, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 
3, no. 6 (1 November 2012): 555–63; Daniel L. Everett, How Language Began: The Story of 
Humanity’s Greatest Invention (New York: Liveright, 2017); John Colapinto, ‘The 
Interpreter’, The New Yorker, 9 April 2007, 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/04/16/the-interpreter-2. 
87 We will discuss the importance of attunement and fittingness more fully in the next two 
chapters. In anticipation of that discussion, here we can simply note, as Nicholas Wolterstorff 
describes it, that aesthetic attunement is related to a universal sense of mild synesthesia. This 
is true of fitting music, and traces of it can still be found in language as McGilchrist notes, “in 
what has become known as the ‘kiki/bouba’ effect (‘kiki’ suggesting a spiky-shaped object, 
where ‘bouba’ suggests a softly rounded object).” McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary, 
119. 
88 This is not to say that all music, by default, attunes one to reality, for this is not the case. As 
we shall see, right-hemisphere affective and embodied engagement with the world, if 
dominated by left-hemisphere grasping, merely becomes sensationalism. 
89 Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2009), 534. 
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intuitively from entrainment of the body in emotional expression: ‘music was built upon the 
prosodic mechanisms of the right hemisphere that allow us affective emotional 
communications through vocal intonations.’”90 
The perspective that music is central to being human may seem novel and somewhat foreign, 
yet this is only so due to the removal of music from communal life in the western world.91 
Thus, even though music “has a vital way of binding people together, helping them to be 
aware of shared humanity, shared feelings and experiences, and actively drawing them 
together,” the specialisation, compartmentalisation and competition characterising modern 
life, as dominated by left-hemisphere engagement with the world, has shifted communal 
experience of music to the periphery of everyday life. 92 As the neurologist Oliver Sacks 
notes, today we have a “special class of composers and performers, and the rest of us are 
often reduced to passive listening. One has to go to a concert, or a church or a musical 
festival, to recapture the collective excitement and bonding of music. In such a situation, there 
seems to be an actual binding of nervous systems …”93  
The key point here is that this primal relating happens at a neurological level; it is a sensory 
engagement with reality prior to critical evaluation. In other words, it is implicit. “The origins 
of language in music and the body could be seen as part of a bigger picture, part of a primacy 
of the implicit. Metaphor (subserved by the right hemisphere) comes before denotation 
(subserved by the left). This is both a historical and an epistemological truth. Metaphorical 
meaning is in every sense prior to abstraction and explicitness.”94 For language to remain 
vital, for it to remain connected to lived reality in the sense that music is, its metaphorical 
nature needs to be nurtured and embraced. Failure to do so inevitably results in the virtuality 
of explicit, symbolic abstraction wherein the depth of implicit meaning is lost. Rowan 
Williams draws from McGilchrist to sum it up well, “Language itself as a whole system 
proceeds to ‘compensate’ for the losses in perception involved in this virtual depiction by 
reinstating something of the musical origin of speech through metaphor; that is, by speaking 
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93 As quoted in McGilchrist, 104. For a contemporary account expositing the power of 
communal singing, see Stacy Horn, Imperfect Harmony: Finding Happiness Singing with 
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out of a more empathic and more consciously embodied attitude, drawing on right-brain 
capacity …”95  
4.3.3.1 Metaphor as Rooted in Embodiment 
However, this metaphorical nature of language points to a more fundamental truth. As Lakoff 
and Johnson have shown, not only is all language essentially metaphorical, but metaphor, 
rooted in bodily experience, is the basis for all meaning.96 The representation of reality within 
the mind is essentially metaphorical. Research in the field of embodied cognition points to the 
fact that bodily engagement with the world forms unconscious categories of cognition that 
guide our conscious thought processes, providing “metaphors we live by.”97 Through our 
bodily experience of reality from a very early age (even prior to using language), we develop 
schemata which order our understanding, the paradigms of in versus out, or up versus down, 
for example. “These patterns emerge as meaningful structures for us chiefly at the level of our 
bodily movements through space, our manipulation of objects, and our perceptual 
interactions.”98 These schemata are unconsciously formed. Everyday aesthetic existence, 
therefore, can contribute to the formation of schemata, or metaphors by which we live, since, 
“The very basis of abstract thought, both in its concepts and in the manipulation of those 
concepts, lies in metaphors drawn from the body.”99  
If this connection between aesthetic engagement → creation of metaphor → shaping of 
perception holds true, there are significant implications for the relationship between everyday 
aesthetic existence, faith and ethics. This connection exists whether one embraces an 
Apollonian or a Dionysian approach to life. But McGilchrist’s core argument is that the 
former, dominated by the left hemisphere, imposes predefined (concrete, certain, fixed, 
already-known) categories on aesthetic engagement, thereby simply entrenching the abstract, 
dead metaphors of conception that allow for the protection of a closed, circular system of 
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artificial reality.100 This process is dominated by a sense of self-consciousness, and 
concomitant individualism, utilitarianism and pursuit of self-preservation. By contrast, 
attending to the material world through a right-hemisphere openness to living metaphor 
breaks out of self-referential abstraction, engaging the Other, and subsequently nurtures an 
empathic engagement with the world, which is foundational for belief and ethics. 
McGilchrist suggests that aspects of the Reformation reflect the dangers of a left-hemisphere-
dominated approach to the world, which rejects living metaphor. While the movement was 
broad, with diverse and complex manifestations, he nevertheless argues that there are  
common elements, and when we see them we are, in my view, witnessing the slide 
into the territory of the left hemisphere. These include the preference for what is clear 
and certain over what is ambiguous or undecided; the preference for what is single, 
fixed, static and systematised, over what is multiple, fluid, moving and contingent; the 
emphasis on the word over the image, on literal meaning in language over 
metaphorical meaning, and the tendency for language to refer to other written texts or 
explicit meanings, rather than, through the cracks in language, if one can put it that 
way, to something Other beyond; the tendency towards abstraction, coupled with a 
downgrading of the realm of the physical; a concern with re-presentation rather than 
with presentation … In essence the cardinal tenet of Christianity – the Word is made 
Flesh – becomes reversed, and the Flesh is made Word.101 
According to McGilchrist’s account, the Reformation replaced metaphor and the aesthetic 
with theory and concept. However, “The problem, as Luther realized, lay not in the statues, 
the icons, and the rituals themselves, but in the way they were understood. They had lost their 
transparency as metaphors, which are always incarnate and therefore must be left to act on us 
intuitively – neither just material or just immaterial, but bridges between the two realms.”102 
The support for this bridge between the realms of the material and immaterial is the human 
faculty of imagination, which enables a living metaphor to have meaning. Again, however, 
since the ambiguity of the imagination is antithetical to the fixed, certain and “safe” world of 
abstract conceptualisation, its epistemological role is not acknowledged by a left-hemisphere 
approach to reality. “As Schleiermacher put it, the Reformation and the Enlightenment have 
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this in common, that ‘everything mysterious and marvellous is proscribed. Imagination is not 
to be filled with (what are now thought of as) airy images.’”103 
4.3.4 The Paradigmatic Imagination 
Although McGilchrist is critical of a world dominated by left-hemisphere attention, he is 
careful to point out that the left-hemisphere is, of course, vital to functioning well in the 
world. As we have seen, it is merely focussed, left-hemisphere attention, unhinged from the 
grounding and context of holistic, right-hemisphere perspective, which becomes problematic. 
McGilchrist responds to Nietzsche by suggesting that the ideal is harmony between the 
Apollonian and Dionysian. Further, that it is the faculty of the imagination that “comes into 
being between the two hemispheres, which enables us to take things back from the world of 
the left hemisphere and make them live again in the right.”104 While the dominance of left-
hemisphere attention turns living metaphors into abstract concepts, thereby disconnecting 
them from embodied reality, the imagination not only returns abstract conceptualisation to 
lived reality, but also thereby offers a Gestaltian sense of integration between the explicit and 
implicit. This is what we will be referring to here, with Garret Green, as the paradigmatic 
nature of the imagination.105 Since the imagination cultivates a broad, receptive perspective of 
reality, guided by the right hemisphere, open to the fluidity and ambiguity of life, it creates 
space not only for engagement of the Other, but the concomitant integration of the 
transcendent with embodied, lived reality. In other words, the imagination allows for a 
paradigmatic perspective of reality which offers a means of perceiving the whole, not merely 
the parts. Thus, the parts are not perceived in isolation, but transformed as they are seen 
according to the whole. Hence, with David Bryant we could simply describe the imagination 
in terms of “seeing as.”106  
 Echoing McGilchrist, James Smith describes the imagination as, 
A quasi-faculty whereby we construe the world on a precognitive level, on a register 
that is fundamentally aesthetic precisely because it is so closely tied to the body. As 
embodied creatures, our orientation to the world begins from, and lives off of, the fuel 
of our bodies, including the “images” of the world that are absorbed by our bodies.107 
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These “images” are not therefore merely ocular; the “imagery” that feeds the imagination 
emanates from a full-bodied experience of reality. The imagination is thus a powerful 
epistemological faculty that has the potential to alter perception of reality. Yet, because it is 
shaped by embodied, affective and implicit reality, it does not fit the narrow, abstract fact-
finding of left-hemisphere processing, hence its rejection by enlightenment epistemology. But 
this rejection has two implications. Firstly, as many have shown, the imagination is critical for 
perception of the divine (extending to all transcendence and everything that remains implicit), 
which, by definition, cannot be comprehended within the confines of explicit, finite 
rationality.108 Secondly, due to its paradigmatic nature, the imagination plays a role in the 
formation of all meaning. In other words, the formative significance of the imagination 
applies not only to embracing wonder and mystery, but also to our perception and 
engagement of material, this-worldly reality; the imagination allows for both apprehension of 
right-hemisphere openness, while also providing a foundation for left-hemisphere concrete 
thought and action.  
The nature of everyday aesthetic existence is diverse and varied, the broad categories of play, 
friendship and art, for example, being easily subdivided into many further subcategories. It 
would hardly therefore be helpful, or accurate, to assert that everyday aesthetic existence, as a 
whole, opens one to the infinite, or provides an imaginative paradigm for engaging reality. In 
fact, this is not the case in every instance, as we shall momentarily discuss. However, it 
should be clear that everyday aesthetic existence, to the extent that it is embodied, affective 
and engages the implicit, has the potential to both open one to the Other, as well as shape the 
paradigmatic imagination, with implications for this-worldly thought and action. 
Formation is a fundamentally imaginative process. If discipleship is the call to imitate Christ, 
there is an important connection here to the embodied shaping of the imagination as 
McGilchrist shows, 
We already know from the discovery of the existence of mirror neurones that when we 
imitate something that we can see, it is as if we are experiencing it. But it goes further 
than this. Mental representation, in the absence of direct visual or other stimulus – in 
other words, imagining – brings into play some of the same neurones that are involved 
in direct perception. It is clear from this that, even when we so much as imagine doing 
something, never mind actually imitate it, it is, at some level which is far from 
negligible, as if we are actually doing it ourselves. Imagining something, watching 
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someone else do something, and doing it ourselves share important neural 
foundations. Imagination, then, is not a neutral projection of images on a screen. We 
need to be careful of our imagination, since what we imagine is in a sense what we are 
and who we become.109 
The implication here is that “discipleship” is a universal human experience. The question is 
merely what, or who, is doing the “discipling,” and to what end? The nature of our attention 
changes what we find and determines who we become.110 As the imagination is engaged 
through friendship, art and play, for instance, paradigms are created and neural pathways 
formed which offer a context for understanding reality. The imagination, “seeing as,” 
provides the context for belief, acting “as if” (a point we shall explore more fully in the next 
chapter).111 
4.3.5 Left-Hemisphere “Dionysian” Sensationalism 
While everyday aesthetic existence has the potential to draw on right-hemisphere processing, 
engaging the implicit, shaping the imagination and opening one to the Other, there is also an 
expression of aesthetic existence which we could term post-modern aestheticism. If bodily 
engagement with the world becomes disconnected from a contextual perspective of the whole 
of reality, which the right hemisphere provides, the body becomes simply a tool to be used for 
the satisfaction of the left-hemisphere’s artificial system of signs. Sensation does not cease to 
exist, but it is interpreted through this hyper-self-conscious, insular rubric. Rather than the 
senses being jettisoned, the post-modern rejection of Apollonian ideals leaves only the senses 
to be explored for some feeling of being alive. “The left hemisphere senses that something is 
wrong, something lacking – nothing less than life, in fact. It tries to make its productions live 
again by appealing to what it sees as the attributes of a living thing: novelty, excitement, 
stimulation.”112 In an ironic reconfiguration of aestheticism, it is the senses that absolutely 
matter, but never with the hope of offering meaning. Disconnected from the whole, all that 
remains is stimulation and sensation. While the “Dionysian” is celebrated, it is never towards 
an end outside of the self, always subservient to the abstract and artificial rules of the game 
determined by the left hemisphere. “The left hemisphere ‘creates’ newness by recombining in 
a novel fashion what is already known, not as imagination does, [but] by allowing something 
that we thought we knew to be truly revealed for the first time. It is like those children’s 
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books with pages split into three, in which you can invent a new animal by putting together 
the head of a camel, the body of a seal and the legs of a goat.”113 Just like the aesthetes’ “art 
for art’s” sake, while seemingly a noble elevation of the aesthetic, it is ultimately a 
devaluation, since it disconnects it from life, so the “betweenness” is lost here amidst self-
reflexive fulfilment.114  
In other words, “Devitalisation leads to boredom, and boredom, in turn, to sensationalism.”115 
The end result is a “high stimulus society” which is “represented through advertising as full of 
vibrancy and vitality,” and the concomitant rise of consumerism, all toward the end of “fresh 
experience and novel excitement.”116 The consequence is sensation disconnected from right-
hemisphere context and the subsequent severance from reality, as “the left hemisphere 
interposes a simulacrum between reality and our consciousness” leading to the “increasing 
virtuality” of life.117 
It follows then that everyday aesthetic existence, while potentially a life-giving, meaning-
shaping embrace of embodied, implicit reality, can become co-opted by left hemisphere 
processing, thereby simply providing novel excitement within the safe confines of what is 
already “known.” In the realm of friendship, for example, the rise of social media provides the 
opportunity for a virtual, disembodied, re-representation, which is ultimately not relational, 
but merely a means of stimulation, safely controlled as a consumerist utility by the click of a 
button.118 The rise of gamification in the realm of education provides another example. 
Gamification provides parameters (rules, objectives, rewards), which are concrete and 
explicit, celebrating success with novel excitement. The creation of this virtual world, limited 
to the rational, precludes the formative influence of the implicit. Art, in both the extreme of 
being highly conceptual, as well as the other extreme of excessively sentimental, becomes 
mere stimulation of the left hemisphere without fundamental connection to lived reality.119 In 
fact, sentimentality is merely a different expression of the same issue we explored regarding 
pornography. Both stimulate the left hemisphere, offering a placebo of the real, while 
ultimately disconnected from life, as the writer Flannery O’Connor articulates well, 
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“Pornography … is essentially sentimental, for it leaves out the connection of sex with its 
hard purpose, and so far disconnects it from its meaning in life as to make it simply an 
experience for its own sake.”120 Significantly, O’Connor suggests that both are an attempt to 
short-circuit a sense of redemption, a return to innocence, but cannot do so, since they are 
neither ultimately embedded in embodied, Christological reality, nor therefore redemptive in 
any sense.  
4.3.6 The Dionysian and Apollonian Revisited  
Such a left-hemisphere approach to aesthetic existence (perhaps we could call it Apollonian 
aesthetic existence) is ultimately self-referential. While it never breaks out of its self-
contained system, it offers a virtual experience of the Other. Or, as Nietzsche warned us, we 
create reality, our perception of the world, including “god,” in our own image. 
Philosophically and theologically, to sustain this system, a left-hemisphere binary is created 
(the categorizing strength of left hemisphere attention) between the real and ideal, 
consequently devaluing the material as merely a manifestation of the abstract, a symbol. As 
McGilchrist notes, quoting Nietzsche’s insightful comment, “‘The symbolic replaces that 
which exists’: surely the perfect expression of the triumph of theory and abstraction over 
experience and incarnation, of re-presentation over ‘presencing’ …”121  
The problem with binaries such as real-ideal and subject-object, McGilchrist suggests, are that 
they are a construction of left hemisphere attention, but are ontologically non-existent, and 
thus absent in preconscious, aesthetic engagement with reality.122 While we cannot deny that 
they aid our processing and communication about the world, they also challenge what 
McGilchrist argues is at the core of right-hemisphere perception of the world: relationality.  
In this context, it is best to understand the dichotomy of Apollonian vs. Dionysian as exactly 
that, a mythological binary helpful for our processing and articulation as to the nature of our 
engagement with reality, as we have done with McGilchrist in this chapter. Having done so, 
we need to acknowledge that fundamentally, reality, and our engagement thereof, is not to be 
found in harmony within the dichotomy as Nietzsche suggested, but in their ontological unity 
in Christ, as Bonhoeffer showed. This is important because there are not two ways of 
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attending to Reality. There are two types of attending, but only one provides access to Reality, 
the other to an artificial system of signs.  
4.4 Conclusion 
Everyday aesthetic existence can therefore serve either the self-enclosed, virtual world created 
by unhinged, left-hemisphere-dominated attention, or it can contribute to the role right-
hemisphere-dominated attention plays in formation, through embodied, implicit engagement 
with reality. As our study of both Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer has suggested, this should 
come as no surprise, since there seems to be a clear distinction between, what we have 
termed, a mature or immature embrace of aesthetic existence. The key question of course, 
which we posed at the end of the last chapter, is how we distinguish the two. At the time, we 
suggested that Bonhoeffer may be inferring that mature aesthetic existence would be guided 
by love, a polyphonous celebration of Christological reality. McGilchrist’s conclusion 
regarding the formative nature of aesthetic existence resonates with this. “What ultimately 
unites the three realms of escape from the left hemisphere’s world … the body, the spirit and 
art – is that they are all vehicles of love … for love is the attractive power of the Other, which 
the right hemisphere experiences, but which the left hemisphere does not understand and sees 
as an impediment to its authority.”123 We shall explore this connection between aesthetic 
existence and service of the other further in the following two chapters, as we consider the 
implications for ethics and faith.
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CHAPTER 5: GRAHAM WARD & AESTHETIC EXISTENCE 
AS FUNDAMENTAL TO BECOMING CHRISTIAN 
Introduction 
The first part of the research question guiding this project asks whether aesthetic existence is 
fundamental to being human. A superficial reading of Kierkegaard would seem to suggest that 
it is not; aesthetic existence is merely an immature stage through which one should progress, 
leaving it behind as one moves to ethical and ultimately religious existence. However, a closer 
reading of Kierkegaard shows that mature aesthetic existence plays a part in every stage of 
life. Bonhoeffer builds on this by arguing that an incarnational approach to reality demands an 
embrace of this-worldly aesthetic existence as an expression of Christian living in the 
penultimate. Bonhoeffer is responding to Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, which 
Nietzsche sees as complicit in modern Apollonian hegemony. For Nietzsche, the devaluation 
of the Dionysian is not merely neglect of a peripheral aspect of experience; it is a failure to 
embrace the most fundamental aspect of human existence. In the last chapter, McGilchrist 
showed why Nietzsche’s critique has valid grounds. There are indeed two ways of attending 
to the world, which accord with the lateralisation of the brain, and McGilchrist has illustrated 
how both are important for engagement with reality. Everyday aesthetic existence is 
fundamental to being human since it plays a preconscious, formative role in the apprehension 
of reality. It does so through the embodied and affective shaping of the paradigmatic 
imagination, which determines how we see as. 
In this chapter we will explore the consequences for the second part of the research question: 
what are the implications then for how aesthetic existence is fundamental to being a Christian, 
bodily engaged in the life of the world? As noted in the introduction, this question gives rise 
to two further sub-questions. Firstly, what are the implications for the formation of being 
Christian (discipleship)? Secondly, what are the implications for being Christian, embodied in 
the world? The former deals with the life of faith and the latter with the life of the world, or 
ethics. We will begin to explore both of these sub-questions in this chapter. At the heart of 
these questions is the relationship between aesthetics, faith and ethics. As we have already 
noted in response to Nietzsche, a recovery of aesthetic existence cannot come at the expense 
of divorcing aesthetics from ethics, a schism that has historically carried disastrous 
consequences, as seen in the rise of Nazism for example. McGilchrist’s work intimates that 
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aesthetic existence, faith and ethics are inextricably connected. In order to understand the 
nature of this relationship we now turn to the work of Graham Ward. 
In contrast to McGilchrist, Ward is a theologian. His work is particularly well suited to the 
project at hand due to the interdisciplinary nature of his research, which draws from a number 
of fields, including philosophy, the human sciences and aesthetics. Ward undertakes what he 
calls an exploration into the “archaeology and architecture” of belief, thereby pointing not 
only to the universality of human belief but also to the nature of its relationship to faith.1 In 
response to McGilchrist, Ward argues that the connection between belief and aesthetic 
existence is even more fundamental than McGilchrist suggests, and ultimately that aesthetics, 
belief and ethics cannot be separated. Beliefs operate as dispositions toward the world, which 
inform our actions, dispositions which are shaped and formed by our embodied and affective 
engagement with the world. Consequently, he puts forward an “embedded” and thus 
“engaged” theology, which articulates how the nexus of belief and analogical aesthetic 
engagement with the world is necessarily linked to ethical life.2 
5.1 Understanding Belief in Relation to Aesthetic Existence 
In order to understand the relationship between aesthetic existence and belief we need to take 
a closer look at the nature of belief, and the distinction between faith and belief. We will 
begin by considering belief in general (as opposed to religious belief), before turning to the 
implications for a life of faith. In order to approach Ward’s response to McGilchrist, a more 
detailed articulation of McGilchrist’s anthropology of belief is required.  
5.1.1 McGilchrist’s Anthropology of Belief as Sensory, Imaginative Existence 
McGilchrist suggests that the nature of belief is misunderstood due to the dominance of left-
hemisphere attention that characterises life in the modern world. The left hemisphere deals 
with abstraction and categorisation, certainty and fixity being the goal, which is to be 
achieved through ratiocination. This is considered the highest form of knowledge. 
Consequently, belief is seen to be merely a “feeble form of knowing.”3 According to this way 
of thinking, if one does not know something with certainty, but one suspects it might be the 
case, one is said to “believe” something. For instance, one may say, “‘I believe that the train 
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leaves at 6.13’, where ‘I believe that’ simply means that ‘I think (but am not certain) that’.” 
Belief here is merely “absence of certainty.”4 
However, as we have seen, while the left hemisphere indeed has an important role to play in 
the formation, and particularly communication of knowledge, if it is not submitted to the 
contextual hierarchy of the right hemisphere → left hemisphere → right hemisphere 
progression, the result is simulated “knowledge,” disconnected from embodied, material 
reality. It may well be certain and fixed, but it is a knowledge of virtual reality. Embodied and 
affective engagements with the world, the dominant modes of aesthetic existence, are 
grounded in the right hemisphere. In other words, while aesthetic existence may have no clear 
role to play in an epistemological process dominated by abstract ratiocination, the end result 
of such knowledge is a simulated, and ironically therefore, somewhat “feeble” form of 
knowing.  
In light of the significance of the right hemisphere → left hemisphere → right hemisphere 
hierarchy, which necessarily points to the formative and epistemological value of aesthetic 
existence, we need to reconsider the nature of belief. For McGilchrist, right-hemisphere 
attention has immense and vital (in the full sense of the word) importance. Left-hemisphere 
certainty, disconnected from right-hemisphere context, is not the pinnacle of knowledge. 
Rationality is, therefore, not more dominant than embodied and affective experience in the 
epistemological process. Consequently, belief is not a weaker form of knowing. Rather, the 
intuitive, implicit, preconscious, embodied and affective knowing of right hemisphere 
attention plays an important, perhaps even dominant role in our apprehension of the world 
and personal formation. Thus, for McGilchrist,  
Belief is a matter of care: it describes a relationship, where there is a calling and an 
answering, the root concept of “responsibility.” Thus if I say that “I believe in you,” it 
does not mean that I think that such-and-such things are the case about you, but can’t 
be certain that I am right. It means that I stand is a certain sort of relation of care 
towards you, that entails me in certain kinds of ways of behaving (acting and being) 
towards you, and entails on you the responsibility of certain ways of acting and being 
as well.5 
Two important points emanate from McGilchrist’s stance on belief. Firstly, the description of 
belief as a relationship has implications for the formative nature of aesthetic existence. If 
aesthetic existence, through embodied and affective relationship to the world, has the ability 
to open oneself up to the Other, aesthetic existence is at the heart of the formation of belief, 
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through the creation and sustenance of relationship. It is a gateway to partaking in an 
ontological reality: the relational nature of the world, or what McGilchrist describes as 
“betweenness,” to which the right hemisphere is receptive. The relationship between the 
believed and the believer is more complex (even unconscious to a degree), organic and 
dynamic than reduction to rational proposition would allow.  
Secondly, McGilchrist suggests that the very nature of this relationship entails response-
ability; belief is a relation of care. In other words, it is a relation that affects behaviour and 
cannot but do so. This perspective of belief inextricably binds it to ethics. Action then, an 
ethical response, is not merely measured ratiocination based on conscious processing of 
abstract concepts, but the partly preconscious, organic and necessary response to an 
existential reality.  
Notably, belief, as a relation of care, foregrounds desire, just as the left-hemisphere 
perspective of belief, as a weak form of knowledge, foregrounds the will. If left-hemisphere 
attention is marked by volitional control, the right is marked by a relational “desire or longing 
towards something, something that lies beyond itself, towards the Other.”6 Once again, this 
has significant implications for our project. Aesthetic existence is a realm of affective 
experience, both appealing to and shaping desire, which holds true whether one considers 
friendship, art or play, for example. In other words, McGilchrist is arguing that belief is 
intimately connected with desire. Desire, not the will, functions as the fundamental impetus 
behind belief. This raises a number of questions: Do we choose our beliefs? To what extent 
do everyday aesthetic experiences influence our desires, and thus our beliefs? And, if belief is 
inextricably tied to ethics, what are the implications for the connection between desire and 
ethical life? Graham Ward explores these questions in greater detail, and we shall return to 
them shortly. 
McGilchrist’s argument for the integration of aesthetic existence, faith and ethics rests on his 
connection between the formation of the imagination (as the faculty that allows us to “see 
as”), and the consequent choice to believe (act “as if”). As we saw in the last chapter, 
McGilchrist suggests that the imagination is the faculty that bridges left and right hemisphere 
attention. Right-hemisphere attention, encompassing preconscious sensory engagement with 
the world, creates unconscious paradigmatic metaphors, shaping the imagination, which 
allows us to see the world “as” through left hemisphere processing. Drawing from Heidegger, 
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and in reference to Wittgenstein’s duck-rabbit, McGilchrist affirms that, “We see things by 
seeing them as something. In this sense … we create the world by attending to it in a 
particular way.”7 In sum, the imagination (the way we see as) is shaped by our embodied and 
affective relationship with the world, thereby grounding our apprehension of reality. 
Based on this embodied and affective relationship with reality, belief is a relational choice, a 
matter of where one places one’s trust, despite the impossibility of certainty. The choosing 
“involves an act of faith, and it involves being faithful to one’s intuitions.”8 As one perceives 
reality through the right hemisphere → left hemisphere → right hemisphere progression, a 
reality grounded in embodiment and the imagination, one acts on the basis of this reality. One 
acts as if. Belief, therefore, is not optional. Everyone sees as, and consequently acts as if. 
Belief is not merely a cognitive endorsement of uncertain information, but a holistic relational 
attitude, a commitment of trust, “a disposition towards the world.”9 
The important question here, which is central to Ward’s critique as we shall see, is how the 
move is made from seeing as to acting as if ? If this is a cognitive choice, are we not simply 
back where we started with left-hemisphere volition controlling belief?  
5.1.2 Ward Affirms McGilchrist: Belief as an embodied, relational disposition 
Graham Ward affirms and builds upon McGilchrist’s findings regarding belief, particularly 
that belief is not merely a weak form of knowledge but a relational category.10 “As such credo 
is not necessarily and immediately linked to a calculus of probabilities and ‘causal thinking’ 
(Wolpert), but rather to relational categories like trust, loyalty and empathy.”11 This 
orientation of “care” is both affective and ultimately leads to concrete action. Ward confirms 
that embodiment, the imagination and belief are inextricably bound together, thereby 
acknowledging the role of aesthetic existence in faith formation. But as already noted, Ward 
has one particularly significant critique of McGilchrist’s description of belief, which has 
implications for this project. Ward argues that McGilchrist’s articulation of belief in terms of 
“acting as if” returns it to the realm of a cognitive choice. If this is so, then the impact of 
aesthetic existence on belief is peripheral, a secondary influence at best, subservient to 
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conscious choice. But Ward argues that this is not accurate since belief is a disposition 
(involving both conscious and preconscious processes), rather than simply a conscious choice.  
Ward suggests that our misunderstanding of belief stems from assessing knowledge through 
Cartesian and Lockean lenses. Reconsidering Plato may be helpful, which he does through 
three tropes in “Plato’s Republic: the simile of the sun, the analogy of the line and the allegory 
of the cave.”12 The question raised through Plato’s exploration of the degrees of knowledge is 
whether belief (pistis) is merely a stepping-stone towards true knowledge, to be jettisoned as 
inferior as soon as a higher form is attained. But this may be something of a Cartesian 
reading, the journey towards certainty having no utility once certainty itself is achieved. Ward 
reflects upon the fact that it may be worth taking a closer look at what is going on here. Do 
the primal moves, saturated by desire, intention and belief, not have a teleological impact on 
the ultimate destination of clarified, abstract knowledge? A more attentive reading of these 
tropes seems to indicate that the various levels of knowledge 
both refer back to previous levels and ahead to the levels that follow, blurring where 
the boundaries lie … we might say: we come to know that which we believe, trust and 
are assured to be true. Or even: we believe that we may understand – which seems to 
be the way Augustine read the Platonic thought available to him in the fourth century 
CE.13 
By contrast, the modern perspective of belief as a weak form of knowledge is the 
consequence of the approach taken by philosophers such as John Locke. Locke’s Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding explores the nature of knowledge and its relationship to 
belief, in Book IV, Chapter XV, defining belief as:  
Being that which makes us presume things to be true, before we know them to be so 
… And herein lies the difference between probability and certainty, faith and 
knowledge, that … each immediate idea, each step has its visible and certain 
connexion; in belief, not so. That which makes me believe, is something extraneous to 
the thing I believe …14  
This essentially remains the modern stance on “the epistemology of belief and believing. All 
cognitive activity takes place in the receiving and receptive mind.”15 A dualism is formed 
between world and subject, a rift that is only overcome by “certain knowledge.” Belief is 
relegated to speculation about the nature of reality. Thus, “with the association of belief with 
                                                
12 Ward, 23–29. 
13 Ward, 25. 
14 As quoted in Ward, 127. 
15 Ward, 127. 
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opinion, fancy and guessing … at best faith becomes a Pascalian wager, a leap beyond 
reason.”16 
We shall return to the connection between belief and faith shortly. But the natural 
consequence of this epistemological perspective is that, “we should aspire to knowledge 
‘altogether clear and bright’ – certainty, transparency, daylight forever; a realised eschatology 
(without God and without judgement) in which there is no shadow of belief or opinion.”17 
The irony is that such “certainty” is only achieved by prioritising left-hemisphere abstraction 
over right-hemisphere embodied and affective engagement with the world, thereby 
entrenching the dualism rather than overcoming it. 
Ward picks up on McGilchrist’s observations of this world-subject dualism, which has 
interesting implications for the relationship between aesthetic existence and belief. As we 
have already seen, Lockean epistemology and the dominance of left-hemisphere abstraction 
has one of two consequences for aesthetic existence. The first possibility is that an I-Thou 
relationship is encountered through aesthetic experience which challenges the sufficiency of 
the left-hemisphere closed system of meaning. By encountering the Other through affective 
and embodied means, the self-sufficient system of signs is breached, demanding the 
exploration of reality undiscovered. Belief here, as a relational category, is intertwined with 
the discovery of the world.  
The second possibility is that an immature and self-seeking engagement with aesthetic 
existence cultivates a sensationalism which merely serves to entrench a simulated reality. 
Belief here, as a weak form of knowledge, has a potent relationship with aesthetic existence. 
Since beliefs, in this instance, are the consequence of a simulated abstraction of meaning, 
these virtual beliefs can be endorsed by self-seeking aesthetic experience, creating a 
delusional and therefore dangerous malformation of the left-hemisphere/right-hemisphere 
symbiosis. We shall more fully explore the nature of this simulated belief shortly. Here we 
need simply note two manifestations of such virtuality: a modern, Lockean naming of such 
“certainty” as “reality”, and the post-modern, Baudrillardian acknowledgement of it as 
simulacrum, accompanied by pseudo-vital sensationalism. The similarity here between the 
modern and post-modern perspectives is in the role immature aesthetic existence plays in 
validating the virtuality, whether it is named simulacrum in the latter, or named “reality” in 
the former.  
                                                
16 Ward, 128. 
17 Ward, 130. 
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To highlight the role of mature aesthetic existence in a dispositional understanding of belief 
and its relationship to reality, we need to move beyond the Lockean perspective, delve deeper, 
and turn to Ward’s “architecture of belief.” 
5.1.3 Dispositional Belief: Aesthetic existence informs “anticipation” and “projection” 
As already noted, Ward suggests that belief is a universal human condition, not only to be 
confined to the realm of religious belief.18 His enquiry leads him to a “biology and 
neuropsychology of believing,” plotting an “architecture” of belief.19 Like McGilchrist, Ward 
suggests that an anthropological fallacy – humans are volitional agents prioritising the rational 
above the affective and imaginative – lies at the root of our misunderstanding of the place of 
belief, the imagination and desire.20 
In challenging this ratiocentric anthropology, Ward shows that “beliefs inform perception, 
interpretation and action prior to rationalisation.”21 The important point here, at the heart of 
Ward’s argument, is the preconscious, dispositional nature of belief. While there may be 
flaws in Plato’s articulation, what he does rightly point toward is the interrelated and dynamic 
nature of the levels of knowing, and ultimate action. Action at times even preceding conscious 
volition, which implies that “we are examining not a linear process but a complex set of 
feedback and feedforward loops in which believing is deeply implicated.”22   
Ward explores the relationship between belief and “what lies beneath” – that which “is prior 
to interpretation and the impact it has on the way we think and behave.”23 In 1987, cognitive 
scientist, John F. Kihlstrom, published a seminal article, “The Cognitive Unconscious,” in 
which he argues that we arrive at “judgements and impressions prior to conscious 
attentiveness.”24 Since the publication of Kihlstrom’s article, neuroscientists have probed each 
aspect of nonconscious activity which he proposed, among other findings, confirming the 
                                                
18 Ward, 14. 
19 Ward, 14. 
20 Ward, 122. 
21 Ward, 12. 
22 Ward, 13. 
23 Ward, 11. 
24 “Kihlstrom recognises … three forms of nonconscious activity: automatic responses, where 
we have learnt something by practice such that it requires little conscious attention … 
subliminal perception, where stimuli too weak to be consciously detected … impact on our 
impressions, judgements and actions… and implicit memory, where events that cannot be 
consciously remembered have a palpable effect upon our experience, thought and action.” 
Ward, 11. 
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“time lag” which resonates with McGilchrist’s RH → LH → RH progression.25 “There is a 
mode of liminal processing, related to embodiment and affectivity, which ‘thinks’ more 
quickly and reacts more instinctively than our conscious rational deliberation.”26 Social 
anthropologists, such as Pierre Bourdieu, have picked up on this, pointing out that the way in 
which we make sense of the world is tightly bound up with a partly preconscious “‘habitus’ – 
encultured dispositions, socialised mindsets and biases.”27 We shall return to Bourdieu and 
‘habitus’ in the next chapter, since this has important implications for everyday aesthetic 
existence; the embodied and affective seemingly “meaningless” and “fun” activities which are 
in fact deeply formative, and the consequent relationship to discipleship and ethics. But here it 
is important to note that for Ward it is precisely these “dispositions” and “biases” which 
constitute belief.28 
If it is true that belief operates on this dispositional level, then it follows, as Ward suggests, 
that “belief is unavoidable.”29 Belief not only undergirds knowing, and subsequent response, 
it is inextricably bound up within the (non-linear) cognitive, affective and embodied processes 
which yield both preconscious and conscious apprehension. Ward maps out this processing 
through the economy of “anticipation–projection–reception–recognition–response.”30 It is a 
common and rather obvious claim that sentient reception plays a role in knowing, but the 
critical point is that reception is always preceded by intentional anticipation and projection. 
“Sentience means that the body is continually receiving an input of information, but 
anticipation is directing and focusing that information in specific ways … only a small 
percentage of what is being received is adequately lit by our consciousness.”31 This is 
necessary in order to make meaning of the world, amidst the mass of stimuli presented 
through dynamic sensory experience, creating representation (left hemisphere) from fluid 
presentation (right hemisphere) by “generating associative narratives.”32  
                                                
25 In an alternative to McGilchrist’s RH → LH → RH progression, Ward describes the same 
principle by arguing that the imagination “fills the gaps” in this time lag between sensation 
and consciousness. Graham Ward, Unimaginable: What We Imagine and What We Can’t 
(London: IB Tauris, 2018), 93. 
26 Ward, Unbelievable, 12. 
27 Ward, 12. 
28 Ward, 12. 
29 Ward, 77. 
30 Ward, 47–77. 
31 Ward, 46. 
32 Ward, 48. 
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Anticipation then, the ability to “see as,” offers an imaginative narrative through which 
stimuli are selectively processed. Based on this narrative, we project meaning. This is the 
intention which drives perception, the “going out of oneself” in order to read meaning into 
experience.33 “As phenomenologists from Edmund Husserl onwards have recognised, human 
beings perceive intentionally. They see meaning.”34 The operation of anticipation and 
projection, to draw connections between one phenomenon and another (whether an 
experiential memory, or an abstract rule), requires the creation of an inferential connection, 
which can be a conscious process but can also be unconscious, thereby forming a disposition. 
The implication is that we may not be fully aware, or even aware at all, of how we arrived at 
the disposition.35 In order for meaning to be shared, these dispositions are then subject to the 
human trait of recognition.36 This is most obvious in the articulation of belief as common 
symbolic language, but Ward suggests that even recognition cannot be reduced to left-
hemisphere abstraction, but includes emotional and implicit knowledge, essentially being “an 
understanding of the other, myself and the relation of meaning binding both other and self.”37 
For our purposes, the most significant aspect of Ward’s economy of human interaction with 
the world and formation of meaning (anticipation–projection–reception–recognition–
response) is the pervasive, integrated and fundamental role of both belief and aesthetic 
engagement. Belief is the lens through which we interact with the world, central to 
anticipation (seeing as), and the subsequent projection of possibilities. 
Belief is evident not only in these projected possibilities – the belief of their 
possibility based on previous occurrences which are not simply recalled in order to 
predict. It also determines how what is seen is seen. Furthermore, belief also resides in 
the abstraction process itself – the construction of how things work in the world. More 
fundamentally, belief is evident throughout the cognitive processes in ways that 
inform both the disposition to anticipate and the projection of possibilities.38 
                                                
33 Ward, 54. 
34 Ward, 51. 
35 Ward, 49. 
36 Ward uses the term “recognition” as “expounded by the nineteenth-century German 
philosopher G. W. F. Hegel in his groundbreaking Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). Himself 
something of an early anthropologist, the word he used was Anerkennung. The German word 
is subtle. Erkennung is ‘knowledge’, but the prefix an lends that word an incompleteness. It is 
‘almost’ knowledge or ‘on the way to’ knowledge, pre-knowing, intuitive, in ways that bear 
some similarities with what many neuroscientists refer to as ‘emotional knowledge’. 
Nevertheless it announces a cognition regarding what is outside the ego, the one perceiving. It 
is as if from an external stimulus the self provokes a knowledge that is not quite knowledge 
within itself: a déjà vu. Hence the translation ‘recognition’.” Ward, 53. 
37 Ward, 53. 
38 Ward, 48. 
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Critically for our project, the influence of belief at this fundamental cognitive level is often 
preconscious, operating in the aesthetic realm of the embodied and affective. Not only 
McGilchrist’s research, but also findings from the field of embodied cognition confirm this, 
as we saw in the previous chapter.39 Further, while cognition is embodied, it is also embodied 
on a social and cultural level, not solely on a personal level. The implications of this are that 
personal and communal, embodied and affective experiences affect belief, shaping the ways 
we see, our anticipation, and our projection of possibilities.40 Everyday aesthetic experiences, 
as embodied and affective, therefore influence not only our beliefs but consequently our 
formation as a whole.  
This does not mean that we can, or should, fall into the trap of attempting a neat, propositional 
equation, quantifying the role that everyday aesthetic experiences play in the formation of 
belief. On the one hand, the problem here would be that we attempt to use left-hemisphere 
abstraction to quantify right-hemisphere embodied and affective formation.41 Any attempt to 
do so will be inevitably reductionist.42 But perhaps the greater concern here would be that this 
would represent a misunderstanding of the process, and ultimately a misunderstanding of the 
nature of meaning in relation to being itself. As we have seen, belief is not merely to be 
equated with ratiocination (this holds true for ethics too, as Bonhoeffer pointed out in chapter 
three). Belief is indeed a pivotal component in the human creation of meaning, but it is a 
perspective of understanding which is primarily relational, not propositional.43 Along the lines 
                                                
39 Ward, How the Light Gets In, 257. 
40 Ward, 118. 
41 As already noted, much of this dynamic is preconscious, beyond rational, empirical reach, 
just as our understanding of consciousness itself is limited. While neuroscience can offer 
important clues to our understanding of belief, we should also acknowledge the limitations of 
this approach. “The irreducibility of belief to the physics and chemistry of the brain draws our 
attention to a lacuna that cannot be disassociated from the lacuna of consciousness itself. We 
cannot account fully for belief, and belief cannot fully account for itself. We don’t always 
(possibly most of the time) know believing’s secret operations, its secret selections among our 
memories, emotions and understandings.” Ward, Unbelievable, 112. 
42 Admittedly, this may seem to be precisely the task of this project. However, there is a 
difference between, on the one hand, neatly quantifying the role of aesthetic existence in the 
formation of belief, thereby suggesting that the process has been captured in its entirety, with 
scientific certainty, while on the other hand, pointing toward undeniable evidence for the 
significant role that everyday aesthetic existence plays in the formation of belief. The latter 
points to important implications, even while not offering the neat, illusory certainty of the 
former. 
43 Propositional abstraction does indeed have a role to play in the clarification and 
communication of belief, but it is not the genesis of belief, nor can it offer comprehensive, or 
even adequte articulation of the complex nature of belief. 
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of “Heidegger’s analysis of ‘being there’, or Dasein,” understanding is “not simply a 
cognitive act in our coming to know something, but … a mode of being in itself. As a mode 
of being, understanding enables us to relate to the world, make sense of the world and our 
exchanges with it, and give shape to that world. It is in this way that understanding is 
existential.”44 But as Ward notes, Heidegger “did not pay enough attention to the way 
understanding as a mode of knowing passes into understanding as a mode of being.”45 Belief 
operates at this nexus of knowing and being; it is lived, the one organically shaping the other 
in embodied, affective and sometimes preconscious ways. Consequently, belief, as a living, 
enacted, relational commitment of trust creates a seeing as, not while disconnected from the 
world in abstract contemplation, but amidst existential reality. “For beliefs are (and have) 
lived conditions for the possibility or impossibility of certain imaginative experiences of the 
world.”46 These “lived conditions” are embodied, creating a dynamic, symbiotic and complex 
relationship between consciousness, aesthetic existence and belief. One that is not driven only 
by conscious volition, but by affective desire embedded in embodiment. Belief “motivates 
and energizes as it issues from the swirl within embodiment itself in relation to and in 
response to all that is given to it.”47 
5.1.4 Ward’s Critique of McGilchrist: The existential “seeing as” of belief 
The preceding exploration of Ward’s architecture of belief is important because it supports his 
critique of McGilchrist’s perspective on belief, a point which is pivotal for this project. 
Ward’s primary concern with McGilchrist’s description of belief is that, in an effort to be 
stylistically neat, McGilchrist (whether advertently or inadvertently) returns belief to the left-
hemisphere realm of cognitive choice, thereby eliminating the preconscious aspects of belief. 
This, we have noted, would severely limit the impact that aesthetic existence has upon belief. 
But as we have seen, Ward argues for the dispositional nature of belief, which does not have a 
linear relationship with cognition and action, but functions within a “complex set of feedback 
and feedforward loops.”48 
                                                
44 Ward, Unbelievable, 7. 
45 Ward, 8. 
46 Ward, How the Light Gets In, 134. 
47 Ward, 257. 
48 Ward, Unbelievable, 13. This is not to say that belief is disconnected from conscious 
volition. It is simply to point out that volition itself is more complicated and multifaceted than 
the Lockean perspective allows. In this regard, it may be helpful to consider Ward’s 
description of belief, wherein he employs the inclusive term of a “mental state”: “At base, 
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For the most part, Ward finds McGilchrist’s perspective on belief helpful. Both agree that 
belief is essentially relational, and thus concerns “recognition” (in the sense of Ward’s use of 
the term). Further, that this disposition of “care” necessarily entails response-ability (it comes 
with ethical implications). They also concur that preconscious, implicit and embodied 
experience of the world affects belief and thereby has implications for concrete action. 
Commenting on McGilchrist’s findings, Ward notes that, “Working together, the left and 
right hemispheres of the brain make believing a mode of cognition associated with 
imagination, motivation, desire, intuition and feeling.”49  
Nevertheless, Ward suggests that McGilchrist’s description of belief in terms of “acting as if” 
situates it firmly within “left-hemisphere ratiocination.”50 It is indeed a curious description 
that McGilchrist employs, for example, “Some people choose to believe in materialism; they 
act ‘as if’ such a philosophy were true.”51 [Italics added] Ward’s observation that this 
phrasing provides stylistic neatness may well be McGilchrist’s motivation here, for it seems 
to allow for a clear articulation of the operation of belief.52 But not only is this description 
inconsistent with McGilchrist’s own work, it does not do justice to the complex and 
integrated nature of belief as further articulated by Ward. McGilchrist himself suggests that 
preconscious “seeing as” fundamentally shapes conscious choice, challenging the fallacy of 
independent ratiocination in a disembodied vacuum.53 However, as Ward notes, not only can 
“acting as if” be construed as a somewhat condescending phrase (acting on fantastical 
“wishful thinking” and associated with untruth), the notion of “choice here is far too locked 
into the assumption of a Cartesian, monadic ego who does the choosing.”54 “I can choose to 
believe that, rationally calculated, materialism or Marxism best fit the facts as we have them. 
But this form of believing is much more akin to Locke’s account of knowledge … it is 
believing very much in service to the probability calculus of left-hemisphere thinking. It 
                                                                                                                                                   
belief is a mental state (where ‘state’ can cover ‘thought’, ‘perception’ and ‘experience’, all of 
which are dynamic, not static conditions), but not all mental states are brought to 
consciousness. That does not mean that mental states are disassociated from sensory 
perception – our beliefs have arisen from somewhere – though there is a continuing debate 
about the extent to which sensing itself has – technical term coming up – intentional content.” 
See Ward, 91. 
49 Ward, Unbelievable, 77. 
50 Ward, 81. 
51 McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary, 170. 
52 Ward, Unbelievable, 78. 
53 McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary, 162. 
54 Ward, Unbelievable, 79–80. 
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cannot be equated, as McGilchrist does, with faith.”55 We shall shortly be turning to the 
relationship between faith and belief in general, but here we can note the problematic nature 
of describing religious belief as “acting as if.” Christianity bears 
witness to an experience not of choosing God but being chosen by God. Such a re-
cognition is based in something familiar, something half-known, known intuitively, 
known in the very substructures of our being human … In seeing as there is always a 
moment of what is given in seeing … In McGilchrist’s characterisation of believing, 
choosing and the ‘as if’, neither does justice to the rich complexity of belief in a 
creator God nor fully describes the disclosive nature of what comes with such a 
belief.56 
What Ward is describing here is the givenness, or even the Otherness, that is always present 
in a relational understanding of belief. Receptivity to this givenness, or Otherness, is often 
intuitive and implicit. It is receptivity within the realm of the aesthetic. This is not a two-stage 
process, wherein we firstly, intuitively and implicitly see as, shaped by embodied and 
affective, preconscious engagement with the world, but then, secondly, go on to consciously 
act as if. It is a complex unity of “feedback and feedforward” loops wherein preconscious 
seeing as informs conscious seeing as, thereby initiating a relational commitment (belief) and 
subsequent action on the basis of this (both implicit and explicit) knowledge of reality. The 
implication is that everyday aesthetic existence is not a separate realm of existence, distinct 
from ethical or religious existence governed by ratiocination. Aesthetic existence, being in the 
moment bodily and affectively, generates an as if that informs ethical and religious being and 
doing, believing and acting. 
To illustrate this we can return to neuroscientific research on mirror neurons. As McGilchrist 
pointed out in the last chapter, our imitative and empathic ability stem from our brains’ 
capacity to vicariously live out, in our very nervous system, an experience external to our 
body, merely by perceiving it. Ward suggests that research on mirror neurons has significant 
implications for understanding the deeply integrated relationship between belief, embodiment 
and the imagination.  
[Mirror neurons] write the ‘as if’ of belief into our physiologies because they evoke 
the “simulation, in the brain’s body maps, of a body state that is not actually taking 
place in the organism,” amplifying the “functional resemblance” (Damasio). In this 
way, and with the help of what … neuroscientist, Antonio Damasio, terms CDZs 
(convergence-divergence zones at the microscopic level that assemble neurons within 
feedforward–feedback loops of information) and CDRs (convergence-divergence 
regions located at strategic areas in association cortices where major pathways for 
                                                
55 Ward, 80. 
56 Ward, 80–81. 
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information come together), belief is not only embodied but inseparable from the 
capacity to imagine.57 [Italics added] 
Further, Ward’s exposition of this “biology of belief,” which neuroscientific research offers, 
shows that a dispositional understanding of belief is not only a conceptual construct but a 
neurological reality. Damasio himself describes a “dispositional space” in brain function, the 
brain encoding previous perceptions and representations as dispositions. These dispositions 
function at a lower level of consciousness (similar to the body’s autonomic system), thereby 
not requiring conscious memory, and freeing up brain-space in a sense.58  
While the contents of images can be accessed by consciousness, we can never have 
direct access to the contents of our dispositions. They are encrypted and dormant. 
Nevertheless, this dispositional space is the source of images in the process of 
imagination and reasoning and is also used to generate movement. It is located in the 
cerebral cortices that are not otherwise occupied by the image [mapping] space (the 
higher-order cortices and parts of the limbic cortices) and in numerous subcortical 
nuclei. The point of all this for an architecture of belief is that the foundations for the 
very edifice of believing itself lie in a knowledge base that is implicit, encrypted and 
unconscious.59 [Italics added] 
In other words, not only is believing fundamentally and inextricably connected to 
embodiment, the human faculty of imagination (seeing as, which feeds belief) is shaped at a 
preconscious level. It is therefore unhelpful to talk of two separate processes – seeing as and 
acting as if – as McGilchrist does. Clearly, acting is related to seeing as, and conscious 
volition plays an important role both in seeing as, as well as acting, but the two-step process 
which McGilchrist’s description intimates is too simplistic, not accounting for the complex 
and organic nature of the process. Rather, as Ward notes above, an intricate web of 
“imagination, motivation, desire, intuition and feeling” affects belief and its consequent 
abstract articulation, in a non-linear and multi-directional manner.60 The implication here is a 
fundamental link between everyday aesthetic existence and belief. While a Lockean 
perspective of belief centres on conscious volition, based on (weak) knowledge, “the aesthetic 
appreciation of the act of believing introduces aspects of the structure of belief hitherto 
concealed: most explicitly, the work of the imagination.”61  
                                                
57 Ward, 95. 
58 Ward, 98. 
59 Ward, 98. 
60 Ward, 77. 
61 Ward, 17. 
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5.1.5 Spotlight on Music: Aesthetic existence as propulsive, mythic sensibility 
It is worth pausing at this point to illustrate the power of aesthetic existence in belief 
formation by looking, once again, at the case of musical sensory immediacy. If belief is not 
merely a weak form of knowledge, but stems from embodied and affective, often 
preconscious engagement with the world, then sensory immediacy is not merely an obstacle 
to be overcome in the development of belief, but rather shapes the imagination, thereby 
playing a role in the very trajectory of belief formation. A brief look with Ward at two 
musical examples, illustrates, firstly, the visceral, propulsive force of musical sensory 
immediacy, and secondly the imaginative myth-formation which ensues. 
Ward points out that before we can speak of sensing and imaginative “making sense,” we 
need to consider sentience itself, which neuroscientists consider to be “‘core’ or ‘primal’ 
consciousness.”62 Ward’s concern is that discussion of the human faculty of imagination can 
easily become cerebral, when in fact it is deeply biological, rooted in the “the body at the 
border of the instinctive and the intuitive.”63 Sentience provides “primal awareness” from 
which consciousness arises.64 It is the birthplace of “elemental passion.” Simply, “Bodies feel, 
that is their nature, and feeling is ‘propulsive’.”65 Between sentience and conscious 
articulation there is a “formed response.”66 Formed response is not merely animal reflex but 
“an intentional propulsion prior to agency, prior to the will of a commanding ego.”67 This is 
the realm of aesthetic existence, expressed, for example, in the arts such as dance, music and 
film, or even in everyday play. “These propulsive intentions have no single aim or 
directedness. As in play, they have no instrumental end other than to display themselves.”68 
To illustrate the propulsive power of musical sensory immediacy, Ward turns to a 
performance by singer, James Arthur, in The X Factor 2012, and in particular his rendition of 
Shontelle’s ‘Impossible’. The song mourns a broken relationship and Shontelle’s version, 
while being at times “angry, regretful, even hurt,” ends neatly in resignation, “the singing … 
beautifully in tune, the words clearly enunciated.”69 By contrast, Arthur brings all of his 
“complex biography” and existential brokenness to the performance. Beginning with “a series 
                                                
62 Ward, Unimaginable, 84. 
63 Ward, 29. 
64 Ward, 85. 
65 Ward, 87. 
66 Ward, 87. 
67 Ward, 87. 
68 Ward, 87. 
69 Ward, 88. 
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of soft moans,” by the second verse his “breathing begins to rasp,” then “anger erupts, which 
is accompanied by him hitting his chest on ‘empty promises [...] I know, I know.’”70 In 
repetition beyond Shontelle’s version, he sings a “reiteration of the opening, his breathing 
becomes unregulated, the lines of the lyrics break, and their articulation is half-formed … 
then launches into a third iteration of the chorus. The notes, shouted, invoke the disturbing as 
he carves into himself … Arthur just wails and howls that brokenness while a backing chorus 
repeats ‘Impossible. Impossible.’ When he picks up their words, ‘Impossible’ is dark with 
sunken depths of despair.”71 Ward notes that it is not Arthur’s musical performance that is 
compelling as much as it is his expression of pain, “both visceral and immediate.”72 
It is the sheer affective propulsion of this “formed response” which we need note here, since it 
cannot simply be discarded as insignificant emotion in the quest for a Lockean development 
of belief. Arthur has been existentially moved through this aesthetic expression, but 
significantly, so have the audience. By listening to, or perhaps better, by partaking in his 
performance, “we are forced to hear an elemental passion that is prior to language. It leaves us 
breathing, but breathless; and not a little frightened for him.”73 In resonance with our 
conversation on mirror neurons above, not only is imagining “profoundly affective and 
somatic,” but “the imagination, as a dynamic process of affects in the body’s immersion in the 
world, emerges in this coming-to-form that is prior to and beneath all public 
communication.”74 
Further, this affective propulsion is a potent force in the creation and sustenance of presiding 
myths, thereby shaping belief.75 It can provide an attunement of the senses to ultimate reality 
in what Ward describes as “mythic sensibility.”76 The imagination and mythic sensibility go 
hand in hand as we “make” sense of sensation.77 Here, Ward turns to the composer Gerard 
Finzi’s Dies Natalis to illustrate the point. Dies Natalis is a five-movement cantata featuring 
settings of Thomas Traherne’s poetry. The theological nature of Traherne’s writing stem from 
                                                
70 Ward, 88. 
71 Ward, 89. 
72 Ward, 89. 
73 Ward, 89. 
74 Ward, 89–90. 
75 “The mythological digs deep into the biological where the instinctive becomes the intuited 
and intuitive.” Ward, 59.  
76 Ward, 156. 
77 Ward, 157. 
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his own experience of mythic sensibility, of “epiphanic quality.”78 Finzi draws from Traherne 
in an effort to produce a composition of “emotional force that eschews the darknesses of late 
Beethoven and Wagner as much as it eschews the sentimentalities and coyness of the 
Romantic child.”79 It is music which tests the range of any soloist and “demands superhuman 
breathing discipline.”80 The result defies articulation; it is a “metamorphosis of the 
everyday.”81 Finzi, drawing from Traherne, and inspired by Botticelli’s Mystic Nativity, 
works with everyday sensation, and through “an orchestration of the sensed” evokes an 
elemental response in the hearer.82 
Our response to what is elemental here feebly gropes for names. ‘Sublime’ won’t help. 
It’s dogged down now in philosophical niceties. But Traherne’s ‘ravishment’ is 
suggestive – for it has the immediacy of the unimaginable; capturing that moment as it 
excites the imagination. Sensing (aesthesis) opens into aesthetics, and immediately the 
effect is a transformation not just of perspective but also of the way existence is 
experienced: gusto, ravishment, wonder, delight are the affective registers of beauty.83 
Propulsive sensory immediacy in service of mythic awareness here produces a new way of 
seeing reality, and consequently a change in disposition toward the world. In short, it shifts 
the imagination, which affects belief. However, it is important to note at this point that such a 
shift is not, by default, a shift in a positive direction, toward apprehending reality more 
accurately.84 As already noted in the last chapter, the imagination can be harnessed both 
toward the cultivation of virtuality as well as toward the apprehension of reality. In order to 
distinguish the difference, we need to turn to the relationship between aesthetic existence and 
faith formation. 
                                                
78 Ward, 159. 
79 “The pauses, the vibrancy of the strings, the crafted mood-changes from the allegro of ‘The 
Rhapsody’ and the dancing energies of ‘The Rapture’ to the introspection of ‘Wonder’, 
enables Dies Natalis to avoid indulgence and strip back any possible nostalgia. What is left is 
the sheer beholding of creation, being created and being creative (‘my new made tongue’). 
Wonder sings out as pure perception of what is imperceptible: the divinely giftedness of all 
things straining to express itself.” Ward, 160. 
80 Ward, 160. 
81 Ward, 160. 
82 Ward, 160. 
83 Ward, 161. 
84 Just as mythic sensibility can lead to wonder and transcendence, it is the selfsame human 
faculty which produces horror. Ward cautions that we cannot discuss the formative power of 
the imagination without acknowledging its pathologies. Ward, 162ff. 
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5.2 Relating Dispositional Belief to the Formation of Faith 
The human ability, then, to see as, the faculty of the imagination, lies at the heart of belief. 
This is a point we need to look at more closely in order to understand the implications for 
aesthetic existence. But before we do so, we need to clarify the relationship between belief 
and faith. This project, after all, is asking the question of the interaction between everyday 
aesthetic existence and faith, but up until this point we have been considering belief in 
general, as a universal human disposition, not specifically religious belief, and the consequent 
relationship between faith and belief. 
5.2.1 This-Worldly Existence and Faith: Projecting the invisible as (religious) belief 
Religious belief is an acknowledgement that reality contains hiddenness, that which is 
obscured from view, beyond the realm of left-hemisphere certainty. However, as Ward shows, 
hiddenness is not only an attribute of divine transcendence, but is equally immanent, this-
worldly. Here he turns to phenomenology to clarify his point.85 In his last essay, ‘The Visible 
and the Invisible,’ Maurice Merleau-Ponty argues that he is dealing with the “‘invisible of this 
world,’ underscoring the immanence of his project.”86 To illustrate this, Ward uses an 
example which Merleau-Ponty works with, but which stems from Edmund Husserl’s Logical 
Investigations: a cube. When we perceive a cube, we can actually only see two or three sides, 
and yet we know it to be a cube. We believe the other sides to be there. In order to make sense 
of it, we project all six sides of the cube. Along with the visual perception of the object, 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that this projection is co-present, allowing us to see a cube, and the 
hiddenness involved, in an act of (this-worldly) intentional transcendence (as opposed to 
absolute transcendence). We see as, seeing the two or three sides present to us as a six-sided 
cube, in what Husserl describes as “apperceptive transcendentalism.”87 Merleau-Ponty 
develops this notion as “perceptual faith.”88 “It is a ‘faith’ that is co-posited with perception 
                                                
85 Ward, How the Light Gets In, 226–33. 
86 Ward, 228. 
87 Ward, Unbelievable, 195. 
88 Ward notes the “theological or quasi-theological language” used in Merleau-Ponty’s work 
here, and highlights the inconsistency of Merleau-Ponty’s insistence that this does not have 
religious implications, a consequence of the “cultural politics” (“securing phenomenology as 
a secular philosophical science”) from which Merleau-Ponty is speaking. See Ward, How the 
Light Gets In, 229–30. 
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itself.”89 “‘Perceptual faith’ is the seeing of meaningful form (what has been referred to as 
Merleau-Ponty’s ‘gestalt ontology’) through intentional expectation and projection.”90  
Using the work of Jean-Louis Chrétien and Dominique Janicaud, Ward questions whether 
there is indeed grounds for Merleau-Ponty to make a distinction between this-worldly 
“intentional transcendence” and divine “absolute transcendence.”91 Does the process of 
“perceptual faith” not apply equally to the operation of religious faith? This is an important 
question for our project, since it probes the relationship of belief, as a fundamentally 
embodied and affective disposition, to faith. On the one hand, it would be a theological error 
to conflate God and this-worldly reality, to do so would simply be pantheism. Yet, as the 
incarnation makes clear, there is an undeniable connection between divine transcendence and 
embodied, this-worldly immanence. While projecting the sides of a physical cube (intentional 
transcendence), and projecting the divine from material reality (absolute transcendence) may 
not operate on the same continuum, it would be equally erroneous to suggest that there is no 
relationship between the two. The created world carries a necessary connection to the 
uncreated creator, as distinct as these two entities are. Merleau-Ponty’s “radical and 
unbridgeable difference” rests on the irrational assumption of “an hermetically sealed realm 
named the immanent.”92 As Ward points out, while the exercise of “perceptual faith” in 
relation to a cube offers a neat, immanent conclusion, an attempt to apply the same process to 
the human body, for example, offers “much more complex and irreducible invisibilities.”93 
How then do we understand the relationship between everyday hiddenness and divine 
hiddenness? If everyday aesthetic existence shapes our beliefs about everyday hiddenness, 
how does this relate to divine hiddenness? This question has direct implications for our 
understanding of the role of aesthetic existence in faith formation. 
5.2.2 Connecting Embodiment with Transcendence: The analogical worldview 
Ward’s answer to this question is analogy.94 As with McGilchrist’s use of metaphor we 
explored in the previous chapter, by “analogy” Ward means something quite different from 
the modern, left-hemisphere perception of analogy as a mere figure of speech – a decorative 
                                                
89 Ward, Unbelievable, 196. 
90 Ward, How the Light Gets In, 229. 
91 Ward, 231–33. 
92 Ward, 233. 
93 Ward, 231. 
94 Although undergirding much of his work, Ward deals with the analogical worldview at 
length in Graham Ward, Cities of God (London: Routledge, 2001). 
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addition solely for the purpose of making a propositional statement more colourful – a helpful 
addition, at best, but not ultimately necessary. Such an understanding of analogy would be of 
no help in relating the uncreated divine to this-worldly reality. Analogy, from this left-
hemisphere perspective, is in service of, and therefore bound within, a closed system of signs, 
producing self-referential “certainty.” Rather, Ward is arguing from the theological concept of 
Analogia Entis: participation in created being offering an analogous participation in divine 
hiddenness.95 In other words, for analogy to break out of modern, left-hemisphere virtuality, it 
needs to be lived. It needs an embodied and affective engagement, a participation in the 
created world, which allows for right-hemisphere, implicit and intuitive openness to the 
hiddenness which lies beyond.  
Ward embraces the analogical as a bridging worldview.96 However, it is a bridge that needs to 
be carefully understood. As McGilchrist suggested regarding metaphor, this bridging capacity 
is only functional to the extent that right-hemisphere, meaning-making aesthetic engagement 
with reality is embraced. The metaphorical, to which McGilchrist refers, and the analogical 
for Ward, are not merely theoretical tools, the product of abstraction. They are formative 
modes of engaging reality, or perhaps better articulated, living reality. As McGilchrist notes, 
co-opting embodied and affective experience into the hegemonic economy of left-hemisphere 
abstraction and then, for example, approaching ritual and icon as representations of explicit 
theory means that they lose their “transparency as metaphors.” Instead, a right hemisphere 
approach demands that they “are always incarnate and therefore must be left to act on us 
intuitively – neither just material or just immaterial, but bridges between the two realms.”97 
Both McGilchrist and Ward point here to the Eucharist as an example. McGilchrist showing 
that through the Reformation living metaphor, as presence, was substituted with simile, “‘this 
                                                
95 The concept has a long, complex and controversial history, the articulation of which is well 
beyond the scope of our focus. While acknowledging this (Barth called it an invention of 
antichrist), we will work exclusively with the concept as Ward develops it, since it offers an 
important contribution to understanding the role of aesthetic existence in faith formation. Karl 
Barth, Church Dogmatics I, The Doctrine of the Word of God, trans. G.W. Bromiley 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975), xiii. 
96 Ward is in the company of a number of other contemporary theologians who share this 
view, most notably those that have come to be associated with “Radical Orthodoxy.” But as 
Ward himself has pointed out, many of the themes of Radical Orthodoxy, including an 
analogical worldview, stem from, and have resonance across broad ecumenical lines. In 
particular it is worth noting the contribution by theologians of Nouvelle Théologie. See 
Graham Ward, ‘Radical Orthodoxy: Its Ecumenical Vision’, Acta Theologica, no. 25 (21 
November 2017): 29–42. 
97 McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary, 444. 
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is my body’ becomes ‘this signifies (is like) my body.’”98 Ward, likewise, contrasting 
Aquinas and Calvin’s notions of “presence” in the Eucharist, and the consequent movement 
from the analogical to the univocal.99 
The analogical therefore lies at the heart of the sacraments, and further, a sacramental 
understanding of all of life, including everyday aesthetic existence, to which we shall shortly 
return. But before we can do so, we need to clarify the nature of this analogical relation. 
Theologically, it is founded in the “analogy that pertains between the uncreated God and 
creation, Christ and human beings. It is an analogy that can pertain because we are made in 
the image of God and therefore, as Jean-Louis Chrétien understands, ‘[i]t is the transcendence 
in us that knows the transcendent’.”100 The analogical worldview thus stems from the 
foundational theological truth that there is a necessary (and from a Christian perspective, 
mutually participatory) connection between a creating, active God and his creation. A 
connection that is both logically necessary, yet also supersedes logic in its mysterious 
operation. 
Analogy as ana-logical is theologically freighted. It bears the weight of a profound 
cosmological significance. It is profound because creation is related to an uncreated 
creator, who not only inaugurates but maintains a world-order within which analogy is 
an index of participation … It is cosmological because analogy traces an order that is 
dependent upon a creating God, an active God.101 [Italics added] 
It is precisely in the mystery of this participation that the power of the analogical worldview 
lies. It is therefore hardly surprising that the perspective largely collapsed (at least in 
Protestant circles) following the rejection of the medieval enchantment of the world, amidst 
subsequent theological abstraction dominated by left-hemisphere attention. In the binary 
categorization and controversy that followed, the analogical worldview has been at times 
understood to locate God and creation within the same category of being. But as David 
Bentley Hart succinctly clarifies, 
The analogy of being does not analogize God and creatures under the more general 
category of being, but is the analogization of being in the difference between God and 
creatures; it is as subversive of the notion of a general and univocal category of being 
as of the equally “totalizing” notion of ontological equivocity, and thus belongs to 
neither pole of the dialectic intrinsic to metaphysical totality: the savage equivalence 
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100 Ward, Christ and Culture, 17. 
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of univocity and equivocity, Apollo and Dionysus, pure identity and pure difference 
(neither of which can open a vantage upon being in its transcendence).102 
Ward affirms that an analogical understanding needs to be prefaced by emphasizing the 
dissimilarity of Creator and created being, lest the two become conflated, through a distorted 
understanding of analogy.103 Further, that in navigating the relationship between embodied 
this-wordliness and divine transcendence, it is all too easy to slip into univocity, equivocity or 
dualism.104 But are these pitfalls not the consequence of navigating this-worldliness, God and 
the analogical from the perspective of left-hemisphere abstraction, rather than right-
hemisphere participation? 
While the dangers are noted, the point remains that a necessary analogical connection exists 
between God and creation, which is affirmed by the incarnation, with further implications for 
this project. As with Bonhoeffer, Ward concurs that Christology lies at the centre of 
understanding reality, and consequently the relation between aesthetic existence (as a 
fundamentally embodied mode of existence) and reality.105 Ward writes at length on the 
“displaced body of Christ,” his argument being that not only does the incarnation itself unite 
divine and embodied reality in the person of Jesus, but that this incarnational relation 
continues following the ascension through the “mapping” or displacement of Christ’s own 
body on to other bodies.106 
When I say all bodies are “in some sense” incarnational they are not identical 
repetitions of Christ’s body, but nevertheless participate in that incarnation in their 
own creaturely way. Embodiment therefore is analogically related to incarnation, and 
it is, as such, that Paul’s soma can refer both to (a) the historical and physical body 
each possesses, even Christ and (b) the transhistorical, spiritual body that is Christ’s 
alone but which is made of several members constituting the Church. This rich, 
                                                
102 David Bentley Hart, The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 241. 
103 Ward, Unbelievable, 191. 
104 Ward, Cities of God, 254. 
105 Ward, Christ and Culture, 5. This is because Christ is the essence of all relationality – or 
the “betweenness” of the world, as McGilchrist would name it – which is at the core of 
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106 Graham Ward, ‘The Displaced Body of Jesus Christ’, in Cities of God (London: 
Routledge, 2001), 97–116. 
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analogical understanding of corpus is detailed in Henri de Lubac’s study of medieval 
sacramentality, Corpus Mysticum.107 
Articulating the precise nature of this relation is not our concern here. For our task at hand the 
important point to note is that such a relation necessarily exists.108 There are significant 
implications for our project: Firstly, this relation is bound up within our very bodies (as 
opposed to our minds, souls, spirits or any other disembodied aspect of being human one 
could argue for). Secondly, this embodied relation holds true across all spatial and temporal 
boundaries since “all places and times are sustained by God’s Being,” as Anselm affirms.109 
In other words, this embodied relation transgresses any “sacred” and “secular” boundaries we 
may artificially impose. Everyday aesthetic experiences are all within the realm of the 
“sacred” in this sense. Thirdly, this relation is not something to be grasped as an abstract 
concept, but one to be lived, to be participated in; this is how it is known.110  
In sum, this-worldly hiddenness or everyday invisibilities are an accepted part of navigating 
material reality. We continuously project to make meaning of these invisibilities through the 
operation of our imagination, seeing as being a fundamental aspect not only of belief, but also 
subsequently of all human being and understanding. The way we see as is shaped by the 
embodied, affective, often preconscious attention we offer the world. In other words, 
everyday aesthetic existence affects belief, playing a significant role in the meaning we 
project into the invisibilities of this world. However, the impact of aesthetic existence is not 
limited to this-worldly believing. Even though divine invisibility cannot be conflated with 
material invisibility, a necessary relation exists between uncreated Creator and creation, a 
relation underscored by the incarnation. As a consequence of this relation, embodied 
existence and everyday aesthetic experiences not only shape this-worldly belief, but also 
thereby have the potential to analogically participate in transcendent reality, thus shaping 
religious belief, and ultimately faith formation. In other words, if embodied participation in 
the created world is analogically related to transcendent reality – that which is invisible - then 
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it follows that embodied and affective practices, as experienced in everyday aesthetic 
existence, are not only formative from a neurological perspective, but also from a theological 
one. Here it should be noted that, just as McGilchrist argues regarding the perception of living 
metaphor, it is particularly right-hemisphere attention that allows for awareness of, and 
participation in this analogical relation. It is necessarily an embodied and affective mode, an 
aesthetic mode of engaging reality. Yet, while all belief is inherently connected to aesthetic 
existence, not all belief culminates in faith formation. To understand why, we need to revisit, 
with Ward, McGilchrist’s findings on the two types of attention we offer the world, and the 
consequences for the relationship of aesthetic existence to faith formation, or lack thereof.  
5.2.3 Two Forms of Belief: Faith & Virtuality111 
Historically and etymologically, the epistemological relation of belief to faith is a close 
one.112 However, the Lockean secularization of belief uncoupled it from faith, 
hermeneutically situating it within a “different semantic field.”113 Belief thus, as we have 
seen, came to be seen as a weak form of knowledge, while faith became largely “associated 
with religious piety.”114 This same epistemological shift lies at the core of McGilchrist’s 
concern regarding the dominance of left-hemisphere, disembodied abstraction in modernity. 
As we saw at the end of the last chapter, McGilchrist’s work indicates that aesthetic existence 
does not, by default, aid an accurate understanding of reality. Potentially, it can serve left-
hemisphere sensationalism, thereby endorsing and validating a virtual perception of reality. 
By contrast, mature aesthetic existence, as a manifestation of the RH → LH → RH 
progression, has the potential to break out of the self-referential system of left-hemisphere 
abstraction, to transcend this insularity, and thereby cultivate a healthy understanding of 
Reality. Ward takes this further to show the implications for belief. In the former, belief 
simply fuels pervading virtuality. In the latter we find a form of believing conducive to faith, 
which we shall briefly consider, before returning to virtuality.  
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112 “Fides is both a mode of knowing and the content or object of that knowing, but the 
emergence of two separate terms from the twelfth century introduced new epistemological 
possibilities. The two separate words arose from the mix of languages. ‘Belief’ comes from 
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113 Ward, 253. 
114 Ward, 250. 
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5.2.3.1 Faith: A commitment to relational belief 
Essentially, this form of belief is an acknowledgement of reality as a mode of belonging, 
constituting more than the atomised individual. It is embedded in right-hemisphere 
relationality. It is “a believing in – there is an object, a relation, and an active 
commitment.”115 “Faith is a response to that which constitutes a relation with; response and 
engagement enable participation in an economy that is shared.”116 Ward highlights three 
points which clarify both the distinctiveness of faith and belief, but also how they work 
together. Firstly, “religious faith is a specific commitment to belief, to the invisible that 
pertains to and subtends the visible.”117 By acknowledging the fundamental role belief plays 
in understanding reality (both visible and invisible), faith is simply an acknowledgement of 
the way things are: we always see as, all knowledge being built on the foundation of belief.  
Consequently and secondly, faith is not the embrace a specific type of belief – religious 
belief; it is a commitment to the “primordial disposition to believe. It is not a different type of 
believing. It is the same disposition framed by and exercised within specific religious 
practices.”118 Here we need to point out two consequences for this project. The first is that 
faith is a manifestation of the RH → LH → RH progression. While faith acknowledges and 
values the aesthetic as it works on our beliefs through embodied, implicit and preconscious 
means (right hemisphere), it also requires explicit articulation (left hemisphere) and a return 
to embodied practice (right hemisphere) in order to be communicated. “Religious faith, 
Christian or otherwise, is a practice of belief … Belief could not be articulated, would have no 
content, and therefore remain highly amorphous, if it were not communicated through 
gestures, images, concepts, narratives etc.: in a word ‘discourse’.”119 Our definition of 
“religious practices” is highly significant for the relationship between everyday aesthetic 
existence, faith formation and ethical action. We will return to this in the next chapter as we 
discuss aesthetic existence in relation to liturgy. Here we simply need note the integral 
connection between faith and practice. Aesthetic practices provide both the primal orientation 
of faith (through the process of belief formation) as well as expressing the outworking of 
faith, which again provides faith orientation in a circular (but not closed, and not necessarily 
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linear) fashion. “Praxis is both the acting that issues from a believing and the acting that 
issues in coming to believe.”120 
Thirdly, “if believing is constitutive of knowing as and seeing as, then religious believing is a 
mode of perception.”121 Just as with all seeing as, there is interpretation involved. Faith is 
then the acknowledgement that Reality lies beyond the realm of certainty. This does not mean 
that faith is an endorsement of a postmodern epistemological vacuum. “Faith is not … some 
intellectual suicide leaping into the void, but an intellectual and affective, somatic 
engagement with the invisible in the visible.”122 As both a relational commitment to the 
Other, and the concomitant mystery which this entails, “religious believing is a way of 
responding to the world that recognizes and valorizes the invisible operative within what is 
materially visible of that world.”123 But comprehending this invisibility demands 
interpretation. Religious believing, as a mode of perception, demands a “reading” of the 
world, which functions on both a conscious and unconscious level. It is a “reading” that is less 
about comprehensive and systematic control of abstract epistemology, and more to do with a 
relational orientation, a commitment to believing in, fuelled by implicit and intuitive 
perception of the visible. It is a “reading” which is inextricably bound up within aesthetic 
experience, to which we shall shortly return. 
5.2.3.2 Virtuality: “Belief” fuelled by aesthetic sensationalism 
We have already discussed the problem of virtuality, through the work of McGilchrist, as the 
manifestation of left-hemisphere hegemony of aesthetic existence in the form of 
sensationalism. We have also seen how this applies to belief, through the work of Ward – a 
contemporary recovery of the visceral and aesthetic nature of belief, but disconnected from 
meaning, devoid of any connection to reality. In contrast to faith, virtuality is the condition of 
Lockean belief once the illusion of certainty has been destroyed, as is the case in postmodern 
epistemology. Rather than faith as relational commitment to belief in, it is an artefact of 
Lockean belief that, adrift amidst simulacra. It “lacks an object, relation, or commitment. It is 
a passive residual state when the gods have fled and in their place is a profound distrust in 
what one is told to be certain.”124 The embodied and affective nature of belief is co-opted in 
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service of a visceral commitment to a “brand.” “Nominalism becomes rampant as signs and 
logos, image and icon are increasingly detached from material entities and take on an 
independent life.”125 The loss of a necessary connection to the real creates a pervading 
confusion about what to believe, amidst the plethora of sensationalist, aesthetic stimuli 
bombarding our imagination. It is a “mediatization of the real” creating a confusion around 
what to believe – in Christ, the saviour of the world, or the anti-ageing properties of a 
new cosmetic mousse – because although believing is an embodied cognitive process, 
an anthropological a priori, in cultures that prize high levels of self-consciousness and 
therefore awareness of embodied cognitive processes, believing can be manufactured, 
consciously so. Advertising is only one of the blatant forms of making a belief 
believable. Ours is an age of galloping dematerialization. Virtual realities proliferate. 
They are not just on our desktops, our TV screens, our movie DVDs, and our theme-
parks, demanding our interactive involvement. They populate our high streets where 
company logos (Starbucks, Nike, Virgin, etc.) float free of the goods they brand.126 
Belief is hijacked by a commoditised world, subject to the market forces of consumerism. In a 
powerful distortion of Lockean belief as a weak form of knowledge, our world is saturated by 
these “aestheticized knowledges,” all working on our imaginations; sensory rhetoric 
persuading our “belief.”127 
Here, in the context of faith, and with particular relevance to the project at hand, we can note 
two particular implications: Firstly, this distinction between faith and virtuality as two forms 
of belief does not mirror the practice of belief in “sacred” versus “secular” environments. In 
other words, “religious” belief, or at least that which is perceived as religious belief, is not 
immune to a nominalist worldview, and the consequent commodification of belief amidst 
virtuality. In fact, quite the reverse holds true. It is precisely in religious contexts, and 
distorted manifestations of Christendom, where this virtuality can be most potent, since it 
operates in subtle, implicit and preconscious means under the guise of religion, albeit an 
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artificial, self-serving distortion of it. If “religious” practice becomes less about 
acknowledging the Other, and more about the creation of a left-hemisphere, self-referential 
system of signs, which produces certainty – a virtual reality – then the “religious other,” or the 
god made in one’s own image, becomes as much a commodity, a simulacrum floating free 
from reality as the god, or brand of Nike. The question then follows as to whether aesthetic 
experience in this “religious” context (manifest as “liturgy,” for example), should be 
understood as virtual sensationalism rather than an expression of faith. Secondly, and 
consequent to this, we need to probe the inverse: if virtuality is not by default excluded from 
institutional religion, faith too, can, and will be both formed and expressed outside the walls 
of a church and the overt “sacred” practices contained therein. In short, everyday aesthetic 
existence can serve either virtuality or faith formation.  
5.3 Implications: Everyday Aesthetic Existence as Discipleship 
“Believing matters; right believing matters even more. And both the access to and the 
formation of that right believing for Christians is discipleship.”128 It is this “access to” and 
“formation of” belief which we have been exploring in an effort to clarify the role of everyday 
aesthetic existence in discipleship. We have found that at the heart of this is the imagination, 
the human ability to see as, which is impacted by embodied and affective experience through 
implicit and intuitive means. 
5.3.1 Imagination: the bridge between aesthetic existence and faith  
The world as we make sense of it, the way we see as, is imaginatively mediated to us through 
sensory engagement with reality.129 Arguably then, the aesthetic is the most potent force in 
this formation, working on our imaginations consciously and unconsciously, implicitly and 
explicitly.130 “We exist … individually and collectively within streams of presentations that 
are somatic as well as psychic and so also inseparable from affects, intentions, drives and 
desires. Individually and collectively we create and transform our worlds out of the operations 
of this imaginary.”131  
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Not only is the imagination fundamentally connected to the sensory, but it is integral to belief, 
as we have seen. “Imagination is belief in action, projecting and anticipating, receiving and 
responding.”132 Faith cultivates the imagination such that a relational commitment to the 
Other is nurtured through embodied and affective practices. This is at times consciously 
intentional, but the intentionality carried within embodied and affective experience does not 
need to be consciously processed to be effective, as we have seen. Herein lies the power of 
the imagination, since it provides a bridge between affect and cognition, the visible and 
invisible, performing a crucial role in formation and sanctification, to the extent that it 
provides a seeing and concomitant participation in Christological reality.133 
In other words, there is a symbiotic, multidirectional relationship between aesthetic existence, 
the imagination and faith formation. We noted earlier that aesthetic practices are both the 
outworking of faith (or virtuality) as well as orienting influences in the formation of faith (or 
virtuality). Another way to put this would be to say that the way we see as, individually and 
collectively, is both shaped by our aesthetic experience and shapes our aesthetic engagement 
with the world. This is what Kierkegaard described as the “poeticising” nature of mature 
aesthetic existence. 
5.3.2 Poiesis as Faithful (Ethical) Practice 
The paradigmatic power of the imagination points not only to the significance of poetic living 
in faith formation, but also to its manifestation as ethical action. Drawing on the work of 
Ricoeur, Ward shows the inherent connection between the imagination and poiesis.134 Since 
social imaginaries are constructions, having no ontological basis in and of themselves, they 
“are ways of making sense, they are forms of poiesis.”135 The implications of this are 
profound, as Ward shows. Admittedly, aesthetic existence as mere sensationalism is 
effectively only “formative” in the generation of virtuality (the work of “fancy”, in 
Coleridge’s taxonomy of the imagination). However, poetic living, as a mature form of 
aesthetic existence, not only plays a significant role in faith formation, but consequently has 
                                                                                                                                                   
foundational not only to individual formation but to common societal understanding and 
practices through a social imaginary, a point we will return to in the next chapter. Ward, 
119ff. Ward, Unimaginable, 153ff. 
132 Ward, Unbelievable, 150. 
133 Ward, How the Light Gets In, 141.  
134 Admittedly, poiesis is a theologically loaded term used in quite diverse ways. Here we 
employ it as Ward expounds it in what follows. 
135 Ward, Christ and Culture, 129–30. 
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an ethical telos. This is because Ward is here arguing for a connection between poiesis and 
praxis, thereby acknowledging the role of the imagination in personal and cultural formation 
and transformation.136 It is helpful to quote Ward at length to clarify his argument, where he 
returns to 
Aristotle’s understanding of poiesis, for poiesis is the name he gives to “making” as in 
“creating.” The noun relates to the verb poieo – to produce, perform, execute, 
compose or, more generally, be active. Poiesis is an historically specific operation 
concerned with creative action. As such, it would constitute one aspect of a theory of 
action – cultural and moral action – and in this way it is associated with praxis, from 
the Greek prasso, meaning to act, manage, do or accomplish. For Aristotle there 
appears to have been a distinction between a specific form of making (poiesis) and the 
more general notion of doing and being involved in an activity (praxis or pragma). 
Praxis would be associated with ethics, politics, and the formation of character. But 
the distinction between poiesis and praxis cannot hold strictly; not if we accept what I 
have outlined about the psychobiology of believing and desiring. So I wish to take 
poiesis in a complex sense that would not isolate aesthetic production from political 
and ethical activity.137 [Italics added] 
It is mature everyday aesthetic existence, as poiesis, which draws one outside of the virtuality 
of the atomised individual, into relationship with the Other, thereby cultivating a participation 
in reality and consequent ethical action. It is poetic faith, as Coleridge notes, as 
“transcendence that … has both theological and ethical significance; we will be shaken from 
our ‘selfish solitude’. The constitution of this poetic faith is transformative. Belief is not only 
given expression, it is created.”138 
As we have previously noted, the ability of the arts to draw us outside of ourselves, to 
transcend our own virtual realities and point towards the divine, are commonly noted 
contributions to faith formation within the field of theological aesthetics. But our focus here is 
everyday aesthetic existence. This includes the profound sensory encounters with the Other 
through awe inspiring music, dance or visual art, for example, but a particular focus here is 
also the aesthetic (as we have broadly defined it) experiences of play, friendship, and daily 
engagement with the popular arts, among others. While the formative nature of the latter may 
be less explicit, as we have already seen, the implicit is also operative as poiesis, making 
sense, building belief. An experience of playing with one’s children, or sharing a walk with a 
friend, for example, may not be explicitly or consciously an experience of “absolute 
transcendence,” but these experiences of “everyday transcendence” nevertheless have the 
                                                
136 Ward, Cultural Transformation and Religious Practice, 141. 
137 Ward, Unbelievable, 146; Ward, Cultural Transformation and Religious Practice, 6–8. 
138 Ward, Unbelievable, 136. 
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potential to draw us out of ourselves and into relation with the other, making sense of the 
world implicitly and intuitively, through our embodied participation in this-worldly reality. 
These everyday moments of aesthetic existence are then both productive in the formation of 
belief, but also themselves the very outworking of that belief.  
5.3.3 Mature Aesthetic Existence as Lived: Sacramental participation 
The organic, non-linear, “feedback-and-feedforward-looping” nature of this belief formation 
and expression speaks to a key point in understanding the role of aesthetic existence in 
discipleship. It is formation through living, through everyday aesthetic existence. It is 
precisely in this embodied, analogical participation in this-wordly reality that faith formation 
occurs. It is not primarily the product of an abstract, linear process dominated by 
ratiocination.139 If Bonhoeffer helped us to appreciate the Christological validity of 
celebrating aesthetic existence, Ward makes it clear that the living of aesthetic existence is not 
only a right response theologically, it is also a significant component of the formation of faith. 
In other words, as we have noted, the embrace of aesthetic existence is not only the 
consequence of faith, it is formative for faith. Mature aesthetic existence as poiesis is the 
creation not only of art, play, friendship, etc., but of a world, an embodied way of being in the 
world, of seeing the world, which celebrates and analogically participates in Christological 
reality. Such existence is a mode of discipleship, a Christological mimesis, which 
sacramentally participates in the divine through embodied reality.  
One can see the form of God not only in the works of human beings – the music of 
Mozart, the paintings of Christ-clowns by Rouault – but in the style of the lives of 
those who have given themselves over to imitating him. The life of Elizabeth of Dijon 
‘became a sacrament’ ... The track of her becoming, her vocation, announces a 
doctrine, a teaching, carved out in, through and upon her body.140  
Ward draws attention to the “complex character of mimesis” through the work of Aristotle, 
for whom art “does not strictly mirror what is but imitates what should be or will be,” 
therefore mediating “between presentation, representation and absence.”141 By extension then, 
we could say that aesthetic existence has the potential to engage one in a way of being and 
                                                
139 Again, this is not to deny the crucial role that abstract theorisation plays in faith formation, 
as in systematic theology for example. But as Ward shows, such abstraction needs to always 
occur within the context of embodied existence, as an “embedded” and “engaged” theology, 
which is at the heart of How the Light Gets In. 
140 Ward, Christ and Culture, 203. 
141 Ward, 32–33. 
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relating that offers a window onto the way things should be, thereby reframing reality and 
forming faith. 
5.3.4 Discerning Mature Aesthetic Existence: Embodied attunement 
The vital question, which we have been following as a thread throughout this project thus far, 
is how we distinguish between “mature” aesthetic existence (forming faith) and sensationalist 
aesthetic existence (forming virtuality). Ward contributes to this through his description of 
discernment and its connection to an embodied “reading” of the world. Ward points out that 
the process of coming to believe is itself a process of discernment, as the verb credo 
historically would have been understood (the way in which Anselm used it, for example, as in 
credo ut intelligam).142 This discernment process of coming to believe takes place amidst 
what Charles Taylor describes as “the ‘immanent frame’, [which is] ‘the sensed context in 
which we develop our beliefs.’”143 “For beliefs are (and have) lived conditions for the 
possibility or impossibility of certain imaginative experiences of the world. ‘[A]ll beliefs are 
held within a context or framework of the taken-for-granted.’”144 
Because this framework operates in the preconscious world of the taken-for-granted, carefully 
evaluating one’s belief solely through logical analysis is not sufficient for discerning right 
belief. Rather, for Ward, discernment is a matter of “reading,” specifically learning how to 
“read well.”145 All creatures having consciousness (from plants to human beings) must “read” 
their environment, reading the “signs, signals and communicative relations” that surround 
them and respond, or adapt appropriately in order to live.146 This reading is “not simply a 
matter of consciousness; the reading goes on at emotional and somatic levels not lit by 
consciousness.”147 Embodied reading as discerning is then a fundamental aspect of being 
human, a prerequisite for mental and physical well-being. Discernment “is an aspect of what 
neuroscientists call the ‘cognitive imperative’: the demand made by the brain to make order, 
to search for causes, and to question.”148 It is the “seeking” in Anselm’s “faith seeking 
                                                
142 Ward, How the Light Gets In, 242. 
143 Ward, 124. 
144 Ward, 134. 
145 Ward, 237. 
146 Ward, 237. 
147 Ward, 237. 
148 Ward, 237. 
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understanding.”149 In other words, discernment is a process inextricably bound up within 
embodied living. The truth being 
learned as it is lived. That is the beating pulse of Christian discipleship. As it is 
learned so there must be a deepening of discernment, a continual reading of the world 
in the light of Christ and by the breath of the Spirit. Prayer is that activity whereby we 
bring the world to Christ and Christ to the world … Theology as prayer is an act of 
faith … But this act of faith cannot be totally divorced from other human acts because 
as faith seeks understanding it must necessarily engage all those human facilities 
which enable any understanding: sensory perception, emotional experience, 
imagination, intuition, will, memory, reasoning etc. Illumination does not by-pass the 
nature of being human; it perfects it.150 
Ward explores this relationship of prayer to aesthetic existence in an article comparing radical 
embodiment in sport and the embrace of “radical incarnation.”151 He describes an athlete’s 
experience of entering “the zone,” a place of deeply attuned embodiment, “pushing beyond 
left hemisphere knowledge to right hemisphere instinct,” the consequence not primarily of 
determination or willpower but disciplined practice.152 “One enters one’s body more deeply; 
eased into it such that there is a new level of relaxation and composure.”153 It is an experience 
often described as transcendence.154 Ward relates this radical embodiment of the sports person 
or dancer to what he calls “radical incarnation – that immersion into the very depths of the 
material and the particular, in Christ, in order to ‘hear’, ‘recognise’ (these are both metaphors, 
you understand) the groaning of all creation for its creator …” 155 This “radical incarnation” 
results in a perception of reality which is not merely known, it is lived. 
The consequence is that Ward is arguing here that the aesthetic category of  “‘fittingness’ or 
‘attunement’ of the body is a possible entry into a deeper form of the ethical, which [he calls] 
‘ethical life.’”156 Fundamentally this is so, because as an incarnational expression of faith, 
such prayerful “attunement” exposes Christological reality for what it is – our participation 
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Ethics 25, no. 1 (2012): 49–64. 
152 Ward, 55. 
153 Ward, 56. 
154 Ward, 56. For a discussion on how an encounter with beauty can parallel this transcendent 
entry into the “zone,” see Ward, Unimaginable, 120. 
155 Ward, ‘A Question of Sport and Incarnational Theology’, 52. 
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and “the immersion of the world in Christ.”157 “Prayer is not the means of transcending the 
material but of entering the materiality of our condition more profoundly.”158  
Discerning mature aesthetic existence then, is a matter of embodied attunement to this-
worldly, analogical life in Christ. “Attunement is both the source and goal of discipleship.”159 
Reading our environments is not merely a process of ratiocination, but includes intuitively 
discerning aesthetic “fittingness.”160 Discerning mature aesthetic existence from sensationalist 
aesthetic existence cannot be solely a conscious process. It is a prayerful engagement, which 
incorporates the whole being, in an intuitive concern for fittingness, a resonance, or in 
Bonhoeffer’s terms, a harmonic polyphony of Christological reality.  
5.3.5 Liturgical Aesthetic Existence: Uniting aesthetics, ethics and faith 
Attuned aesthetic existence, as a celebration of Christological reality, is therefore liturgical, 
“where liturgy is not just something that goes on in church, but a way of being church beyond 
buildings, institutions, lectionaries, and orders of service.”161 In this sense, there is no line to 
be drawn between liturgy and living.162 However, poetic living, as a form of liturgy for the 
Christian, is not only an expression of faith. It is also formative for faith, as we have seen. In 
other words, poetic living is a form of poiesis, not only making films, music, fine art, play, 
etc., but thereby making sense of the world, forming belief.163 Further again, this poiesis, as 
living, cannot but have an ethical telos. Believing, as a relational disposition, participating in 
reality, is ethically oriented.164 If in the living, in the making, the personal imagination and the 
social imaginary are being shaped and formed, it will have cultural and material effects; it will 
change the way we act. It is this integration of aesthetic, ethical and religious life which we 
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160 Fittingness is a term with rich Christian heritage, one that Anselm uses, “in his work Cur 
Deus Homo … to describe God’s suitable accommodation to the human and created order. It 
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162 Ward, 122. As we shall see in the next chapter, James K. A. Smith extends the 
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the communication of the truth in God, as forms of prayer.” Ward, How the Light Gets In, 
193. 
164 Ward, Unbelievable, 148. 
 162 
need to probe further in the next chapter, our understanding of everyday aesthetic existence as 
liturgy being central to this exploration.
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CHAPTER 6: WOLTERSTORFF & THE LITURGICAL ORIENTATION 
OF MATURE AESTHETIC EXISTENCE 
Introduction 
Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer introduced us to the notion of mature aesthetic existence as a 
valid expression of being Christian based on an incarnational embrace of this-worldly reality. 
Firstly, as we saw through Bonhoeffer’s call for a recovery of aesthetic existence in the life of 
the church, this embrace is theologically necessary. It is a polyphonous celebration of 
discipleship in penultimate reality, a “following after” Christ incarnate. Rightly oriented then, 
mature aesthetic existence is an act of worship (a notion we will further explore in this 
chapter), a right response to being Christian. Further, secondly and significantly, such an 
embrace of aesthetic existence is also formative, playing a role in becoming Christian. 
Kierkegaard introduced this view to us through his endorsement of “poetic living,” co-
creating with Christ in the poeticizing act of self-formation. We built on this through the work 
of Graham Ward, which suggests that religious belief itself, and consequently faith formation, 
is inextricably bound up with affective and embodied experience in the world. Bonhoeffer’s 
musical metaphors provide an illuminating example of this, his lived experience of musical 
sensory immediacy playing a constitutive role in his theology. Aesthetic existence is, 
therefore, not only fundamental to being human as McGilchrist showed, but plays a 
significant role in both being and becoming Christian.  
In this chapter we will be exploring the relationship between mature aesthetic existence and 
ethics, as action in the world. We have already begun to explore this relationship, particularly 
through the work of Graham Ward. Ward’s description of “ethical life” demands a “radical 
incarnation,” an “attunement” of the body embedded in living, in distinction from the 
imposition of “moral codes, implicit or explicit.”1 In other words, Ward’s description of 
discipleship as incarnational living is, by definition, fundamentally embodied and thus 
inextricably tied to both aesthetic existence and ethical action. Rather than ethics then being a 
separate category of human existence, distinct from aesthetics and faith, all three aspects of 
being human cohere in a holistic understanding of being Christian, one being inseparable 
from the others. 
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As we saw at the end of the last chapter, it is particularly in understanding mature aesthetic 
existence as liturgical that connections between aesthetics, faith and ethics are clarified. 
Considering aesthetic existence through the lens of liturgy offers two important contributions. 
Firstly, it elucidates the nature of mature aesthetic existence as a fitting expression of 
Christian living, distinguishing it from potentially deforming modes of aesthetic existence. If, 
as Ward posits, there is no line to be drawn between liturgy and Christian living (liturgy thus 
not limited to activity within the walls of a church), then a liturgical understanding of daily 
aesthetic engagement becomes a means of ethical discernment, akin to Bonhoeffer’s 
polyphonic living. The litmus question for right Christian living, whether understood 
religiously, ethically or aesthetically, is thus fundamentally relational. Mature aesthetic 
existence has a liturgical orientation, with holistic implications for the direction of desire, 
service and worship.  
Secondly, understanding mature aesthetic existence as everyday liturgy underscores the 
observation that aesthetic engagement is inextricably bound up with faith formation and 
ethical action. As noted through Ward’s work, the aesthetic category of poiesis is not separate 
and distinct from the ethical category of praxis. Rather, a complex, organic and two-way 
relationship exists between the two. On the one hand, “praxis is both the acting that issues 
from a believing and the acting that issues in coming to believe.”2 On the other, as we have 
seen, poiesis, as aesthetic engagement in the world (making music, dance, a meal, play, etc.), 
also, at the same time, plays a role in making sense of the world, forming belief. Aesthetic 
engagement in the world is best understood then as both praxis and poiesis. In other words, 
aesthetic practices contribute not only to faith formation, but also to the formation of ethical 
categories and ultimate action. At the heart of this chapter is the assertion that aesthetic 
practices have ethical consequences. Here, a liturgical understanding of aesthetic existence 
clarifies this relationship, particularly as we will employ it, by framing it within the relational 
and ethical context of social practices.3 
                                                
2 Ward, How the Light Gets In, 276. 
3 Although not explicitly engaged, three classic theoretical models undergird this chapter. 
Firstly, practice theory, as delineated by the likes of Pierre Bourdieu, which highlights the 
formative role of practice, accentuated as habitus and the shaping of culture by practice. 
Secondly, the related theory of social practice, as developed by Alasdair MacIntyre, which 
highlights the normative nature of “socially established cooperative human activity” toward a 
specific telos. And finally, the interrelated conceptualisation of a social imaginary, described 
by Charles Taylor as, “the way ordinary people ‘imagine’ their social surroundings,” which is 
“not expressed in theoretical terms, but is carried in images, stories, and legends … making 
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We will begin by clarifying Ward’s articulation of the Christian act as liturgy before turning 
to the work of Nicholas Wolterstorff. Wolterstorff is particularly well suited to this enquiry 
because of his theological and philosophical work on liturgy and aesthetics, both of which we 
will explore through his articulation of social practice. Initially, we will treat these parallel 
aspects of his work independently. First, we will consider Wolterstorff’s understanding of 
liturgy as embedded in a socially constructed “script.” Next, we will turn to his argument for 
understanding aesthetics too, in the context of social practice, thereby rejecting the modern 
narrative of aesthetics as disinterested contemplation. Finally, we will bring both these 
elements together, showing that a liturgical approach to aesthetic existence foregrounds not 
only its formative contribution, but also the inseparable relationship between aesthetic 
experience, faith formation and ethical action, which collectively function as a fitting 
expression of shalom. 
6.1 Christian Action as Liturgy 
Building on the work of Ward, the concept of “liturgy,” with which we are working in this 
chapter, is not limited to that which takes place within ecclesial “buildings, institutions, 
lectionaries, and orders of service.”4 Rather, Ward posits understanding liturgy as a way of 
being; it marks the entire gamut of Christian living. Simply, Christian action is liturgical.5 We 
shall delineate a definition of liturgy shortly, through the analysis of Wolterstorff, but before 
we do so, it will be helpful to outline the essence of Ward’s argument for understanding 
Christian action as liturgy. 
Ward turns to Aristotle’s use of leitourgia (from which we derive “liturgy”) as a helpful 
starting point. Aristotle engages the term in his Nicomachean Ethics, wherein he considers the 
                                                                                                                                                   
possible common practices.” Collectively, and supported by the likes of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (antepredicative knowing as processed in the body), these theories point toward the 
formative nature of embodied practice, particularly in relationship to the imagination, a point 
comprehensively argued in James Smith’s “Cultural Liturgies” project. While this chapter 
will at times stretch the strict boundaries of these models, they offer the foundation for the 
trajectory of the argument. Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1990); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 187; Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, 23; 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (London: Routledge, 1976). Smith’s 
“Cultural Liturgies” project: James K. A. Smith, Desiring the King; Imagining the Kingdom; 
Awaiting the King, Cultural Liturgies, v. 1-3 (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2009; 2013; 
2017). 
4 Ward, How the Light Gets In, 120. 
5 Graham Ward, The Politics of Discipleship: Becoming Postmaterial Citizens (Grand Rapids: 
Baker Academic, 2009), 181–220. 
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ethics of an action (praxis). Significantly, here ethics is not divorced from aesthetics, the 
Greek “to kalon” being equally “the Good” and “the Beautiful.”6 In this context, and in 
keeping with the etymology of the term (litos ergos literally being the “work of the people,” 
or “public service”), Aristotle’s use of leitourgia is employed in both a narrow sense as “a 
technical political term for a service rendered to the city or state,” but also more broadly and 
“nontechnically to refer to any act of service.”7 Aristotle’s use of leitourgia points then to two 
significant observations regarding this early use of the term. Firstly, a close relationship exists 
between action and liturgical practice. Secondly, and consequently, describing leitourgia as to 
kalon brings together both ethics and aesthetics in the liturgical act. 
Understood through this lens, Christian liturgy, as an act of service, relationally orients 
action, since it is a proclamation of that to which one is committed. Liturgy, so construed, is 
the embodied and active extension of belief, as a relational disposition, the expression of a 
commitment of trust.8  In this sense, liturgy as a Christian act of service cannot be confined 
within the walls of a church, but needs to be understood within the relational context of being 
Christian, being in Christ. The Christian act can thus only be understood in light of the church 
being the body of Christ.9 Action cannot be construed outside of this participatory relational 
ontology, which  
is summed up in Christ’s words to his disciples: “he dwells in me, and I in him” (John 
6:56 KJV). This statement can be taken as axiomatic for an account of a Christian act. 
In this act, therefore, we are not dealing with an autonomous subject who, in full 
knowledge of the facts of a situation, acts consciously in and for himself or herself. In 
the conception of a Christian praxis, there is no room for such a modern notion of self-
sufficiency … In fact, what characterizes this Christian agent is a surrender, a 
                                                
6 Ward, 182. 
7 Ward, 183. 
8 The Catholic catechism describes liturgy as God’s people participating in the work of God. 
It is therefore fundamentally active. If, “to swim is a verb [and] swimmer is the noun [then] 
liturgy is a verb, Church (plural) or Christian (singular) is the noun.” Liturgy is thus simply 
the active life of the Christian, Aidan Kavanagh describing liturgy as “doing the world as the 
world was meant to be done.” David W. Fagerberg, ‘Liturgical Theology’, in T&T Clark 
Companion to Liturgy, ed. Alcuin Reid (London: T&T Clark, 2015), 9,10,15. 
9 Wolterstorff notes that it is specifically through the “enactments of liturgy” that Alexander 
Schmemann sees liturgy “actualizing” the church. Importantly, Schmemann highlights the 
Christological nature of this actualisation, which is at the core not only of this chapter, but this 
entire project, describing “worship as the life of the church, the public act which eternally 
actualizes the nature of the Church as the Body of Christ.” [Italics added] Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, The God We Worship: An Exploration of Liturgical Theology (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2015), 4; Alexander Schmemann, Introduction to Liturgical Theology (Crestwood, 
NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1966), 12. 
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sacrifice, in which he or she is bound by what Augustine calls a “vinculum caritatis” 
[bond of love].10 
Christian action then is not merely the consequence of this relational orientation; discipleship 
is “not simply following the example of Christ; it is formation within Christ, so that we 
become Christlike. And the context of this formation is the church in all its concrete 
locatedness and eschatological significance.”11 [Italics added] This formation takes place in 
the concrete everyday; all action, including aesthetic engagement, indicative of a relational 
commitment. “Interrelationality,” therefore, is fundamental to the becoming of the Christian 
self, actions an expression of this. “The Christian embodied agent always lives beyond 
himself or herself in and toward other bodies (the eucharistic body, the ecclesial body, social 
bodies of various kinds, the civic body, and the body of Christ).”12 In this sense, action should 
not be seen, first and foremost, through the lens of utility, but through the relational lens of 
participation. Rather than the I-It modern transaction of the self with material existence 
(leading to aestheticism), an I-Thou orientation to embodied existence celebrates mature 
aesthetic existence as integral to discipleship. Here, Ward reminds us of Augustine’s 
distinction between “use” and “enjoyment” and his argument that enjoyment has “a higher 
theological purpose: to enjoy a thing is to participate in the worship of God. God must be 
enjoyed; he cannot be used.”13 Ward proposes that a liturgical understanding of Christian 
action is thus not oriented by utility, but by enjoyment of “the goodness, beauty, justice and 
truth of God,” thereby uniting faith, ethics and aesthetics.14 
In other words, rather than create categories of action such as “teaching, commanding, 
obeying, entertaining,” or aesthetic enjoyment for that matter, “because all Christian action 
participates in the economy of love, all action becomes liturgical.”15 All Christian action, 
oriented by love of God is doxological; it is a proclamation of worship and ultimate 
allegiance.16 Resonating with Alexander Schmemann’s liturgical approach to a sacramental 
understanding of all of life, Ward suggests that the aesthetic and ethical natures of the 
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Christian act cohere, and are inseparable, when located in the common telos of life in Christ.17 
“The object/objective of the Christian act is to articulate what is just, good, beautiful, and true 
in, with, and beyond whatever is the grammatical object on which the agent works. In such a 
laboring, the agent is priestly, the act liturgical, and the object sacramental because each 
participates in the unfolding of God’s grace.”18 
The liturgical nature of the Christian act, thus understood, elucidates the inextricable 
connection between aesthetic existence and ethical action to which we have thus far been 
alluding. Firstly, mature aesthetic existence is a right response, a doxological response to 
being in Christ. To use an aesthetic category, there is a fittingness to such a response.19 
However, as is illustrated through the Greek term, to kalon, such fittingness is as much ethical 
as it is aesthetic. Ethical action is equally a fitting response, and Ward here suggests that the 
modern notion of severing the two categories points to a failure to understand the relational 
and participatory nature of discipleship, the liturgical nature of all Christian living.  
Secondly, a liturgical understanding clarifies that in their mutual coherence, aesthetic 
existence and ethical action are not only right responses to faith, they are also formative for 
faith. It is in the midst of Christian action, as liturgy, that faith is formed. The implication here 
is that the liturgical nature of Christian actions should be understood as practices, along with 
the social, historical and cultural contexts which inform them. In sum, Christian action as 
liturgy is not only a fitting doxological expression of discipleship, but can operate as 
formative practice, thereby itself playing a role in becoming Christian. In order to investigate 
this claim, further clarifying the relationship between Christian action as liturgy and formative 
practice, along with the implications for aesthetic existence as discipleship, we turn to the 
work of Nicholas Wolterstorff. 
6.2 Liturgical Existence as Practice 
While bringing Ward into dialogue with Wolterstorff may not be an obvious connection to 
make, since they are operating from distinctly different theological traditions, once again, the 
                                                
17 Alexander Schmemann, For the Life of the World: Sacraments and Orthodoxy (Crestwood, 
NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1982).  
This liturgical approach to all of life has a rich history in the tradition, going right back to the 
Church Fathers, as shown by Balthasar’s treatment of Maximus the Confessor, Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus the Confessor (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003). 
18 Ward, The Politics of Discipleship, 195. 
19 We will explore the concept of fittingness more closely later in this chapter. 
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focus is neither the work of Ward nor Wolterstorff but the question at hand.20 As such, it is 
particularly fruitful to engage Wolterstorff at this point, precisely because he approaches 
liturgy and aesthetics from a different perspective. While he is not working from a 
sacramental ontology in the sense that Ward is, his philosophical analysis of the mechanics of 
both liturgy and aesthetics illuminates the connection between liturgical aesthetic existence 
and praxis.21  
We also need to briefly acknowledge the foundation from which Wolterstorff is working; his 
epistemological grounding of belief in “entitlement” (as opposed to rationality) fundamentally 
                                                
20 The work of both Ward and Wolterstorff is so wide-ranging and interdisciplinary that to 
pigeonhole them into a specific theological label would be both an unfair reflection of their 
work, and probably sit somewhat uneasily with each. Nevertheless, for the sake of being 
succinct, we could locate Ward within the Radical Orthodoxy movement while Wolterstorff is 
grounded in the Reformed tradition. Both contexts obviously provide distinctive theological 
foundations, which while informing the arguments presented here, lie beyond the exploratory 
scope of our project. That being said, however, these traditions are not as disparate as they 
may seem at first sight, at least for the purposes of their contribution to this project. 
Epistemologically, for instance, both are responding to the vacuum left by the demise of 
modern logical positivism, seeking a recovery of the metaphysical. Both acknowledge the 
limits of enlightenment rationality in this enterprise, “belief” for neither limited to the realm 
of objective certainty characteristic of “classical foundationalism” (to use Wolterstorff’s 
phrase). The paths that they have taken in response are clearly different, Wolterstorff and 
Plantinga’s articulation of Reformed Epistemology certainly distinct from Radical 
Orthodoxy’s post-modern Augustinian epistemology. Yet, as James Smith notes, while “these 
different schools of thought are not often associated (indeed, Reformed epistemology remain 
virulently allergic to ‘postmodernism’)” he suggests “that, in fact, these tensions represent a 
kind of sibling rivalry.” The intention in this chapter is to bring these “sibling rivals” together 
to further enrich our understanding of the relationship between aesthetics, ethics and faith. 
Smith will have something of a role to play in the background, as bridge-builder to bring 
these positions together. James K. A. Smith, Thinking in Tongues: Pentecostal Contributions 
to Christian Philosophy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 109. 
21 As already noted, Wolterstorff’s scholarship cannot be reduced to a “Reformed” 
perspective; to do so would be a grave error, his work on liturgy being a case in point. Indeed, 
Wolterstorff acknowledges that one of the two theologians who have most impacted his 
thinking on liturgy is the Orthodox theologian, Alexander Schmemann (the other being the 
Swiss Reformed theologian Jean-Jacques von Allen), even if he is not totally comfortable 
with Schmemann’s coalescence of the worship of God and appreciation of the world as 
sacrament, a point which we will later engage. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically: 
Philosophical Reflections on Religious Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 6, 
footnote 12. See also Nicholas Wolterstorff, Hearing the Call: Liturgy, Justice, Church, and 
World, ed. Mark R. Gornik and Greg Thompson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 32. 
The point should also be made here that Wolterstorff has no problem, following Calvin, with 
the world being experienced as a “sacrament” of God (his concern is simply Schmemann’s 
liturgical articulation of this response). Wolterstorff, 24. 
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connecting faith with responsible action.22 Wolterstorff has long argued for the pre-theoretical 
nature of founding “control beliefs,” which are not consciously and rationally reflected 
upon.23 Belief is intimately tied to practice. Specifically, Wolterstorff highlights the 
significance of “practices of inquiry,” the formation of belief embedded in social practice.24 
The full epistemological articulation of such an understanding of belief, which has come to be 
known as Reformed Epistemology, necessarily then includes an acknowledgement of 
“immediate beliefs” (or “basic beliefs,” as Plantinga names the concept), those beliefs which 
are held “immediately,” not on the propositional basis of “reasons for.”25 There is a clear 
parallel here between Wolterstorff’s description of “immediate beliefs” and Ward’s 
articulation of belief as a partly preconscious disposition, even if they resolve the observation 
in different ways.26 For our purposes, the important point to note is the mutual grounding of 
belief in practice. While we will be limiting our engagement with Wolterstorff to his 
articulation of liturgy and aesthetics as framed by social practice, it is worth noting the 
epistemological weight of practice that underlies Wolterstorff’s larger project. 
The question that we are putting to Wolterstorff, as informed by Ward, is whether mature 
aesthetic existence is best understood as liturgical, thereby integrating faith with aesthetics 
and ethics through a doxological orientation of embodied action. If such a claim is valid, then 
                                                
22 While Wolterstorff concedes that there is merit in approaching belief from the perspective 
of both rationality and “warrant” (Alvin Plantinga’s project), he argues that human beings 
largely do not subscribe to a belief on the basis of a rational decision, and yet we hold people 
responsible for what they believe. The reason people are held responsible for their beliefs is 
founded not in the rational, volitional basis of the particular belief (as one might expect), but 
rather in the belief’s genesis being located in social practice. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Practices 
of Belief: Volume 2, Selected Essays, ed. Terence Cuneo (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), 6–7, 62–117. 
23 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason Within the Bounds of Religion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1984). 
24 Wolterstorff, Practices of Belief, 7. 
25 Reformed Epistemology is quick to point out that even though “immediate beliefs” are not 
held on the basis of ratiocination, this does not make such belief irrational. In fact, the 
possibility exists that immediate beliefs, including religious belief, can be explored rationally 
and be shown to be cogent. Wolterstorff, 338–41. 
26 There are also interesting connections to be made here, on multiple levels, between 
“immediate beliefs” and Kierkegaard’s understanding of aesthetic existence as “sensory 
immediacy.” For instance, just as “immediate beliefs” are not by default either sound or 
fallacious, so too, one can argue that Kierkegaard’s portrayal of the problematic nature of 
sensory immediacy does not allow for the fact that sensory immediacy can either contribute to 
the construction of a virtual reality or the affirmation of Reality. Or, perhaps more 
significantly, both concepts point to the extent of preconscious human engagement with the 
world and the way in which preconscious aesthetic experience, belief and practice interact 
before we even become aware of it. 
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the implications are that mature aesthetic existence has a circular relationship with faith 
formation and ethical action. Mature aesthetic existence is both an expression of worship (it is 
a fitting celebration of being Christian, a polyphonic embrace of this-worldly, Christological 
reality) and also formative for becoming Christian. Approaching aesthetic existence through 
the lens of this liturgical cycle (expression-formation-expression-formation-etc.) highlights 
not only the formative and celebratory aspects of mature aesthetic existence, but 
consequently, the point at the heart of this chapter: Faithful aesthetic practices have ethical 
consequences.  
6.2.1 Wolterstorff’s Model: Liturgy as performative 
Wolterstorff’s unique analysis of liturgy stems from his pioneering philosophical dissection of 
the performative nature of liturgy.27 While much theological work has been done over the 
centuries regarding both the expressive and formative aspects of liturgy, liturgy has not been 
explored through the lens of analytic philosophy, particularly as a performative act.28 
Wolterstorff’s focus is on the enactment itself, on “what is done,” his argument being that by 
looking closely at this performative dimension light will be shed on both the expressive and 
formative aspects of liturgy.29 His approach is thus particularly relevant to this project 
because it is not ratiocentric; he is exploring what is going on in the liturgical action itself, 
rather than that which can be distilled from it to rational proposition.30  
                                                
27 We need to note at the outset that Wolterstorff understands “liturgy” in the strict sense, as 
the doxological actions performed by a community of Christians gathered to worship on a 
Sunday. While he is not closed to extending the term “analogically” to actions in the broader 
life of the world, his treatment is in the context of this narrow sense. By contrast, for our 
purposes, we are approaching liturgy in the extended sense, understanding mature everyday 
aesthetic existence as liturgical. However, despite these differing parameters, the argument 
here is that the principles of Wolterstorff’s analysis remain valid for an extended 
understanding of liturgy, a point that will be clarified as Wolterstorff’s argument is 
articulated. Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 11. 
28 Wolterstorff, 5. 
Wolterstorff notes that since 2007 he has been collaborating with a small group of liturgical 
theologians and philosophers to “‘jumpstart’ the subfield of philosophy of liturgy.” Here, 
Wolterstorff acknowledges James K. A. Smith’s contribution, and it is Smith’s work that is 
particularly helpful for integrating Wolterstorff’s strict sense of liturgy to the extended sense, 
as we shall see. Wolterstorff, ix.  
29 Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 5. 
30 It is for this reason that Wolterstorff specifically chooses to focus on Orthodox liturgy for 
his analysis, since, “unlike the liturgies of the West, the Orthodox liturgy has never been 
subjected to what one might call ‘rationalization.’ In Western liturgies the thought has been 
simplified, the language clarified, complexity reduced, hyperbole diminished, metaphors 
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6.2.1.1 Liturgy is “Scripted” Activity 
At the heart of Wolterstorff’s dissection of liturgical enactment is his observation that liturgy 
is a form of “scripted” activity. He argues this by firstly noting that there is a distinction 
between types of acts and instances of acts. Or, in philosophical terminology, there are act-
types and act-tokens.31 Act-types can recur; they are universals.32 Wolterstorff suggests that 
liturgy is best understood as a sequence of act-types. In other words, liturgy is not the random 
expression of worship. Rather, an instance of worship is liturgical when it conforms to the 
sequence of act-types prescribed as universal. Wolterstorff names this the “script,” scripted 
activity being a type “of activity for which there are prescriptions in force.”33  
To clarify what this means, it is helpful to consider other types of scripted activity. Liturgy is 
only one “species” within the “genus” of scripted activity.34 Wolterstorff considers two 
examples, American football and music.35 In American football, plays are conducted 
according to a playbook. If a quarterback calls Play #9 there is a script prescribed for the 
sequence of actions to be accordingly followed. Play #9 can be executed correctly or 
incorrectly. However, this does not mean that every instance of Play #9 is identical. There are 
instances of Play #9 which are better and worse, but which are not necessarily correct or 
incorrect. Likewise, a musical performance follows a script. The most obvious manifestation 
of the script is the score.  
However, the key point of relevance for our project is that the script is not merely the score, or 
the playbook. Wolterstorff is stretching the term “script” beyond “instructions written down 
in words,” or diagrams or musical notations for that matter.36 In fact, as we shall see, the most 
determinative aspects of the script are exactly those which cannot be so articulated. The 
playbook cannot possibly articulate every aspect of every action that is to be performed in the 
play within the diagrams or words that constitute it. In addition to the rational articulation of 
the playbook, a history of practice contributes to the script. All of the athletic components – 
                                                                                                                                                   
eliminated. The Orthodox liturgy is prolix, poetic, excessive, wild, hyperbolic, highly 
metaphorical, complex, often obscure, much of it clearly the production of poets rather than 
theologians.” Wolterstorff, 9. 
31 Wolterstorff, 13. 
32 Strictly, it is not accurate to say that all act-types are universals, as Wolterstorff explains, 
but for our purposes, as the concept applies to liturgy, it is sufficient to treat them as such. 
Wolterstorff, 13. 
33 Wolterstorff, 14. 
34 Wolterstorff, 18. 
35 Wolterstorff, 14–18. 
36 Wolterstorff, 17. 
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running, catching, tackling, throwing, etc. – have a history of embodied practice through 
which appropriate action is prescribed. Partly this can be (and is) articulated through 
technique (hence, coaching), but partly this transcends cognitive expression and is learned via 
embodied practice, immediate sensory fittingness, attunement or experiences of “being in the 
zone,” manifest in terms such as “muscle memory.”37 We could say then, that apart from the 
prescriptions specified in the playbook, the script for the particular play also draws upon 
prescriptions specified through embodied practice, and further, as Wolterstorff highlights, the 
meaning communally attributed through social practice. In music, for instance, “The script for 
a musical performance is the total set of prescriptions holding for that performance, both 
those specified in the score and those embedded within the relevant social practice.”38 Beyond 
the score, the social practice of violin-playing, or conducting, etc., emerge from the social 
practice of the particular society. This holds true also for organically composed music, such as 
jazz, which may not be operating from a score, but nevertheless submits to the script of what 
constitutes a jazz performance.  
Since social practices contribute to the scripting, the script that informs liturgical action is not 
simply shaped by explicit and direct means, but also through the implicit and indirect.39 
Liturgy, even understood in the narrow sense of congregational enactment in a worship 
service, is therefore formed not only by the dynamics of the specific congregation and its 
religious tradition, but also by society more generally.40 Here we should recall that it is in 
living, through embodied, aesthetic, relational interaction with the world that imaginative 
paradigms are formed through which we see the world. Again, we should recall that these 
imaginative paradigms do not operate solely, or even primarily, on an individual level, but 
they are communal, they are social imaginaries. These social imaginaries inform the nature of 
social practices which become normative for scripted action. The implication of this 
progression is that aesthetic engagement is not only an aspect of liturgical enactment itself, 
but also contributes to the script that determines liturgical action.  
                                                
37 Smith draws on the research of John Barth and Tanya Chartrand to show that embodied 
practices can lead to such “automaticities.” Smith, Desiring the Kingdom, 80–82. 
38 Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 17. 
39 Wolterstorff notes that no liturgy is explicitly composed from scratch. Rather, since the 
birth of the early church, liturgy emerges from, and contains implicit belief. A significant aim 
of his liturgical theology is the attempt to “make the implicit explicit.” Wolterstorff, The God 
We Worship, 12–13. 
40 Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 20. 
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6.2.1.2 Liturgical Activity has “Count As Significance” 
If liturgical enactment belongs to the genus of scripted activity (along with many other 
scripted activities), it is specifically to be identified within this genus with those activities 
which have count as significance.41 In other words, it is an activity performed not for the sake 
of itself, like an American football game, but for the significance it holds beyond the act 
itself. Speech-act theory has illuminated the reality that in human life one act can count as 
another. For instance, raising one’s hand at an auction counts as making a bid. Within the 
liturgical script of a worship service, being sprinkled with water, or immersed in water, or 
raising one’s hands, or eating bread and wine, are not merely acts in themselves, they have 
count as significance. The critical question for this project is whether it is possible for this 
count as significance to extend to actions beyond the context of a worship service, into the 
actions of every life. This depends on the “script” which informs those actions (assuming a 
script does inform those actions, not all action, of course, is scripted). We will return to this 
momentarily, but we first need note a second specific attribute of liturgical enactment. 
6.2.1.3 Liturgical Activity is for Direct Engagement with God 
If liturgical enactment falls within the genus of scripted activity, and is further, specifically 
categorised by actions of count as significance, then the particular species of liturgy is 
uniquely marked by being for direct engagement with God.42  
When we orient ourselves toward God by enacting a liturgy we engage God directly 
and explicitly. When we kneel, there is no creature before whom we are kneeling; we 
are kneeling before God. When we stand with hands upraised, there is no creature 
before whom we are standing with hands upraised; we are standing with hands 
upraised before God.43  
Wolterstorff suggests that by understanding liturgy according to these criteria, staring in awe 
at the “starry heavens” is not a liturgical act, since it is mediated. The object of attention here 
is the stars, not God, the potential worship of God being indirect and implicit in this act. 
Similarly, in relating to fellow human beings as bearers of God’s image, while these 
interactions may point toward the wonder of God, the engagement here, again, is indirect and 
implicit; directly and explicitly, the object of action is one’s fellow human being.44 In sum, 
Wolterstorff identifies liturgy as a sequence of act-types which conform to a script, but 
                                                
41 Wolterstorff, 24. 
42 Wolterstorff, 26. 
43 Wolterstorff, 27. 
44 Wolterstorff, 27. 
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specifically scripted activity that has count as significance and which is for direct engagement 
with God. 
6.2.2 Applying the Model: Liturgy as lived in the everyday 
Wolterstorff’s articulation of liturgical action is not only helpful for understanding the 
fundamentally embodied nature of a strict sense of liturgy, but also is insightful for 
understanding mature, everyday aesthetic existence as liturgical. However, the applicability of 
extending Wolterstorff’s model to action in all of life rests on two criteria: firstly, whether 
such action can carry count as significance, and secondly, whether such action can be 
construed as direct engagement with God. On both counts, particularly the second, 
Wolterstorff suggests that extending a liturgical understanding to action in all of life is 
untenable. Nevertheless, by taking a closer look at these criteria it is evident that the exclusion 
of everyday aesthetic existence from liturgical enactment is not only an unnecessary move, 
but to the contrary, these qualifications are useful for defining the boundaries within which 
mature aesthetic existence can be understood as liturgical.  
6.2.2.1 Aesthetic Existence as Direct Engagement with God 
While delineating liturgy as being for direct engagement with God is a helpful contribution to 
our project, Wolterstorff’s application of the notion is reductionist, thereby unnecessarily 
eliminating everyday aesthetic enactment from the realm of the liturgical. We need to qualify 
Wolterstorff’s criteria here by noting that “direct” engagement with God is: firstly, always 
mediated; secondly, never purely direct and explicit; and consequently, thirdly, best 
understood not as a binary, but on a continuum. Simply, in an effort to articulate an argument 
which is analytically neat (which is helpful for a project such as this) care needs to be taken to 
allow for the complex and organic nature of human existence, lest artificial dichotomies are 
created which do not accurately reflect an embodied life of faith.  
In fairness, by “direct” engagement with God, Wolterstorff is not suggesting that liturgical 
engagement with God is not mediated through our sensory engagement with material reality, 
only that God is here the primary object of our attention. Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that since all engagement with God is mediated due to our finite nature, in a strict sense, 
engagement with God cannot be purely “direct.” As de Gruchy succinctly put it earlier, “the 
mystery of the ultimate is glimpsed not grasped, for it is always mediated in the penultimate 
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polyphony of life.”45 Hence, we need note the fundamentally sensory nature of a strict sense 
of liturgy, mediated through material engagement with the bread and wine, vocal cords and 
sound waves, water and oil. Wolterstorff’s point is that the object of attention here is not the 
oil, or the water, or the wine, but God. Or, to put it differently, this is not a mode of immature 
aesthetic existence, or sensory immediacy, being lost in the moment of aesthetic experience, 
purely for the moment, but for direct engagement with God. Yet, is this not a reductionist 
view of what is going on here? It is precisely the embodied nature of this engagement that 
makes it meaningful, being present in the moment of tasting the wine, feeling the water, 
smelling the oil. As we have seen, Kierkegaard describes this as immediacy which is 
characteristic of faith, a second immediacy, or an immediacy after reflection; being present in 
the moment, but the sensory moment carrying significance beyond itself. The implication here 
is that in speaking of “direct” engagement with God, we need to acknowledge the necessarily 
mediated nature of that process, since we are embodied, finite beings.  
Acknowledging the fundamentally embodied, and thus mediated, nature of all “direct” 
engagement with God points to a second clarification we need to make: all such liturgical 
enactment will always be a complex, symbiotic combination of being direct and explicit while 
also being indirect and implicit. Engagement with God can only be direct and explicit to the 
extent that it is a conscious process, as a function of left-hemisphere attention. However, as 
we have learned, the implicit and indirect embodied cognition of right-hemisphere attention is 
not comprehensively articulated in consciousness. Aspects of paradigmatic formation remain 
largely unconscious. In other words, by engaging the whole being in liturgy, the significance 
and meaning of a particular act is only partially accessible through the abstraction of direct 
and explicit propositional thought and language. The power of liturgy lies precisely in 
unifying the cognitive, affective and embodied aspects of being human, thereby engaging 
both the explicit and implicit, the right and left hemisphere in worship of God. While this 
accounts for the richness of liturgy in Christian living, it makes left-hemisphere analysis of 
what is going on here challenging.46 For our purposes, the key point to elucidate here is that in 
speaking of liturgical enactment as for “direct” engagement with God, it is helpful to clarify 
                                                
45 De Gruchy, ‘The Search for Transcendence in an Age of Barbarism’, 10. 
46 In concluding his analysis of a performative understanding of liturgy, Wolterstorff notes 
that work needs to be done on better understanding the relationship between liturgy and life-
meaning. While Wolterstorff is correct, his comment points to the complex nature of liturgy 
in relation to existence. Analysis can only partially explain the total and holistic “life-
meaning” of what is going on here. Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 293–94. 
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that Wolterstorff is essentially describing a focus of attention or orientation.47 Rather than 
speak of “direct engagement with God,” we could therefore say that liturgical enactment 
orients one’s whole being in focus on God. 
By affirming that “direct” engagement with God is actually mediated, and that what we are 
essentially describing here is a holistic orientation, we have clarified that this delineation of 
liturgy is best understood not as a binary distinction, but on a continuum. Not all action is 
equally liturgical, taking Holy Communion is not liturgical in the same sense as gazing at the 
stars, to use Wolterstorff’s example. However, this is not to say that enjoying the stars is not 
liturgy, as a binary application of Wolterstorff’s model would assert. Rather, the suggestion 
here is that some liturgical enactments orient one’s whole being more completely and 
comprehensively in worship of God than others. Or, to return to the recurrent Bonhoefferian 
theme throughout this project, if liturgy in the strict sense (such as celebrating the Eucharist or 
baptism) is the fundamental and required liturgical cantus firmus affirming the ultimate, then 
gazing at the stars or enjoying the sunset are the penultimate, liturgical counterpoints, offering 
all of human existence as polyphonic worship. At the heart of such a stance is a Christological 
understanding of all of reality, as we have seen.48 Schmemann is helpful in articulating this 
point.49 Liturgical enactments, strictly understood, or the “instituted acts called ‘sacraments’” 
are not magical in and of themselves, but pivotal for allowing one “to see” the world “and to 
‘live’ it in Christ.”50 Is this not Wolterstorff’s point, that liturgical enactment is orientation of 
one’s whole being in Christ? But Schmemann further clarifies that the implication of this 
orientation in Christ affects all perception and engagement in the life of the world. 
A Christian is the one who, wherever he looks, finds Christ and rejoices in Him. And his 
joy transforms all his human plans and programs, decisions and actions, making all his 
mission the sacrament of the world’s return to Him who is the life of the world.51 
The institutional sacraments may then be the pinnacle of liturgy, representing the one end of 
the continuum, embodied participation in the Eucharist, for example, a manifestation of life in 
Christ. However, rather than a binary perspective which locates “secular” aesthetic experience 
outside of this liturgical enactment, the Eucharist is an “entrance into a fourth dimension 
                                                
47 Wolterstorff, 26. 
48 Jean Corbon notes that liturgy infusing all of life is the unavoidable implication of a fully 
developed Christology, “The liturgy, which is celebrated at certain moments but lived at 
every moment, is the one mystery of the Christ who gives life to human beings” Jean Corbon, 
The Wellspring of Worship (New York: Paulist Press, 1988), 141. 
49 Schmemann, For the Life of the World, 76. 
50 Schmemann, 113. 
51 Schmemann, 113. 
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which allows us to see the ultimate reality of life. It is not an escape from the world, rather it 
is the arrival at a vantage point from which we can see more deeply into the reality of the 
world.”52 The Eucharist, along with other liturgical practices of the institutional church, are 
not the expressions of liturgy as distinct from secular life in the world. This is not what makes 
them pivotal. Rather they are crucial because they are the entryway, the “vantage point,” the 
paradigm from which all Christian action in the world can be understood as liturgical.  
While we then need to necessarily expand Wolterstorff’s strict delineation of liturgy, we can 
affirm that not all liturgical enactments are “for direct engagement with God” in the same 
way. Or, to reformulate it as discussed above, not all liturgical enactments orient one’s whole 
being in focus on God to the same degree. Wolterstorff himself points out that some liturgical 
enactments (even in his strict delineation of liturgy – passing the peace, for example) are 
“ancillary and subordinate” to being “directly” engaged with God.53 By his own admission, 
their ancillary and subordinate status does not eliminate these actions from being considered 
liturgical. Here, we are acknowledging that mature aesthetic existence in the everyday, in the 
life of the world, is indeed “ancillary and subordinate.” It is not the cantus firmus, but this 
does not exclude it from being considered liturgical. However, it is critical that we not 
confuse this “ancillary and subordinate” status for peripheral and insignificant. Such a 
misunderstanding stems from underestimating the impact of the indirect and implicit in 
human existence. As we have seen, through the work of McGilchrist and Ward, everyday 
aesthetic existence is formative in ways which are most often precisely indirect and implicit. 
In other words, ancillary and subordinate liturgical enactments in everyday life can impact not 
only faith-formation but also further action in the world. To expand on this, we need to turn to 
Wolterstorff’s second criteria for understanding scripted action as liturgical, its count as 
significance. 
6.2.2.2 Aesthetic Existence Can Count As Worship 
In Wolterstorff’s model, while liturgical enactment orients one’s whole being in focus on 
God, it also has count as significance, as informed by a script. It would seem then that 
everyday aesthetic existence, strictly understood, cannot be considered liturgical since it is 
engaged for itself, not for significance beyond itself. However, a closer look at both what 
qualifies as count as significance, as well as the nature and role of the script, shows that by 
                                                
52 Schmemann, 27. 
53 Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 27. 
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rejecting a reductionist view of this dynamic, everyday aesthetic engagement can indeed carry 
an element of count as significance as informed by (and in turn contributing to) a socially 
constructed “script.” 
While certain actions, such as raising one’s hand at an auction, are enacted solely for their 
count as significance, it does not follow that actions outside of this set do not carry any count 
as significance. In other words, in the context of our discussion of liturgy here, it is possible 
for an action to be enacted for its own sake and to also carry count as significance.54 To use 
Wolterstorff’s example, playing in the football game may well be solely for the pleasure of 
the game itself (aesthetic existence), in accordance with the script as operative for the game 
itself. However, it is too simplistic not to acknowledge that there may well be multiple scripts 
in operation here. A father may join his son in playing the game specifically because he 
desires to build a relationship with his son. The father may enjoy the game, he may at times 
be entirely in the moment, but this does not mean that the game has no significance beyond 
itself. In fact, the father’s primary motivation for playing the game is the count as 
significance: the message of love thereby communicated.  
Gazing at the stars in wonder may not orient one’s whole being in focus on God to the same 
degree as explicit liturgy enacted in a church on Sunday morning. It may not carry the same 
intensity of count as significance, but to say that it neither orients one toward God, nor counts 
as a worshipful act (a fitting response to the shared beauty of incarnational reality) would be 
reductionist and inaccurate. Granted, the nature of the count as significance may be more 
implicit than explicit (although more than likely both), but as we have seen, this implicitness 
does not indicate that it is irrelevant. The pivotal question is what determines count as 
significance? Intention clearly plays a role, but as Wolterstorff shows, even intention is not a 
prerequisite for a particular liturgical act to be meaningful.55 Rather, it is the relation between 
intention and adherence to the broader script that proves insightful.  
                                                
54 In parallel to this question of whether an act can carry both count as significance, while at 
the same time being engaged for itself, one can consider whether, according to Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s model, it is possible for practices to produce both internal and external goods. 
Wolterstorff’s argument is that the goods gained by a practice can at times be both internal 
and external, or even defy such categorisation. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Art Rethought: The 
Social Practices of Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 92–96. 
55 Wolterstorff deals extensively with the question of what is going on when firstly, a person 
does not understand the particular liturgical enactment they participate in, and secondly, when 
a person without faith participates in liturgy; on both counts he does not find the liturgy 
invalid. Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 42, 97ff. 
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6.2.2.3 The Implicit “Scripting” of Liturgical Aesthetic Existence 
The presiding script is the key element in determining the count as significance of liturgical 
enactments. As we have seen, Wolterstorff shows that the script carries both explicit 
instruction (in the form of words or diagrams, such as lectionaries or orders of service) and 
implicit prescription (in the form of ecclesial and broader cultural social practices). In a strict 
understanding of liturgy, a congregation collectively submits to such a script when they gather 
on a Sunday morning to worship. However, a broader understanding of liturgy acknowledges 
that humans, as essentially beings-in-relation, are necessarily always participating in one or 
other form of communally “scripted” activity in everyday life.56 Such scripts always carry 
implicit elements, although at times they also contain explicit prescription, such as in an 
auction, football game, musical performance, court of law, etc. Scripts also define whether 
prescribed actions carry count as significance or not, such as raising one’s hand in an auction, 
a classroom, or a church. For our purposes, the main point here is that the church’s liturgical 
script (and consequent enactment which has count as significance) does not only operate in 
the more “direct” and explicit setting of a Sunday morning as Christians physically gather in 
community, but the “script” continues to operate in every time and place as prescribed to the 
body of Christ in the everyday.57  
                                                
56 This claim is building on the work of narrative theory in cognitive science (sometimes 
referred to as “cognitive narratology,” by Smith, for example) and narrative theology, in 
conjunction with the notions of social imaginaries and social practices that inform this 
chapter. As such, it is acknowledged that if Wolterstorff has already stretched the meaning of 
the term “script,” we are here stretching it even further by equating it with a presiding cultural 
narrative, or social imaginary. However, for the purposes of articulating the formative and 
expressive nature of a liturgical understanding of aesthetic existence, we will continue to use 
the term “script” since it highlights the communally (ekklesia in the fullest sense of the term) 
prescribed nature and significance of mature aesthetic existence. Smith, Imagining the 
Kingdom, 130ff. 
57 In the background of this chapter is the tension between liturgy as communal versus 
individual enactment. While Wolterstorff’s focus is on liturgy as communal enactment, he 
does not mean that each enactment is uniformly enacted by every individual; there is indeed 
space for individual roles in such communal enactment. Liturgy encapsulates the interplay 
between individual and communal identity. Wolterstorff describes this as “joint action.” The 
suggestion in this chapter is that we simply extend Wolterstorff’s articulation of joint action 
more broadly to individual Christians in the everyday, acting “jointly” in the world as the 
collective body of Christ, Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 63.  
For more on the individual enactment of liturgy, see Bruce E. Harbert, ‘Liturgies within the 
Liturgy’, in The Liturgical Subject: Subject, Subjectivity, and the Human Person in 
Contemporary Liturgical Discussion and Critique. (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University 
Press, 2008), 114–31. 
 181 
As such, gazing at the stars does have count as significance in accordance with a broader 
liturgical script. This broader script is informed both by explicit and implicit elements. 
Explicitly, for example, there is a biblical injunction connecting engagement with the beauty 
of creation and worship of the Creator (Psalm 8:3-5; 19:1, in relation to the stars, for instance, 
are obvious examples among many others). Further, a theological tradition may make an 
explicit doctrinal prescription (as in the Catholic Catechesis On Creation). Implicitly, through 
the social practices of a particular theological tradition or local church community, the 
importance of worshipping God through celebration of the beauty of creation may be 
affirmed. In such a case, the Christian person living within this script cannot help but worship 
God when encountering the starry sky. It is a moment of sensory immediacy, a moment of 
aesthetic existence informed by a larger liturgical script, offering count as significance to the 
moment. 
6.2.2.4 Liturgical Aesthetic Existence Vis-À-Vis Competing Cultural Liturgies 
However, as we have noted, this broader Christian liturgical script is not the only script at 
play in the everyday. In fact, we could say that it is not even the only broader “liturgical” 
script at play. Multiple “liturgical” scripts are operative in everyday life as informed by the 
largely implicit prescriptions of social practice. In this sense we can talk, as Smith does, of 
“cultural liturgies”; not all holistic orientation, or “worship” is directed at Christ, or even at a 
religious deity.58 As Smith notes, there are rival “kingdoms” vying for our desire and enacted 
worship.59 Each of these “kingdoms” is driven by a set of social practices which prescribes 
their respective operative liturgy.60  
Bonhoeffer’s call for a recovery of aesthetic existence in the life of the church, amidst the 
horrors and atrocities of Nazi Germany, is a counter-cultural, explicit naming of a liturgical 
script he had implicitly embraced up until that point. He is not here suggesting an aesthetic 
escapism from reality into a moment of sensory immediacy for itself. Rather, as informed by 
a broader Christological script, he suggests it is fitting to celebrate aesthetic existence as a 
                                                
58 See Smith’s “Cultural Liturgies” project, James K. A. Smith, Desiring the King; Imagining 
the Kingdom; Awaiting the King, Cultural Liturgies, v. 1-3 (Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker 
Academic, 2009; 2013; 2017). 
59 Smith, Desiring the Kingdom. 
60 Smith offers a vivid description of the “temple” of the contemporary shopping mall along 
with the “worship” of iconography (brands), and communal enactments that a “pilgrimage” to 
the mall entails. He notes that the same liturgical mode is operative in the modern sports 
stadium. The “script” here, while it can be explicitly deduced, as Smith shows, is largely 
operative on the level of implicit social practices. Smith, 17–27. 
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manifestation of faithful Christian living. While having music constantly playing at the 
Finkenwalde seminary may not be liturgical in Wolterstorff’s strict sense (it is not explicitly 
for direct engagement with God, and does not obviously have count as significance as 
operative within an overt and explicit liturgical script, such as an order of service), in the 
broader sense being argued for here, it is indeed a liturgical enactment. To use the broadened 
criteria we have drawn from Wolterstorff, there is no doubt that the Finkenwalde seminarians: 
1.) Oriented their lives holistically in focus on God (as grounded in the practice of 
institutional sacraments; belief manifest here as a life disposition, not a weak form of 
knowledge); 2.) Subscribed to a liturgical script which proclaimed all of their “life together” 
as worship to God; 3.) Consequently, the enjoyment of music functioned not only as a 
moment of rich aesthetic existence, but also counted as a worshipful celebration of 
incarnational living, in polyphonic harmony with their explicit affirmation of this truth.61  
Further, by considering this performative manifestation of mature aesthetic existence as a 
liturgical enactment (to continue the example of the Finkenwalde seminarians playing music), 
it points not only to the expressive nature of their everyday liturgy here (a polyphonic 
celebration of Christological this-worldliness), but to the formative nature of such everyday 
liturgy. This formative nature is easily underestimated due to its indirect and implicit 
operation. It does not lend itself to being measurable by means of rational abstraction, as it is 
non-linear, organic and complex. However, as we have seen through the example of 
Bonhoeffer’s musical metaphors, the formation of his theological categories through his 
musical experience is an insightful example of the formative impact of aesthetic existence as 
everyday liturgy.  
Thus far in this project, we have noted that in order to understand why everyday aesthetic 
enactments such as these are formative, we need to reject the modern epistemological 
narrative, as expressed through the likes of Locke, in favour of models which acknowledge 
the impact of embodied and affective interaction with the world on human understanding. 
There is another modern narrative – the aesthetic narrative – that we now need to confront, 
                                                
61 An important point in this example is that the seminarians may not themselves have 
explicitly named their playing of music as “worship.” In Wolterstorff’s strict understanding of 
liturgy, this disqualifies the act from being categorized as liturgical enactment. However, at 
the heart of this chapter (and this project as a whole) is the suggestion that the implicit and 
indirect are not dissociated from the explicit and direct. Implicitly, Bonhoeffer and the 
seminarians embraced the playing of music as congruent with their holistic “liturgical” project 
of “life together,” thereby affirming a sense of polyphonic resonance.  
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through the work of Wolterstorff, in order to appreciate that aesthetic existence as everyday 
liturgy is fundamentally connected to action in the world.  
6.3 Aesthetic Engagement as Practice 
Wolterstorff has helped us to articulate mature aesthetic existence as liturgical: as anchored in 
life oriented by focus on God, thereby conforming to a broad liturgical script wherein 
aesthetic existence is not for its own sake, but for the significance it carries beyond the 
aesthetic act itself as polyphonic worship of the Creator. But according to the modern 
narrative of aesthetics this is a contradiction in terms. Art exists for its own sake, not for 
significance and responsibility beyond itself.  
6.3.1 Severing Aesthetics from Action: Modern disinterested contemplation 
Wolterstorff names this the “grand narrative of art” – the pinnacle of the aesthetic in modern 
life being disinterested contemplation, as manifest in the rise of art institutions, such as 
museums and galleries.62 On the same continuum, everyday aesthetic enjoyment is for itself. 
As Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Climacus observed regarding an outing to Deer Park, according 
to this narrative, aesthetic frivolity is distinct from ethical life. Such aesthetic experience is 
peripheral to the serious business of life. The narrative separates aesthetics from action, 
poiesis from praxis. Consequently, aesthetic engagement is distinct from ethics. Wolterstorff 
challenges this narrative by suggesting that aesthetic engagement is best understood as 
action.63 Artistic creation and presentation are best seen as social practice.64 
Wolterstorff suggests that while aestheticians and philosophers no longer support the veracity 
of this modern, grand narrative on art, it continues to influence our thinking in contemporary 
life, as is evident in our everyday engagement with aesthetics and the privileged place of high 
art.65 The narrative emerged due to the rise of “a middle class with considerable leisure time 
… [alongside] a secular civil society” and rests on two theses.66 The first is the progressivist 
idea that in this modern conception of disinterested contemplation, as the pinnacle of aesthetic 
                                                
62 Wolterstorff, Art Rethought, 5–82. 
63 This is comprehensively argued in Nicholas Wolterstorff, Art in Action: Toward a 
Christian Aesthetic (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980). 
64 While Wolterstorff’s focus is on art rather than aesthetics more broadly, the suggestion here 
is that the principles from his focus on the subset of art apply to the broader category of 
aesthetics as here discussed.   
65 Wolterstorff, Art Rethought, ix–x; 1–16. 
66 Wolterstorff, 7. 
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engagement, art had finally come into its own; it had reached its ultimate telos.67 The second 
is that the arts offered an escape from the “causal instrumental rationality” that dominated 
modern life, “The arts are liberated from service to extraneous values and freed to come into 
their own,” as such they are “socially other and transcendent.”68 Hence, as we have seen with 
Kierkegaard’s interaction with Romanticism and Bonhoeffer’s response to Nietzsche, the 
aesthetic was seen as a means to escape the fragmentary everyday and recover the ideal 
whole.69 Consequently, the highest form of the aesthetic, as socially other and transcendent, is 
venerated, seen as distinct from the finitude and utility of everyday action, cementing a 
distinction between true art and that which is merely craft.70  
Wolterstorff rejects both theses as untenable. On the former – that the aesthetic has reached its 
telos in disinterested contemplation – he argues that this is not only impossible to prove, but it 
is highly dubious when one considers the state of modern art. Fundamentally too, it is 
fallacious on the basis that reaching a telos requires stasis, which is clearly not the case as 
seen over the last 300 years, where notions and expressions of “art” continue to evolve.71 But 
it is specifically Wolterstorff’s response to the second thesis – that at its pinnacle, the 
aesthetic is socially other and transcendent – which is of interest to us here, since he suggests 
that rather than “socially other and transcendent,” art (and by implication, the aesthetic more 
broadly) is always socially embedded in practices.  
Wolterstorff shows that the argument for the socially other and transcendent nature of art rests 
on the fallacy that art is clearly and distinctly concerned with “internal finality in place of 
external causal finality; unity in place of fragmentation.”72 Internal finality is here understood 
                                                
67 Strictly, Wolterstorff identifies three theses, not two, underlying this narrative, but for our 
purposes it is sufficient to conflate his first two theses into one. Wolterstorff, 27. 
68 Wolterstorff, 32. 
69 Max Weber insightfully points out why this narrative causes friction between faith and 
modern aesthetics, why Kierkegaard, for example, felt impelled to critique immature aesthetic 
existence in this sense. “For [in this modern narrative], art becomes a cosmos of more and 
more consciously grasped independent values which exist in their own right. Art takes over 
the function of a this-worldly salvation, no matter how this may be interpreted. It provides a 
salvation from the routines of everyday life, and especially from the increasing pressures of 
theoretical and practical rationalism. With this claim to a redemptory function, art begins to 
compete directly with salvation religion.” Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology, ed. Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 
342. 
70 Wolterstorff, Art Rethought, 17. 
71 Wolterstorff, 70–73. 
72 Wolterstorff, 76. Although Wolterstorff is drawing from a range of aestheticians, he 
engages the account of internal finality particularly as articulated by Philipp Moritz (a friend 
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as the sole internal concern for “unity of the parts with parts and parts with the whole,” rather 
than concern for any external causation.73 Wolterstorff bases his rejection of the binary basis 
of this thesis on three points: Firstly, even works of fine art are created for both disinterested 
attention and causal effect (remuneration, appreciation, etc.). While such causal effects may 
in some cases not be immediately apparent, they inevitably exist on closer inspection. 
Secondly, a work can be socially other and transcendent even though it is not made for 
disinterested contemplation (Orthodox icons, for example). Thirdly, the distinction between 
external and internal finality is blurred even in the process of artistic creation. Every artistic 
action, every compositional technique contains an element of means-end rationality. Applying 
paint so that it is seen to be a tree, for instance, is a process necessarily driven by external 
causation.74 “To eliminate all ‘servitude’ from the artist’s compositional choices, all means-
end rationality, one’s work has to be purely abstract.”75 
6.3.2 Uniting Aesthetics and Action as Social Practice 
By rejecting this grand narrative of art, Wolterstorff is suggesting that rather than understand 
the aesthetic as socially other, thereby disconnecting it from action, it is, by contrast, more 
accurate to acknowledge that it is fundamentally grounded in social practice. Wolterstorff is 
not alone in this assessment, “In recent years … [writers about the arts] have brought to light 
the many ways in which art is enmeshed in the social dynamics of our societies rather than 
transcending those dynamics.”76 Wolterstorff articulates this social embeddedness through the 
                                                                                                                                                   
of Goethe), which he suggests is representative of the larger perception that art has “intrinsic 
and not just instrumental worth,” this intrinsic worth being “socially transcendent, even god-
like.” Wolterstorff, 35. 
73 Wolterstorff, Art Rethought, 80. 
74 Wolterstorff, 73–82. 
75 Wolterstorff, 79. 
76 Wolterstorff, 84. Lagging behind, the field of theological aesthetics remains dominated by 
the “transcendent and socially other” value of the aesthetic in faith life. Unfortunately, 
Wolterstorff’s frustration that theological sub-disciplines tend simply to follow philosophical 
trends seems to be realised in this case. Wolterstorff notes that, “it’s because they accept the 
narrative without question that [Clive] Bell, [Gerardus] Vander Leeuw, [Paul] Tillich, and 
their cohorts focus exclusively on the contemplative mode of engagement with art in their 
discussion of art and religion …” The intention of this project is to contribute to 
understanding the faith implications of the aesthetic as socially embedded. Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, ‘The Religious Dimension’, in The Blackwell Guide to Aesthetics, ed. Peter 
Kivy (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), 334. Wolterstorff, Hearing the Call, 432. 
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lens of social practices.77 He suggests that if we pay close attention to the inherent connection 
between aesthetics and human action, we will see that we engage the aesthetic in different 
ways. By “ways” he means act-types or sequences of act-types (just as with liturgy above).78 
There are “ways” of violin-playing, to use the same example again. As we have seen, these 
“ways” are informed by shared societal practices. Violin-playing is both the product of, and 
for that particular social practice. Because of this shared practice, violin-playing has social-
practice meaning.79 If one were to play the violin in a way discordant with its social practice, 
it would be meaningless, if not cacophonous, to the hearers.80 Social practices not only inform 
the making and presenting or performing of art, but also engagement with such works.81 For 
instance, composing, performing and appreciating classical music as presented in an opera 
house requires familiarity with the respective social practices involved.  
However, this does not mean that the social practices of art, as disinterested contemplation (or 
absorbed attention, in Wolterstorff’s phrasing), have a monopoly on “ways” of engaging the 
aesthetic more broadly, or even the arts, more narrowly. Wolterstorff highlights a few of the 
many other social practices which inform aesthetic making, presenting and engaging, such as 
memorial art (a manifestation being the mural art of Belfast), art for veneration (Orthodox 
icons), protest art (Uncle Tom’s Cabin), etc.82 We will turn to one of these examples, work 
songs, shortly. The point here is that the vast majority of our everyday aesthetic engagement 
in the world is governed by a constellation of social practices, and the social-practice 
meanings that accompany them. Further, that while such aesthetic engagements may well 
(and indeed do) offer experiences of transcendence at times, this is not the function of them 
being socially other, disconnected from action in the world, or even being disconnected from 
means-end rationality for that matter. In resonance with the incarnational understanding of 
being Christian we have outlined thus far, transcendence and action in the world are not 
mutually exclusive. To the contrary, the formative potency of aesthetic practice is 
underscored by acknowledging that aesthetic engagement, as everyday action, has the ability 
to offer experiences of transcendence. 
                                                
77 Wolterstorff is not the first to acknowledge this link. Both Julius Moravcsik and Noël 
Carroll have written about approaching the arts as social practices. Wolterstorff, Art 
Rethought, 85. 
78 Wolterstorff, 86. 
79 Wolterstorff, 112–13. 
80 Wolterstorff, 87. 
81 Wolterstorff, 96–97. 
82 Wolterstorff, 123–303. 
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6.4 Aesthetic Practices Sustain a Vision of the Good Life 
6.4.1 Aesthetic Engagement Towards a Telos 
Understanding aesthetic engagement through the lens of social practice highlights that all 
aesthetic engagement contains means-end rationality. This statement is only problematic if we 
equate means-end rationality with “causal instrumental rationality.” However, while many 
aesthetic practices are not engaged in this latter sense – “to cause some event” – they have a 
more implicit sense of means-end rationality in the form of counting as.83 Thus, on the one 
hand, there are clearly certain actions that carry more explicit means-end rationality, enacted 
for causal instrumental rationality. We describe such actions as utilitarian. However, on the 
other hand, the suggestion here is that rather than locating the aesthetic in a separate and 
distinct set (that of “transcendent and socially other”) entirely disconnected from utility, 
approaching aesthetic enactment through the lens of social practice highlights the pervasive 
implicit sense of means-end rationality. Social practices have a telos and the count as 
significance implicit in aesthetic action is ordered by the presiding telos. Even though much 
aesthetic enactment is not considered overtly for utility – it is considered for itself – on closer 
inspection it becomes apparent that such enactment nevertheless plays a role in affirming an 
orientation to a certain telos. Acts of aesthetic existence, such as walking on the beach, 
playing football or listening to music, may explicitly be labelled by the participant as being 
for the moment, expressions of pure non-utilitarian sensory immediacy. However, such 
actions perform a role in a larger life-narrative. Walking on the beach may be predominantly 
simply for itself, for the pure pleasure of it, but even here it can also count as a liturgical 
celebration of incarnational existence. There may be other narratives at play too. It may count 
as exercise, even if not performed for exercise. Listening to music may be simply seen as an 
experience of sensory immediacy, but even as such, it can potentially count as a polyphonic 
embrace of created goodness. Or, in relation to other ordering life-narratives at play, it may 
also count as rest, for example.  
To put it differently and return to our earlier discussion on scripts, multiple life-narratives, or 
“scripts,” are operative, whether implicit or explicit, with multiple teloi, including the ultimate 
telos of the good life (however construed), which order the count as significance of aesthetic 
practices therein. Or, as Smith describes it in Augustinian terms, what one worships is 
betrayed by the “liturgies” of one’s everyday practices, disclosing how one’s desires are 
                                                
83 Wolterstorff, 78. 
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ordered in orientation toward respective “kingdoms.”84 Just as liturgical enactment on a 
Sunday, strictly understood, orients one toward the kingdom of God, so cultural liturgies, 
such as the deeply aesthetic practice of a consumer’s outing to the mall, may orient one 
toward a different “kingdom.” The key point to note here is that since the count as 
significance of aesthetic practices is often implicit, it is possible to participate in, and thereby 
subscribe to a particular “liturgical” script, and its accompanying social-practice meaning, 
without being fully cognisant of this subscription.  
6.4.2 Mature Aesthetic Existence as Fitting Shalom 
Mature aesthetic existence requires an embrace of a broad liturgical script which guides all of 
life’s actions as aesthetic-ethico-religious practices. This is not to say that such action is 
always permeated with conscious and explicit liturgical intention. Inevitably, by definition, 
this cannot be the case if we understand aesthetic enactment as being marked by sensory 
immediacy.85 Rather, aesthetico-ethico-religious practices are recognised as liturgically 
oriented by their fittingness to the telos of shalom. Fittingness is usually understood to be an 
aesthetic category, but as we briefly explored earlier, if we are to take the relationship of 
embodiment to meaning seriously, then fittingness has not only aesthetic, but ethical and 
religious implications too. At the end of the last chapter we noted through Ward’s work that 
embodied attunement or fittingness is an entryway into a deeper actualisation of ethical life. 
This is so because it offers a holistic perception of Christological reality; thus Ward’s 
assertion that “attunement is both the source and goal of discipleship.”86  
If mature aesthetic existence is liturgically oriented, so discerned by the fittingness of 
aesthetico-ethico-religious practices to the telos of shalom, then it is important to clarify our 
definition of shalom, and consequently the significance of fittingness for not only aesthetics 
but ethics. Wolterstorff’s articulation of shalom is holistically relational: 
Shalom is flourishing in all one’s relationships: to God, one’s fellow [human beings], 
to oneself, to the natural world, to society and culture. It has both a normative 
                                                
84 Smith, Desiring the Kingdom. 
85 However, as should be apparent by now, a neat distinction between immediacy and 
reflective intentionality only exists in theoretical abstraction. Immediacy and explicit 
intentionality have a complex, multi-directional relationship, as Ward shows, thereby 
challenging a rigid binary between a Kierkegaardian first and second immediacy. 
86 Ward, ‘A Question of Sport and Incarnational Theology’, 63. 
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component, being rightly related, and an affective component, finding joy in being so 
related.87  
It is clear that orienting one’s life by such a relational and affective understanding of shalom 
demands not only abstract left-hemisphere attention, but the embodied and affective 
“betweenness” contributed by right-hemisphere attention. Note that Wolterstorff is not 
suggesting that there are two types of shalom: normative, or ethical shalom, and affective, or 
aesthetic shalom. Rather these two components, this dual understanding of the good life, of 
the “kalos” life, cohere in this aesthetico-ethico-religious understanding of shalom. The 
embodied and affective nature of shalom demands a measure such as fittingness to adequately 
discern appropriate action.   
The strength of fittingness as a means of discernment is its integration of embodiment, affect 
and reason in everyday evaluation. While Wolterstorff has articulated a detailed theory of 
fittingness, our concern here is largely limited to its application in the everyday.88 For 
instance, a jagged line fits better with restlessness and a smooth line fits better with 
tranquillity.89 Light fits better with “ping,” and heavy fits better with “pong.”90 In a sense, we 
could describe fittingness as “expanded synaesthesia” which is common to all.91 Technically, 
we can define it as “cross-modal similarity.”92 It is the human ability to intuitively associate 
one modality with another, drawing from the fullness of the right → left → right-hemisphere-
attention progression. As such, it is the same faculty that allows us to understand metaphor, 
the association of one modality with another.93 “Metaphors are often (if not always) renditions 
of perceived fittingness.”94 Here we should recall our discussion on the analogical 
participation of everyday action in Christological reality. Hence, the human ability to discern 
                                                
87 Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Human Flourishing and Art That Enhances the Ordinary’, in 
Envisioning the Good Life: Essays on God, Christ, and Human Flourishing in Honor of 
Miroslav Volf, ed. Matthew Croasmun, Zoran Grozdanov, and Ryan McAnnally-Linz 
(Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2017), 164.  
Elsewhere, Wolterstorff emphasises this affective component in resonance with an 
Augustinian “enjoyment” of God, “Shalom at its highest is enjoyment in one’s relationships 
… To dwell in shalom is to enjoy living before God, to enjoy living in one’s physical 
surroundings, to enjoy living with one’s fellows, to enjoy life with oneself.” Wolterstorff, 
Hearing the Call, 110. 
88 Wolterstorff, Art in Action, 96–121. 
89 Wolterstorff, 97. 
90 Wolterstorff, 97. 
91 Wolterstorff, 101. 
92 Wolterstorff, 99. 
93 Wolterstorff, 102. 
94 Wolterstorff, 116. 
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fittingness is the same faculty that allows one to perceive an embodied action as having 
liturgical count as significance. There is a fittingness to such action. 
This is so due to the appropriateness or fittingness of particular actions to a presiding script or 
narrative. For instance, planting a tree serves as a fitting memorial to a student who has 
passed away, while vandalising the classroom wherein he learned is not a fitting memorial.95 
In liturgically orienting one’s life toward shalom certain actions may instrumentally further 
shalom, while others may count as affirming shalom – both will fit the script. Here, 
fittingness should be understood not only in an aesthetic sense, but as a measure of 
appropriate aesthetico-ethico-religious action.96 In other words, fittingness is also a means of 
ethical discernment.97 An ethic informed by fittingness brings to the fore the strengths of 
right-hemisphere relational attention to the world.98 The implication is an enhancement of 
Wolterstorff’s ethic of care, including creation-care, founded in love.99  
However, to consider fittingness as an ethical versus aesthetic qualifier is to miss the point, 
for the significance of fittingness is precisely in pointing to the integration of mature aesthetic 
                                                
95 Wolterstorff, Art Rethought, 139. 
96 An example of such an approach would be appropriating Geoffrey Cupit’s argument for 
understanding justice through the lens of fittingness, in conjunction with the concept shalom. 
“An unjust act is an unfitting act; it is an act which fails to accord with the status of the person 
treated.” Geoffrey Cupit, Justice As Fittingness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 2. 
97 Much has been written on approaching ethics through fittingness, a conversation revived in 
recent years. The contemporary philosophical dialogue on “fitting attitude theories of value” 
is one such example. See for instance (as part of an ongoing dialogue in Ethics), Conor 
McHugh and Jonathan Way, ‘Fittingness First’, Ethics 126, no. 3 (18 March 2016): 575–606. 
For an overview of the state of the debate, see Christopher Howard, ‘Fittingness’, Philosophy 
Compass Early View: Online Version of Record before inclusion in an issue (29 July 2018): 
e12542, https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12542. From a theological perspective, H. Richard 
Niebuhr, and then James Gustafson building on Niebuhr, provide a foundation for ethics seen 
as appropriate or fitting human action. See, James M. Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric 
Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).  See also, R. Melvin Keiser, Roots 
of Relational Ethics: Responsibility in Origin and Maturity in H. Richard Niebuhr (Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1996). 
98 Fittingness is fundamentally about relational sensitivity, with ethical implications on 
multiple fronts. In the words of the Niebuhr scholar, Charles S. McCoy, “In one sense 
fittingness underscores the importance of particularity – responding to particular persons, 
situations and issues. In a larger sense, fittingness requires taking account of the 
encompassing context of the social and natural environment, so that what is done fits with 
everything else that is happening and avoids causing more problems than it solves.” As 
quoted in Dieter T. Hessel, ‘“Now That Animals Can Be Genetically Engineered: 
Biotechnology in Theological-Ethical Perspective”’, in Ecotheology: Voices from South and 
North, ed. David G. Hallman (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2009), 288. 
99 Which Wolterstorff articulates as “care-agapism,” see Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice in 
Love (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015). 
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existence and ethical action in a life oriented toward shalom. Kevin Vanhoozer rightly argues 
for the integrative nature of fittingness as discernment by associating it with wisdom. 
Wisdom – the virtue that orders all other virtues – is intrinsically linked to the 
imagination, and to beauty, via the theme of fittingness. The wise person perceives 
and participates fittingly in the ordered beauty of creation. Wisdom thus integrates the 
true, the good, and the beautiful … Right perception, the capacity to discern, is 
therefore the connecting link between aesthetics and ethics.100 
In other words, “the wise person perceives and participates fittingly” in shalom. Such 
participation, such action, cannot be merely described as “ethical.” While it is “right” action 
and there is a normativity to such action, it is also affective, as Wolterstorff pointed out in his 
definition of shalom. Vanhoozer affirms here that the affective sense of shalom as the good 
life is not the giddy heights and agonizing lows of Romantic or Nietzschean aestheticizing 
self-creation, but the joy of co-poeticising with Christ in the Kierkegaardian sense of poetic 
living.101 “Joy is the perception of, and the participation in, a larger ‘fittingness’ that satisfies 
our longing for ultimate meaning. Joy is not a passing feeling so much as a perduring mood or 
orientation to the whole of life. Christian joy is being-toward-resurrection.”102 
To recap: Fitting aesthetic action participates in the liturgical script of shalom. It is a 
performative act which is both formative and expressive. On the one hand, it is expressive of 
shalom as a function of right-relationship, of being-in-Christ, of being-for-others. Such an 
incarnational understanding of being human orients play, friendship, art and all manner of 
everyday aesthetic existence as liturgical celebration. At the same time, and on the other hand, 
it is formative for shalom. Participation in such practice not only shapes the individual 
imagination, but if enacted collectively, the social imaginary. The count as significance of 
such action consciously and unconsciously underscores the script and its telos. In other words, 
if one were to ask, with Wolterstorff, from a performative perspective, what is happening in 
everyday aesthetic action as liturgy, what does it do? We could answer with him, simply, it 
enhances. Liturgy “serves our life in the world” by directing and nourishing it.103 Mature 
aesthetic existence, manifest as liturgical action, polyphonically enhances everyday 
experience of shalom. To elucidate this summation, and by way of conclusion, we can turn 
once again to the example of music as aesthetic existence. 
                                                
100 Vanhoozer, ‘Praising in Song: Beauty and the Arts’, 115. 
101 Vanhoozer, 121–22. 
102 Vanhoozer, 118. 
103 Wolterstorff, Hearing the Call, 23. 
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6.5 Spotlight on Music: Sung work as enhancement towards shalom 
Wolterstorff’s analysis of the social practice of work songs not only provides a case study of 
aesthetic engagement understood as action, but clarifies how everyday aesthetic action 
enhances through a liturgical orientation toward shalom. Work songs are typically understood 
to be songs that are sung to accompany work. However, such a fragmented perspective stems 
from a separation of aesthetics from action, poiesis from praxis. Wolterstorff argues that 
rather than two distinct entities – songs and work – it is more accurate to speak of the single 
entity of sung work, “the singing and the working ‘coinhere’ – to borrow a term from 
theology of the trinity.”104 The singing is not merely an insignificant accompaniment to the 
work, it modifies the work; it changes its nature.105 Drawing from an interview with a 
prisoner engaging in sung work, Wolterstorff highlights the sentiment that “singing makes the 
work ‘go so better.’”106 In other words, work songs enhance one’s experience of work. The 
question is why; why does sung work “go so better”? 
It is fundamentally because manifestations of sung work can function as “signs” of shalom, 
“samples of shalom that [point] to a shalom beyond themselves.”107 Prisoners attest to singing 
while working to “uplift themselves … as a manifestation of the ‘will of the human spirit.’”108 
Conversely, prison overseers may disallow singing in order to crush workers’ spirit.109 Even 
in the face of denigrating labour, “by singing, the worker manifests an indomitable sense of 
his or her ineradicable dignity.”110 Pragmatically, sung work may “go so better” because it 
sustains working rhythm, or energises, or cultivates solidarity, etc.111 However, these utilities 
only partially explain how singing enhances work. “Singing enhances not only the work itself 
but the workers’ experience of the work. The creative excess of the singing blurs the 
distinction between work and play by introducing a dimension of play into the work; this 
enhances their experience of the work.”112 In other words, the introduction of play, an 
expression of aesthetic existence, modifies the work, allowing it to count as an expression of 
human flourishing.  
                                                
104 Wolterstorff, Art Rethought, 259. 
105 Wolterstorff, 270. 
106 Wolterstorff, 262. 
107 Wolterstorff, ‘Human Flourishing and Art That Enhances the Ordinary’, 169. 
108 Wolterstorff, Art Rethought, 259. 
109 Wolterstorff, 259. 
110 Wolterstorff, 259. 
111 Wolterstorff, ‘Human Flourishing and Art That Enhances the Ordinary’, 169. 
112 Wolterstorff, 169. 
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Drawing from music historian, Ted Gioia, and his research on work songs, Wolterstorff 
suggests that workers experience the creativity of singing while working as an intrinsic good. 
The workers sing “for the joy of creating sung work.”113 Sung work then, as the fusion of 
poiesis and praxis, functions as a sign of shalom. Or, to put it in the language we have used 
thus far, sung work may implicitly count as an affirmation of shalom, flourishing in the joy of 
being human.114  
However, it does not follow that singing while working automatically validates any labour as 
harmonious with human flourishing. Here we need to return to fittingness as a means of 
holistic discernment. Wolterstorff points out that certain songs fit certain work due to rhythm, 
tempo and “expressive character.”115 To use the wrong song would not enhance the work but 
make it more challenging. To use a musical metaphor, there needs to be harmony between the 
work and the song. It needs to fit. We can take this further; for sung work to be fully 
expressive of flourishing, it needs to fit a liturgical life-script of shalom. Such fittingness is 
neither merely aesthetic, nor ethical, but a measure of goodness in which both cohere.116 
Mature aesthetic existence, as liturgically integrated with both ethical and religious life, thus 
“contributes to flourishing by enhancing our ordinary activities.”117 With Wolterstorff, we can 
therefore conclude by asking, “Might it be that, in general, human flourishing is best 
advanced by enhancing the ordinary rather than by trying to deny it or in some way to 
transcend it?”118 Mature aesthetic existence as discipleship, embraces the immediacy of the 
ordinary, orienting such action toward God in a liturgical disposition, thereby counting as 
worship, which not only celebrates being Christian, but formatively orients becoming 
Christian.
                                                
113 Wolterstorff, Art Rethought, 265. 
114 The objection may be raised that action is here obviously connected to aesthetics simply 
due to the example chosen, work (action) + songs (aesthetics) = sung work. However, the 
example merely serves to neatly portray Wolterstorff’s point that all aesthetic engagement is 
action. We could also consider Wolterstorff’s articulation of hymns as sung work, or “sung 
praise,” the singing of the action of praise making it “go so better.” Or even the exercise of 
absorbed attention for listening to classical music will “go so better” when fitting shalom, the 
relational flourishing of kalos in its fullest sense, incorporating faith, aesthetics and ethics. 
Wolterstorff, ‘Human Flourishing and Art That Enhances the Ordinary’, 174ff. 
115 Wolterstorff, Art Rethought, 261. 
116 This is the necessary consequence of integrating Christian worship and everyday life, as 
Vanhoozer notes, “To worship well is to live well, and vice versa. Aesthetics and ethics alike 
cultivate sensibilities that enable one to make judgements concerning fittingness.” Vanhoozer, 
‘Praising in Song: Beauty and the Arts’, 118. 
117 Wolterstorff, ‘Human Flourishing and Art That Enhances the Ordinary’, 179.  
118 Wolterstorff, 179. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
7.1 Summation of Findings 
The aim of this project has been to provide a theological foundation for the practice of 
discipleship, as life in the world, through the lens of aesthetic existence. As such it serves as 
something of a theological prolegomenon to practical theology. The research objective 
determined at the outset was to explore whether aesthetic existence is fundamental to being 
human, and therefore to being Christian, bodily engaged in the life of the world. An 
affirmation of this fundamental role has implications for both discipleship (the life of faith) 
and the way this is lived out in the world (ethics). This concluding chapter will offer a 
summation of the key findings, before turning to the implications, highlighting areas for 
further research and the potential trajectories such a practical theology could take. 
Initially, Kierkegaard helped us to articulate the nature of aesthetic existence as sensory 
immediacy. Immediately, a trajectory emerged that was followed throughout the project and 
lies at the core of the ultimate findings: There are two modes of aesthetic existence in relation 
to discipleship, one leading to Christian formation, the other to self-created “formation,” or 
the creation of virtuality. In Kierkegaard’s terminology, he described the former through the 
concept of “poetic living” and the latter as the life stage of aesthetic existence. The life stage, 
or sphere of aesthetic existence is a mode of aesthetic existence wherein the aesthetic 
becomes absolute. In other words, it is an expression of aestheticism. By contrast, 
Kierkegaard suggests that the Christian attitude toward, or mode of aesthetic existence, rejects 
sensory immediacy as absolute and the Romantic self-creation associated with it. Rather than 
poeticising one’s own life, one co-poeticises with Christ in a mode of poetic living as 
discipleship. It is this mode which we then termed mature aesthetic existence for the 
remainder of the project.1  
Kierkegaard’s focus is on the immature mode of aesthetic existence, highlighting the 
deformative danger of such existence, particularly when coupled with Christendom, thereby 
                                                
1 Stemming from Bonhoeffer’s discussion of “mature worldliness,” as summarised by de 
Gruchy, “‘Mature worldliness’ is a way of being Christian in the world that is fully human, 
truly of the earth; one that involves not only living responsibly in the world but also living 
what Bonhoeffer described as a genuinely “aesthetic existence” of creativity, playfulness, 
freedom and friendship, something that he felt should characterize the life of the church.” 
John de Gruchy, A Theological Odyssey: My Life in Writing (Stellenbosch: Sun Media, 2014), 
60. 
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creating a comfortable and apathetic virtuality, disconnected from being a “witness” to the 
reality of Christ. His prophetic critique is arguably more relevant than ever. Not only do we 
face manifestations of Christendom today in dissonance with costly discipled living, but the 
post-modern tendency toward self-creation, further enabled by the “aestheticization of 
everyday life” and ubiquitous sensory technology supporting such self-creation provides 
fertile ground for the proliferation of virtual realities, both individually and collectively.2 
Consequently, a pivotal question for this project is how one distinguishes between these two 
modes of aesthetic existence. Kierkegaard gives comparatively little attention to the mode of 
mature aesthetic existence, since the rhetorical urgency of his “attack on Christendom” 
dominates his work. However, he does point to the centrality of the imagination in 
discipleship and the notion that a “second immediacy” or “immediacy after reflection” may 
be vital to the Christian life. For Kierkegaard, it appears then that reflection and consequent 
intention are the necessary precursor to mature aesthetic existence as an aspect of 
discipleship. We shall return to this point shortly.  
Kierkegaard’s limited and qualified endorsement of aesthetic existence stands in vivid 
contrast to Bonhoeffer’s enthusiastic call for a recovery of aesthetic existence in the life of the 
church. His affirmation of this-worldly immediacy, as manifest in the freedom of art, play, 
friendship and Bildung, stems from his Christology and the importance of an incarnational 
approach to imitating Christ. Christological reality is not merely other-worldly. The 
penultimate celebration of aesthetic existence has value precisely due to the “worldliness” of 
Christian reality. In other words, while Kierkegaard’s focus is exposing the Romantic illusion 
of poeticising a life which unites the finite and infinite, Bonhoeffer shows that participation in 
finite reality, even in its fragmentary state, has meaning as it is unified in Christ. It is the 
cantus firmus of Christ, as one is anchored in love for God, which makes the fragments, the 
moments of aesthetic existence, cohere in polyphonic counterpoint.   
Bonhoeffer, then, continues the theme of distinguishing between two modes of aesthetic 
existence. In fact, for Bonhoeffer, there are different ways of seeing reality, and discipleship 
is precisely the ability to make the distinction, the ability to see reality in light of Christ. 
Bonhoeffer was all too aware of the consequences of the aesthetic gone awry, severed from 
ethics, amidst the rise of Nazi Germany and his own experience of distorted Christendom. 
                                                
2 Thiessen, Theological Aesthetics, 1. 
See Walsh’s observations regarding the applicability of Kierkegaard’s analysis to post-
modern life. Walsh, Living Poetically, 245. 
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Mature aesthetic existence is neither the untethered free play of the imagination, nor distinct 
from costly discipleship, but its polyphonic counterpoint. Herein lies the key to discerning 
mature aesthetic existence, “Where the cantus firmus is clear and distinct, a counterpoint can 
develop as mightily as it wants.”3 
Two core findings lie at the heart of this project, which can be traced throughout. The first we 
have just noted, that there are two modes of aesthetic existence in relation to discipleship: 
formative and deformative, and discerning the distinction is important. The second core 
finding is that mature aesthetic existence plays a dual role in being Christian. If Kierkegaard 
introduced us to the formative nature of mature aesthetic existence as co-poeticising with 
Christ, Bonhoeffer highlights its expressive nature, as a celebration of this-worldly, 
Christological reality in the penultimate. Yet, Bonhoeffer also points to the formative, not 
explicitly, but in an implicit sense, through the formative role his own experience of music 
played in his theological development. The contribution of musical metaphors to the 
formation of Bonhoeffer’s late theology points toward the role sensory immediacy can play, 
collaborating with the imagination, in the formation of paradigms, ways of seeing. To further 
explore this formative role, we turned to the work of McGilchrist and his neuropsychological 
research. 
McGilchrist showed that aesthetic existence is indeed fundamental to being human as an 
embodied, affective, often preconscious mode of attention that humans universally employ in 
relating to the world and making meaning. The classic notion that there are two ways of 
engaging the world – the Dionysian and Apollonian – is grounded in our very physiologies, 
having resonance with the two types of attention dominant in the lateralisation of brain 
function. However, and this is an important concluding point, it is not an either/or, both are 
vital. Along with McGilchrist, it is critical to be clear that although the significant role of 
aesthetic existence (or, for McGilchrist, right-hemisphere attention) in human consciousness 
needs to be highlighted, as is the task of this project, this does not in any way deny the 
indispensable role of abstract rationality and critical thinking (left-hemisphere attention) in 
being human and becoming Christian. One does not come at the expense of the other, but both 
should work together in a symbiotic relationship, feeding off, challenging and directing one 
another. The point, for both McGilchrist and this project, is simply that the tendency of 
modernity is to prioritise the latter at the expense of the former, which is not only an error, but 
leads to an illusory sense of reality. 
                                                
3 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 8:394. 
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It is illusory since it is precisely the embodied and affective immediacy of right-hemisphere 
attention that offers context and breadth, along with an implicit and intuitive sense of how the 
specifics of left-hemisphere abstraction fit in relationship to the whole. As we have seen, 
emerging fields such as embodied cognition, affective neuropsychology and everyday 
aesthetics testify to this necessary relationship. The reality is that it is impossible for human 
beings not to exist aesthetically. Sensory immediacy is the necessary consequence of 
embodiment, a fundamental aspect of daily human life. Illusory notions of reality are created 
when the primal role of such sensory immediacy is denied, which is exactly why the 
advertising industry’s ideal subjects are those who claim advertising has no effect on them, 
since they make choices solely on a “rational” basis. The aesthetic works largely on our 
formation through preconscious and implicit means, shaping our paradigmatic imagination, 
with the consequence that the significance of this influence can be disregarded if subject to 
ratiocentric hegemony. Immature aesthetic existence is dominated by the hyper-self-
consciousness of left-hemisphere attention, thereby simply offering pseudo-vital experiences 
of sensationalism which serve simulacra rather than breaking out of the self-contained “hall of 
mirrors” to encounter the Other. This is most apparent in the rise of sensory technologies to 
support such sensationalism, all while situating the subject at the centre of “reality” (as 
manifest in personal devices, digital gaming, virtual reality, even aspects of “social media,” 
etc.).4 But it is also present in the less obvious social constructions of a prosperity gospel, or 
distorted Christendom, for instance. This is immature aesthetic existence in service of an I-It 
approach to the world, rather than embracing the power of aesthetic existence as a means of 
everyday transcendence, serving an I-Thou interaction with relational reality. The latter is 
fundamental to understanding the essentially metaphorical nature of all abstraction and 
language, as it functions analogically, pointing towards ultimate Reality, as Ward showed. 
Ward elucidated the role of aesthetic existence in becoming Christian by challenging the 
boundaries between aesthetics, ethics and religion. Belief is not simply a religious category, 
but plays a role in everyday life. Modern epistemology ranks belief below rational certainty, 
as a weak form of knowledge. Both McGilchrist and Ward challenged this perspective, 
pointing to the dispositional nature of belief as a relational commitment of trust. Such an 
articulation of belief integrates it with action, McGilchrist describing it in terms of “acting as 
if,” in response to the way in which reality is imagined (seen as). But Ward showed that the 
                                                
4 Smith describes this as the “iPhone-ization of our world.” “The world as ‘available’ to me 
and at my disposal — to constitute the world as ‘at-hand’ for me, to be selected, scaled, 
scanned, tapped, and enjoyed.” Smith, Imagining the Kingdom, 143. 
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interaction between sensation, action and belief is even more integrated, primal and 
preconscious than this. It is impossible to distil these spheres of being human from one 
another. Rather, the propulsive nature of aesthetic existence, as it shapes the imagination, 
plays a significant role in seeing, acting and believing. Instead of a neat, linear progression 
(sensory experience → ratiocination → belief → action), Ward showed that anticipation and 
projection can precede conscious ratiocination, affecting one’s disposition toward the world at 
a preconscious level in a complex, multidirectional interaction between action, belief, 
ratiocination and sensory experience. Not only does aesthetic existence shape the imagination, 
but we live into these paradigms as embodied beings, our desires moulded by these “mythic 
sensibilities.” 
Aesthetic existence is indeed then a form of poiesis, as Kierkegaard introduced to us, but the 
way in which it is involved in “making sense” is not distinct from action in the world, or 
praxis. The end result of immature aesthetic existence is the making of simulacra and the 
celebration of self-referential sensationalism. By contrast, the poiesis of mature aesthetic 
existence is the creation not only of art, play, friendship, etc., but thereby, of a way of seeing 
the world, an embodied way of being in the world, which celebrates and analogically 
participates in Christological reality. Such existence is a relational commitment, a mode of 
discipleship, a Christological mimesis, which sacramentally participates in the divine through 
embodied reality, thereby integrating aesthetics, ethics and faith. 
The way of discerning such mature aesthetic existence is through the measure of fittingness to 
the liturgical “script” of shalom-making. Wolterstorff affirmed that aesthetic engagement is a 
form of action, refuting the modern “grand narrative of art,” which seeks to locate it within a 
separate sphere of disinterested contemplation, having no utilitarian purpose, but being for 
itself and thereby locating it as socially other, the pathway to transcendence. Rather, aesthetic 
engagement is embedded in social practices, carrying normative value toward a specific telos. 
Or, as James Smith described it, practices are oriented toward a specific “kingdom” or vision 
of the good life. While aesthetic engagement may not be explicitly utilitarian, it can contain 
means-end rationality in a number of ways, notably by carrying count as significance. Even 
sensory immediacy, being in the moment, can carry count as significance, through embodied 
and imaginative participation in a larger narrative toward a specific telos. These larger life-
narratives, informed by a social imaginary and embodied as social practices function as 
“scripts,” offering meaning to action. But drawing on all we discovered regarding the 
preconscious and implicit significance of aesthetic existence, the key point here is that such 
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sensory participation is not only expressive of a particular “script” but also formative for that 
“script.” To identify aesthetic existence as “harmless fun” is thus illusory. There is a 
reinforcing circularity about such participation, or a “discipleship,” oriented by the relevant 
telos. The question is then not whether one worships, but whom or what one worships. By 
understanding all Christian action in the world as liturgy, and consequently embracing a 
holistic orientation of a liturgical “script” for all of life, aesthetic existence functions as both 
expressive of being Christian in the world, and formative for becoming Christian. Within this 
“script” distinctions between sacred and secular are non-existent, the everyday and the 
ordinary are significant and enhanced through mature aesthetic existence as signs of shalom. 
7.2 Implications and Fruitful Trajectories for Practical Theology to Take 
7.2.1 The Feral Nature of Aesthetic Existence 
Aesthetic existence is not easily domesticated. This is precisely the nature of sensory 
immediacy; it “lies beneath” ratiocination, as Ward points out, engaging the imagination as 
“mythic sensibility.”5 We have explored at length the dynamic, propulsive nature of aesthetic 
existence, but again, it needs to be clear that the “mythic sensibility” it cultivates can lead to 
either wonder or horror.6 There are indeed “hidden pathologies” of the imagination, as Ward 
reminds us, and the expression of this can be horrific, as evidenced by Nazism.7 This is why a 
recovery of aesthetic existence cannot be a Nietzschean abandonment to the Dionysian, 
beyond good and evil, but rather needs to be the cultivation of mature aesthetic existence. 
However, herein lies the challenge, precisely because aesthetic existence “lies beneath.” This 
is why any discernment of mature aesthetic existence needs to be holistic, going beyond 
conscious ratiocination to the attunement, or fittingness discerned by one’s whole being, in 
polyphonic resonance to a broader life-narrative.  
Two points need to be made in regard to this feral nature of aesthetic existence. Firstly, a 
project such as this, relying solely on tools of rational analysis, can only intimate at abstract 
approximations as to its nature, always losing something of the essence of this aspect of being 
human by such reduction to propositional language. As a result, it should be clear that a 
project such as this cannot comprehensively articulate the nature and function of aesthetic 
existence in being human, even while it aims to offer a greater degree of understanding in this 
                                                
5 Ward, Unimaginable, 115. 
6 Ward, 156ff. 
7 Ward, 119. 
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regard. Neat encapsulations of aesthetic existence will always elude our grasp, for precisely 
the same reason that it remains valuable as a window to (everyday) transcendence, wonder 
and mystery. As noted earlier, however, while it is impossible to quantify the role of aesthetic 
existence in human formation with scientific certainty, this does not mean we cannot point to 
its fundamental significance; such has been the task of this project. 
Secondly, this slippery nature of aesthetic existence is precisely why the church has often 
been reluctant to embrace it. If it cannot be controlled, who knows where it will lead? A 
mature aesthetic existence cannot be programmatised, ordered or dictated solely by explicit 
means. In many senses it is easier then to simply reject it. But such a rejection comes at a high 
price as we have seen; this formative aspect of being human continues to operate, either for 
good or ill, even if not explicitly embraced. What might the solutions be? 
7.2.2 A Second Immediacy Revisited 
Possibly, a helpful starting point would be to return to Kierkegaard’s “second immediacy.” 
On the one hand, we need to reject a linear account of Kierkegaard’s notion of a second 
immediacy, or immediacy after reflection. The relationship between immediacy and explicit 
reflection is simply more complex than the sequential progression implied here. However, on 
the other hand, we should acknowledge the important role of reflection and intention in 
mature aesthetic existence. Sensory immediacy plays a role in discipleship precisely when it 
is integrated with reflection, intention and self-control, just as “playing” a musical instrument 
cannot be separated from disciplined practice. The crucial point here is the complex, multi-
directional, symbiotic relationship between these aspects of human existence. In this sense, 
we could say that all immediacy is a “second” immediacy. Being in the moment is always 
informed by paradigms already formed through amalgamation of previous sensory 
experience, reflection, intention, action, etc. In another sense, we could suggest that all 
immediacy is a “first” immediacy, being viscerally in the moment will always “lie beneath” 
conscious intention and reflection to some degree at least. Intention shapes immediacy and 
immediacy intention. Reflection, intention and volitional action therefore do have an 
important role to play, but due to the complexity of this relationship, the question is how to 
best engage these aspects of being human to cultivate mature aesthetic existence in the 
everyday? 
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7.2.3 An Ecclesial Embrace of Everyday Aesthetic Existence 
As noted at the beginning of chapter four, this feral nature, the “uncontrollable, even demonic, 
energies” associated with aesthetic existence has led to a suspicious response from the 
church.8 In many ways this is valid. As noted in this project, there is indeed a deformative 
component to aesthetic existence.9 It is therefore clear that the church should not simply offer 
an unqualified endorsement of aesthetic existence.  
However, the church also cannot afford to ignore the formative power of aesthetic existence. 
In other words, banishing it from the Christian life is not the solution, particularly amidst an 
aestheticized, technologically saturated society with a plethora of consumerist and political 
agendas calling for “worship.” Rather the church needs to cultivate ways of being attuned to a 
liturgical life toward shalom in the everyday. What does this look like? 
7.2.3.1 Cultivating a “Script”: Everyday liturgical practices for the 21st century 
A starting point is to acknowledge the power of aesthetic practice, intentionally nurturing and 
cultivating spaces for individual and communal everyday liturgical practices for the 21st 
century. In a post-modern society re-discovering the spiritual power of aesthetic engagement 
and embodiment,10 the church can offer both explicit and implicit affirmation of a “script” 
which embraces everyday aesthetic existence. The Christological nature of this-worldly 
reality, and consequently, the liturgical significance of the everyday should be didactically 
affirmed. In addition to this explicit affirmation, the church (as Christians in the life of the 
world) could be both endorsing and creating spaces which celebrate communal play, music, 
dance, hiking and feasting, etc., alongside practices of costly discipleship. Again, these two 
realms – explicit and implicit “scripting” – are ideally not separate and distinct; explicit and 
                                                
8 De Gruchy, Christianity, Art and Transformation, 16. 
9 The irony, however, is that church traditions most careful to avoid aesthetic existence are 
often precisely those exposed to its deformative nature. By excluding aesthetic existence from 
their portrayal of the Christian life, they simply abdicate any responsibility to this formative 
aspect of human existence, handing it over to the “cultural liturgies” of everyday life for a 
secular “discipleship.” 
10 For instance, apart from Horn’s popular work on the power of communal singing, see also 
Bronwyn Tarr’s recent research on “synchrony,” and the relational connectedness fostered by 
shared music and dance, for example, Jacques Launay, Bronwyn Tarr, and Robin Dunbar, 
‘Synchrony as an Adaptive Mechanism for Large-Scale Human Social Bonding’, Ethology 
122, no. 10 (2016): 779–789; Horn, Imperfect Harmony. 
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intentional reflection both feeding into and learning from the embodiment of liturgical, 
everyday aesthetic existence.11 
7.2.3.2 Attunement to the Moment in Relation to the Existential Whole 
Nevertheless, again, the nature of aesthetic existence means that such intentional affirmation 
will form only part of a Christian embrace. Moments present themselves unexpectedly in the 
everyday, amidst the apparently disjointed fragments of life. As Bonhoeffer pointed out, 
discipleship is the ability to see, to be attuned to these moments as the formative experiences 
that they are. The fragments can here function as lenses through which to perceive the 
polyphony in greater mysterious fullness. In this sense, there is resonance between 
Kierkegaard’s second immediacy and Paul Ricoeur’s second naïveté.12 Mature aesthetic 
existence requires first-hand experience of costly discipleship. It requires confrontation with 
the jarring fragmentation of a fallen world, not theoretically but existentially, to move beyond 
the critical to a second naïveté, or a second immediacy.13 Such an embrace of mature aesthetic 
existence can never be programmatised. However, an attunement is required, a sensitivity, 
both personally and pastorally (for others), to identify the fragments, the moments, leaning 
into them as a polyphonic living in counterpoint to the cantus firmus of love for Christ. A 
mature aesthetic existence is therefore integrated with an understanding and mindful practice 
of spiritual formation. 
7.2.4 A Liturgical Embrace Guided by Love 
Finally, any practical articulation of mature aesthetic existence will need to have love at its 
core (a theme which has been subtly present throughout our study). Kierkegaard oriented this 
project by noting that aesthetic existence is not an ethical category, in the sense that it is not a 
question of permissibility, but as Bonhoeffer added, a question of freedom. Further, we could 
conclude by saying that it is a relational question of formation (Bildung), of becoming, in 
relation to. This is why it is core to discipleship; it orients, and manifests an orientation of 
                                                
11 For an excellent example of this, see Tish Harrison Warren, Liturgy of the Ordinary: 
Sacred Practices in Everyday Life (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Books, 2016). 
12 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1986), 349ff. 
13 Bonhoeffer, Kierkegaard, de Gruchy and Wolterstorff’s lives all attest to the fundamental, 
existential shift which intimate pain and death brings, both Wolterstorff and de Gruchy losing 
sons, Wolterstorff describing his life as forever being “divided into before and after.” 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Lament for a Son (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 46. See also John 
de Gruchy, Led into Mystery: Faith Seeking Answers in Life and Death (London: SCM Press, 
2013). 
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one’s love. Here we can recall Kierkegaard’s description of a first immediacy as sensory-
erotic immediacy to be taken up within marriage, alongside Bonhoeffer’s suggestion that the 
passion of Song of Solomon can “develop as mightily as it wants” in counterpoint to the 
cantus firmus.14 Mature aesthetic existence therefore reflects the paradox of the gospel; it is 
kenotic while being pleromatic. It is being-for-others even through existential immersion in 
the sensory moment. It is not the rejection of earthly love, but an orientation of passion, desire 
and immediacy as liturgical “service of the other” in polyphonic resonance with God’s love 
for us. 
                                                
14 Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, 8:394. 
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